BEABfflB  « 


LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


Class 


THE 


SECOND  BATTLE 


OF 


BULL   RUN, 


AS    CONNECTED    WITH    THE 


FITZ-JOHN  PORTER  CASE. 


A  PAPER  READ   BEFORE  THE   SOCIETY  OF  EX-ARMY  AND  NAVY 
OFFICERS  OF  CINCINNATI,  FEBRUARY  28,  1882. 


BY 


JACOB  D.  COX, 

Maj.  Gen.  Commanding  23^  Army  Corps. 


CINCINNATI: 
PETER  G.  THOMSON, 

1882. 


C7 


Copyright,   1882, 

by 
PETER  G.  THOMSON. 


ELECTROTYPED   AT 

FRANKLIN    TYPE    FOUNDRY, 

CINCINNATI. 


PEEFAOE. 


In  the  following;  paper  my  aim  has  been  to  bring  together 
the  evidence  bearing  on  a  few  decisive  points.  Whoever 
settles  these  solidly  in  his  mind  will  find  a  trustworthy  clue 
to  the  intricacies  of  the  great  mass  of  testimony  in  the  three 
bulky  volumes  which  make  up  the  Congressional  documents 
relating  to  the  case.  To  comment  upon  all  the  varying  state 
ments  of  witnesses,  and  formally  weigh  all  the  discrepancies, 
would  itself  require  a  volume.  For  those  who  may  have  the 
leisure  for  it,  it  would  be  interesting;  but  the  judgment  will 
turn,  at  last,  upon  the  way  one  looks  at  the  few  central 
points.  The  question  is  whether  an  officer  did  his  duty  in  a 
given  situation.  To  answer  it,  we  have  to  know  what  his 
orders  were,  and  whether  he  obeyed  them.  If  he  did  not, 
we  have  to  inquire  what  means  he  took  to  discover  the  con 
dition  of  affairs  on  the  field,  and  what  zeal  and  energy  he 
showed  in  efforts  to  do  this  and  to  carry  out  his  instructions. 
His  conduct  must  be  judged  in  the  light  of  what  he  knew, 
and  the  spirit  he  showed. 

Facts  which  he  did  not  know,  and  took  no  proper  military 
means  to  discover,  can  not  favorably  affect  the  character  of 
his  conduct.  The  conclusion  reached,  however,  is  that  the 
more  of  the  facts  we  know,  the  worse  the  conduct  appears. 
It  Avill  be  better  for  the  dignity  of  the  country  that  a  former 
judgment  of  a  court  should  not  be  reversed  on  grounds  that 

will  not  bear  the  ultimate  test  of  historical  scrutiny.     To 

(iii) 

217195 


IV  PREFACE. 

help  form  a  right  judgment  now,  is  the  motive  for  consenting 
to  the  publication  of  a  paper,  the  preparation  of  which  is 
sufficiently  explained  in  its  opening  paragraphs. 

In  the  appendix  will  be  found  the  substance  of  most  of  the 
evidence  which  has  been  distinctly  referred  to  in  the  text, 
both  documentary  and  oral.  It  is  but  a  small  part  of  the 
whole,  but  it  will  enable  those  who  have  not  access  to  the 
complete  report,  to  see  the  character  and  logical  connection 
of  facts  which  must  be  wholly  ignored  or  overborne  before 
one  can  reach  the  conclusions  which  General  Porter  asks  us 
to  accept. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


I.   Introductory       . 1 

II.  March  from  Warrenton  Junction   ...  8 

III.  Discrepancies  in  Testimony      ....  14 

IV.  Time  of  Longstreet's  arrival    ....  16 
V.  Schenck's  and  Reynolds'  movements      .         .  20 

VI.  Errors  in  Recollection       .....  28 

VII.  Longstreet's  position  on  the  field            .         .  30 

VIII.  Map  of  the  Battlefield      .         .         .         .         .  31 

IX.  Porter's  conduct 50 

X.  The  Half-past-four  order 62 

XI.  Porter's  dispatches 64 

XII.  Appendix 

1.  Porter's  letters  to  Burnside      .                  .  73 

2.  Pope's  orders  to  Porter    ....  76 

3.  Porter's  dispatches  to  McDowell      .         .  79 

4.  Dispatches  of  other  officers      .     •    .         .  81 

5.  Official  reports,  National  officers,     .         .  85 

6.  Official  reports,  Confederate  officers         .  86 

7.  Oral  testimony 93 

8.  General  Garfield's  opinion  in  1880  .         .  119 
XIII.  Index  121 


(S\ 


THE 

SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


GENTLEMEN  OF  THE  SOCIETY.  —  Although  my 
judgment  concerning  the  case  of  General  Fitz- 
John  Porter  was  sharply  defined,  and  my  belief  was 
strong  that  the  so-called  newly  discovered  evidence 
in  itself  tended  rather  to  confirm  the  judgment  of 
the  Court-martial  which  condemned  him,  than  to 
make  any  good  ground  for  the  reversal  of  the  sen 
tence  and  the  bestowal  of  honors  and  emoluments, 
which  was  recommended  by  the  recent  Board  of 
Investigation,  I  still  was  unwilling  to  take  part  in 
the  public  discussion  of  the  matter.  My  reasons 
were  chiefly  personal  ones,  based  on  old  friendships 
and  associations,  and  would  have  controlled  me  but 
for  the  circumstances  which  made  public  my  letter 
on  the  subject  to  General  Garfield,  without  my  con 
sent. 

The  letter  was  written  in  February,  1880,  when 
General  Garfield  had  no  expectation  of  being  made 


2  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

a  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  but  was  preparing 
himself  to  defend,  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
the  judgment  of  the  Court-martial  of  which  he  was 
a  member.  Not  long  afterward  he  had  casually 
allowed  a  common  acquaintance  of  himself  and  Gen 
eral  Porter  to  read  the  letter,  and  Porter  thus  be 
came  acquainted  with  an  outline  of  its  contents. 
On  the  24th  of  May,  of  the  same  year,  General 
Porter  wrote  to  me,  telling  me  of  his  partial  knowl 
edge  of  the  letter,  and  asking  for  a  copy  of  it,  that 
he  might  give  me  proofs  of  the  errors  into  which  I 
had  fallen,  and  enable  me  to  correct  them. 

Naturally  surprised  at  this,  I  demurred  to  what 
seemed  to  be  opening  the  door  to  a  controversy 
with  one  in  his  unhappy  situation.  On  referring 
the  request  to  General  Garfield,  he  consented  to 
my  acceding  to  General  Porter's  wish,  and  I  did 
so.  Meanwhile,  the  Convention  at  Chicago  met, 
and  the  \vonderful  series  of  events,  beginning  with 
Garfield's  nomination  and  election,  and  ending  with 
his  murder,  followed.  I  mention  the  dates  given 
above,  that  it  may  be  clearly  seen  that  the  corre 
spondence,  Porter's  request  for  a  copy,  and  Gar- 
field's  consent,  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the 
Presidential  canvass,  with  which,  I  have  been  told, 
there  has  been  some  attempt  to  associate  Garfield's 
attitude  to  the  case. 

Somewhat  later  I  learned  that  copies  of  my  let- 


OF    BULL    RUN.  3 

ter  were  in  the  hands  of  members  of  the  Board ;  that 
General  Porter  had  printed  a  reply  to  it ;  and  that 
whether  I  would  or  no,  I  was  driven  from  the  atti 
tude  of  private  criticism  into  one  of  public  debate. 
Happily,  the  friendships  which  had  made  me  wish 
to  avoid  discussion  were  too  well-founded  to  be 
affected  by  differences  of  opinion.  When,  there 
fore,  I  learned  that  this  Society  desired  to  have  a 
somewhat  fuller  presentation  of  my  views,  I  no 
longer  saw  any  good  reason  for  hesitating  to  speak 
on  the  subject. 

In  December,  1862,  a  Court-martial  tried  Gen 
eral  Porter  upon  charges  and  specifications  duly 
preferred,  on  which  he  was  arraigned  for  criminal 
insubordination  and  disobedience  of  orders  upon 
the  battle-field.  The  Court  consisted  of  Generals 
Hunter,  Hitchcock,  King,  Prentiss,  Ricketts,  Casey, 
N.  B.  Buford,  Slough  and  Garfield.  Under  their 
finding  and  sentence,  approved  by  President  Lin 
coln,  he  was  cashiered  and  disqualified  from  holding 
office  under  the  Government. 

It  was  natural  that  General  Porter  should  devote 
his  life  to  obtaining  a  reversal  of  the  sentence.  As 
soon  as  the  war  was  over  he  began  corresponding 
with  officers  of  the  Confederate  army,  aiming  espe 
cially  at  procuring  opinions  from  them  that  Lee  had 
succeeded  in  concentrating  his  army  on  the  2gth  of 
August,  1862,  before  Porter  had  been  able  to  get 


4  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

into  co-operation  or  connection  with  the  rest  of  our 
army  under  Pope,  who  was  attacking  Jackson  on 
the  heights  above  Groveton,  in  the  battle  known  as 
the  Second  Bull  Run.  During  General  Grant's  two 
terms  of  Presidency  the  newly-discovered  evidence 
was  submitted  to  him,  but  he  declined  to  allow  any 
steps  to  be  taken  looking  toward  a  re-opening  of 
the  case. 

In  1878,  President  Hayes  yielded  to  Porter's  so 
licitations  and  appointed  an  Advisory  Board,  con 
sisting  of  (ienerals  Schofield,  Terry  and  Getty,  to 
examine  the  case,  in  view  of  the  newly-discovered 
evidence  claimed  by  Porter,  and  to  report  recom 
mendations  to  the  President.  The  anomalous  char 
acter  of  such  a  Board,  its  legality,  and  its  power  to 
compel  attendance  of  witnesses,  are  questions  upon 
which  I  do  not  propose  to  touch.  I  shall  confine 
myself  wholly  to  matters  in  which  you  as  a  Society 
of  military  men  of  large  experience  in  actual  war 
.will  be  interested.  The  Advisory  Board  found  that 
Porter's  conduct,  so  far  from  being  blameworthy, 
was  a  model  of  military  excellence,  and  advised  that 
he  be  reinstated  in  the  regular  arm$  with  such  rank 
as  he  would  have  reached  in  ordinary  course  if  he 
had  survived  the  war,  with  pay  and  emoluments  for 
the  score  of  years  during  which  he  had  been  re 
manded  to  civil  life.  The  President  referred  the 
whole  subject  to  Congress.  A  bill  has  been  intro- 


OF    BULL     RUN.  5 

duced  this  winter  to  carry  out  in  substance  the  rec 
ommendation  of  the  Advisory  Board.  The  death  of 
President  Garfield  gives  opportunity  for  renewing 
the  pressure  for  action  upon  his  successor,  and  this 
is  being  vigorously  used. 

This  outline  of  the  situation,  condensed  as  it  is 
to  the  smallest  compass,  shows  that  the  case  is  one 
on  which  the  opinion  of  the  men  who  themselves 
served  in  the  war  ought  to  be  felt,  and  no  one  can 
question  the  right  of  associations  like  this  to  lead 
their  fellow-citizens  in  the  effort  to  reach  a  right 
judgment  upon  it. 

My  own  convictions  I  will  state  as  follows : 

1.  The  so-called  newly-discovered  evidence  gives 
us  nothing  worthy  to  overthrow  or  to  modify  the 
judgment  of  the   Court-martial,  which  tried  Porter 
in   1862.      Rightly  considered,  it  sustains  and  sup 
ports  that  judgment  in  a  strong  and  striking  man 
ner. 

2.  Lapse  of  time  has  greatly  increased  the  unreli 
ability  of  mere  memory,  especially  as  to  hours  of  the 
day;  and  as  Porter's  case  rests  largely  upon  this  sort 
of  memory,  the  Court-martial  convened  in  the  very 
year   of  his   alleged    misconduct   was    much    more 
likely  to  have  trustworthy  evidence  than  the  Ad 
visory  B4ard. 

3.  The  new  evidence  is  almost  wholly  from  Con 
federate  sources  ;  and  that  part  of  it  which  is  orig- 


O  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

inal  and  was  contemporaneous  with  the  events,  is 
overwhelmingly  in  support  of  the  condition  of  facts 
found  by  the  Court-martial. 

4.  The  question  of  Porter's  guilt  turned  upon  his 
conduct  under  the  orders  he  received,  and  in  view 
of  the  situation  at  the   time  as    he  and    his  com 
mander   knew  or   had    the    means  of   knowing   it. 
From   this    point  of  view,    also,   the  Court-martial 
was  right  and  the  Advisory  Board  was  wrong. 

5.  To  accept  the  present  statements  from  memo 
ry  of  the  Confederate  officers  as  to    the  time  and 
place   of    Longstreet's    arrival    on    that    field,    still 
leaves  the  most  inextricable  confusion  and  contra 
diction  among    them,    with   a   decided    balance    in 
favor   of   those    who    agree   with    the    conclusions 
drawn  from  the  general  concurrence    of  witnesses 
who  were  in   the  National   army,  and  whose  testi 
mony  supports  the  judgment  of  the  Court-martial. 

6.  If  Porter  were  right  as  to  time  and  place  of 
Longstreet  on  the  field,  the  judgment  of  the  Court- 
martial   against  him  would  still  be  sound  on  mili 
tary  principles. 

To  discuss  the  whole  campaign  of  August,  1862, 
is  plainly  impossible  within  the  limits  of  a  single 
paper.  To  discuss  the  whole  series  of  engagements 
in  the  last  days  of  that  month  would  car-ry  me  be 
yond  the  limits  of  a  single  evening.  I  shall  have 
to  confine  myself  to  the  events  upon  which  the 


OF    BULL    RUN.  7 

Court-martial  of  1862  based  their  judgment,  namely, 
those  occurring  on  the  28th  and  2pth  of  the  month, 
and  on  these  I  must  assume  that  you  are  familiar 
with  the  general  history. 

The  Advisory  Board  found  that  Porter's  animus 
towards  General  Pope,  his  commander,  was  of  no 
real  importance  in  the  case.  I  confess  myself  un 
able  to  comprehend  how  this  was  possible.  The 
spirit  and  intention  constitutes  the  difference  be 
tween  a  man's  foolishly  being  captured  by  the  en 
emy  and  his  being  a  deserter  deserving  death.  It 
constitutes  the  essential  difference  between  an  of 
ficer's  doing  some  blundering  or  timid  thing,  de 
serving  only  censure  or  contempt,  and  his  being 
guilty  of  the  highest  of  military  crimes.  The  stern 
law  of  war  punishes  even  cowardice  with  death 
when  it  sets  a  dangerous  example  ;  but  if  a  hostile 
spirit  of  hatred  and  insubordination  toward  the 
commander  produces  the  same  results  as  cowardice 
would,  the  crime  is  exaggerated.  In  the  one  case 
it  may  be  a  physical  weakness,  which  we  pity  and 
despise,  while  we  punish  it;  in  the  other  it  is  a 
purposed  and  willful  wrong,  allied  closely  to  treach 
ery.  To  say  that  malice  makes  no  difference  irv-.of- 
fenses,  is  simply  to  invert  all  rules.  I  must  say, 
therefore,  at  the  start,  that  if  any  one  holds  that 
Porter's  animus  toward  his  superior  officer  ought 
not  to  weigh  in  considering  his  conduct  under  his 


THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

orders,  from  him  I  must  part  company  at  the  very 
beginning;  for  I  hold  most  explicitly  that  express 
ill-will  and  insubordination  being  once  proven,  it 
must  necessarily  affect  our  interpretation  of  conduct 
in  every  situation  of  the  day. 

MARCH    FROM    WARRENTON    JUNCTION,    AUGUST    2J-8. 

The  manner  in  which  one  judges  of  Porter's  de 
lay  in  obeying  the  order  to  march  from  Warrenton 
Junction  to  Bristow  on  the  night  of  the  27~28th  of 
August  will,  to  some  extent,  determine  his  stand 
point  in  judging  of  things  which  occurred  later. 

The  order  from  Pope  to  Porter  was  an  explicit 
one:  ''The  Major-General  commanding  directs  that 
you  start  at  I  o  clock  to-night  and  come  forward 
with  your  whole  corps  .  .  '  •.  so  as  to  be 
here  by  day-light  to-morrow  morning."  It  said 
Hooker  had  been  in  a  severe  engagement.  It  indi 
cated  an  advantage  over  the  enemy,  but  not  a  rout. 
It  repeated;  ''It  is  necessary  on  all  accounts  that 
you  should  be  here  by  daylight."  The  general 
facts  were  that  the  most  enterprising  officer  of  the 
Confederate  army,  with  nearly  half  of  Lee's  infantry 
and  all  his  cavalry,  was  upon  the  line  of  our  com 
munications.  It  was  a  time  when  extraordinary 
speed  of  movement  and  rapidity  of  combination  was 
plainly  demanded  on  our  side;  a  time  when,  if  ever, 
a  commanding  officer  needed  to  feel  his  troops 


OF    BULL    RUN.  9 

answering  like  a  spirited  charger  to  the  spur;  a 
crisis  in  which  a  supreme  exertion  may  rightly  be 
demanded  of  every  officer  and  man  composing  an 
army.  It  was  a  summer  night,  the  roads  were 
dry;  and,  so  far  as  physical  comfort  went,  the 
troops  could  march  easier  than  by  day ;  but  no 
matter  for  that,  the  order  indicated  fighting  for  the 
next  day,  and  was  peremptory  as  to  time  of  starting. 
Porter  did  not  obey  it,  but  began  his  march  at 
daylight,  the  time  when  he  was  ordered  to  arrive  at 
Bristow.  His  excuse  was  that  the  night  was  dark,  that 
one  of  his  divisions  had  had  a  hard  march  that 
day,  and  that  from  such  reports  as  he  had,  the 
road  to  Bristow  was  a  good  deal  obstructed  by  wag 
ons.  The  sufficiency  of  the  excuse  can  not  be 
admitted.  It  might  do  for  a  peaceful  march,  away 
from  the  presence  of  the  enemy ;  but  in  war  and  in 
such  a  crisis  in  war,  our  judgment  must  refuse  to 
assent  to  the  justification.  Let  us  see  how  other 
soldiers  judged  of  their  duty  in  similar  circumstan 
ces.  In  Georgia,  on  the  25th  of  May,  1864,  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  was  marching  late  in  the  even 
ing,  trying  to  reach  Pumpkin-vine  Creek,  after 
crossing  the  Etowah  River.  Hooker  was  in  advance, 
and  his  trains  in  this  case  also  filled  the  road.  The 
column  was  necessarily  broken,  the  men  picking 
their  way  among  the  wagons,  straggling  out  by 
the  road-side  when  it  was  possible  to  march  there, 


IO  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

and  being  wearied  and  worried  to  the  last  degree 
by  the  obstacles.  Just  before  dark  distant  firing 
was  heard.  Schofield  ordered  that  the  column 
should  close  up  and  push  on  as  fast  as  possible. 
A  severe  thunder-storm  came  up,  followed  by 
pouring,  drenching  rain,  in  which  the  corps  contin 
ued  to  march  till  midnight,  and  then  went  into 
bivouac  by  the  road-side,  not  a  wagon  or  tent  of 
their  own  being  near  them.  Instead  of  seeking 
shelter,  General  Schofield  himself  pushed  forward 
to  see  what  had  been  going  on  ;  and  in  trying  to 
pass  some  wagons  his  horse  fell  with  him  into  a 
gully  which  could  not  be  seen  in  the  darkness,  and 
he  was  severely  hurt.  But  orders  were  sent  for  the 
corps  to  continue  its  march,  after  only  a  single  hour 
of  rest  they  marched  again,  and  the  gray  in  the 
east  was  just  appearing  when  they  reported  to 
Sherman  and  asked  for  an  assignment  of  their  posi 
tion  on  the  field.  Hooker  had  had,  as  in  1862,  a 
very  severe  action,  though  it  was  at  New  Hope 
Church  this  time.  There  was  no  council  of  di 
vision  officers  called  to  consider  the  propriety  of 
marching,  but  orders  were  issued  and  the  march 
was  made,  and  every  soldier  knows  that  it  is  only 
in  that  way  that  campaigns  are  made  successful. 

It  is  a  telling  sarcasm  on  Porter's  conduct  that  he 
was,  at  Warrenton  Junction  that  very  day,  writing 
to  Burnside  that  no  vigor  was  shown  by  Pope's 


BULL    RUN.  I  I 

command;  that  the  enemy  was  "pursuing  his 
route  unmolested  to  the  Shenandoah  ;''  that  he  found 
4 '  a  vast  difference  between  these  troops  (the  Army 
of  Virginia)  and  ours;"  and  that  they  "needed 
some  good  troops  to  give  them  heart,  and,  I  think, 
head!  " 

Whatever  good  services  Porter  had  done  before, 
gave  to  his  new  commander  the  right  to  expect 
ability  and  efficiency  from  him  ;  and  when  we  see 
him,  day  after  day,  sneering  at  Pope,  and,  as  in 
the  letter  quoted  above,  basing  his  sneers  at  Pope's 
ignorance  of  the  situation  upon  an  ignorance  of 
his  own,  more  glaring  in  contrast  with  the  facts  as 
history  now  reveals  them  to  us,  than  anything  to  be 
found  in  Pope's  dispatches,  we  find  ourselves  con 
cluding  that  General  T.  C.  H.  Smith  was,  on  the 
whole,  right  in  interpreting  Porter's  animus  as  he 
did,  and  in  saying  that  Pope  might  expect  him  to  fail 
him.  It  is  only  just  to  judge  what  occurred  on  the 
29th  of  August  in  the  light  of  this  conduct  and  of 
this  spirit. 

No  doubt  military  orders  are  to  be  taken  accord 
ing  to  the  spirit  rather  than  the  letter,  and  that  a 
certain  discretion  belongs  to  a  corps  or  division 
commander ;  but  the  danger  is  that  this  discretion 
will  be  made  the  pretext  for  doing  less  than  he  is 
ordered  to  do.  It  would  be  safer  to  say  that  dis 
cretion  is  left  the  subordinate  to  do  more,  but 


12  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

rarely  to  do  less  than  ordered,  if  the  thing  is  pos 
sible.  A  commanding  officer  will  be  forced  to  put 
his  orders  in  curt  and  peremptory  phrase  always, 
if  his  subordinates  are  to  find  reasons  in  his  expla 
nation  for  doing  as  much  or  as  little  as  they  please. 
There  may  be  good  reasons  why  a  dispatch  shall 
conceal  the  true  reasons  for  an  order.  It  is  rarely 
wise  to  say  any  thing  which  could  do  harm  if  it  fell 
into  the  enemy's  hands,  and  any  dispatch  may  do 
so.  In  the  presence  of  an  enemy  a  subordinate 
is  never  justifiable  in  drawing  reasons  from  the  nar 
rative  part  of  a  dispatch  for  neglecting  the  manda 
tory  part.  He  is  bound  to  assume  that  his  supe 
rior  had  good  reasons  for  his  order,  and  knew  as 
well  as  he  who  receives  it,  that  there  may  be  appa 
rent  inconsistency  between  the  thing  commanded 
and  the  situation  as  partly  described.  Pope's  reit 
erated  and  emphatic  assertion  of  the  necessity  of 
Porter's  presence  by  daylight  meant,  and  could  only 
mean,  that  the  advantage  Hooker  was  said  to  have 
was  still  consistent  with  some  imminent  danger,  or 
some  imperative  necessity  in  regard  to  proposed 
action.  We  can  not  ignore  or  forget  that  every 
body  knew  the  situation  was  a  very  grave  one. 
Porter's  own  dispatches  show' that  he  knew  the 
rest  of  Lee's  army  was  forcing  the  marching  to 
join  Jackson,  and  that  a  series  of  engagements  had 
already  begun  which  must  end  in  the  disgrace,  if 


OF    BULL    RUN.  13 

not  ruin  of  the  National  army,  unless  every  corps 
and  division  commander  exhibited  the  fullest  ener 
gy  of  which  he  was  capable.  And  the  delay  of 
Wednesday  night  does  not  stand  alone.  It  was 
followed  by  the  order  to  march  at  first  blush  of 
dawn  on  the  29th,  receipted  for  at  half-past  five 
but  not  obeyed  till  seven.  The  interval  was  used 
on  that  morning,  not  in  writing  a  dispatch  to  Pope 
saying  that  the  order  was  received  after  the  con 
templated  hour  of  movement,  but  he  would  try  to 
make  up  for  the  delay  by  instantaneous  marching 
and  increase  of  speed, — no,  instead  of  this  Porter  is 
writing  at  six  a  long  letter  to  Burnside,  repeating 
his  sneers  at  Pope's  assumed  ignorance  of  the  situ 
ation,  talking  of  his  taking  two  corps  to  Centerville 
as  a  "body. guard,"  when  the  dispatch  in  his  hand 
showed  that  Pope  had  not  moved  with  these  corps 
to  Centerville  at  all,  but  was  at  Bull  Run.  He 
says  to  his  correspondent:  "  Comment  is  unneces 
sary,  "  when  that  phrase  is  to  be  used,  if  at  all,  by 
those  who  consider  his  conduct  under  such  circum 
stances.  He  exhibits  himself  plainly  as  a  disaffect 
ed  subordinate,  writing  professional  libels  on  his 
superior,  while  he  neglected  and  delayed  obedience 
in  so  systematic  a  way  as  to  demonstrate  that  his 
commander  was  likely  to  fail  in  any  combination 
which  depended  on  his  promptness  or  efficiency. 


14  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

DISCREPANCIES    IN    TESTIMONY. 

In  considering  testimony  of  the  kinds  presented 
to  us  in  this  record  we  should  keep  in  mind  the  fact 
that  much  of  it  is  the  remembrance  of  men  after 
sixteen  years  has  elapsed.  No  one  will  claim  that 
this  is  as  reliable  as  contemporaneous  evidence.  It 
would  be  a  miracle  if  much  were  not  lost,  much 
misremembered  after  that  lapse  of  time.  In  re 
calling  events  so  remote,  a  natural  law  of  memory 
will  give  length  of  duration  relatively  great  to  those 
occurrences  in  a  given  day  which  seem  most  im 
portant. 

Again,  judgment  as  to  the  hour  of  day,  is,  after 
a  long  interval,  one  of  the  most  uncertain  of  things, 
unless  there  is  something  like  the  peculiar  light  of 
dawn,  of  twilight,  of  gathering  darkness,  etc.,  asso 
ciated  in  the  memory  with  the  picture  itself,  and  so 
helping  to  fix  the  time.  Dispatches  noting  the 
hour  of  sending,  or  indorsed  with  the  hour  of  re 
ceipt,  are  among  the  most  reliable  fixed  points 
from  which  we  can  reckon,  and  should  outweigh 
other  evidence  as  to  time,  when  such  dispatches 
seem  to  be  sent  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business, 
and  are  free  from  suspicion  of  being  made  for  a 
purpose. 

Men  mean  to  perjure  themselves  much  less  fre 
quently  than  people  think,  and  palpable  inaccura- 


OF    BULL    RUN.  15 

cies  in  testimony  on  immaterial  points,  are  quite 
consistent  with  the  general  truth  of  a  statement. 
We  have  swift  witnesses  who  really  think  they  re 
member  every  thing  the  counsel  who  calls  them 
may  .insinuate,  and  we  have  others  who  are  easily 
led  into  the  trap  of  testifying  to  immaterial  details 
on  which  they  have  no  clear  memory.  The  case 
before  us  illustrates  both  these  phases  of  inaccuracy. 
The  orderlies  who  accompanied  Captain  Douglass 
Pope  in  carrying  the  4:30  order  were  readily  led 
to  say  they  remembered  a  steeple  on  Bethlehem 
Church,  a  thing  easily  accounted  for  by  the  firm 
association  of  a  steeple  with  a  church  in  the  minds 
of  most  Northern  men.  Porter's  counsel  argued 
that  here  was  proof  of  false  swearing,  but  they  do 
not  seem  to  have  noticed  that,  of  the  two  witnesses 
called  to  contradict  the  orderlies,  and  who  tell  us 
they  had  known  .the  church  all  their  lives,  one 
testifies  that  the  church  was  a  frame  building,  and 
the  other  that  it  was  built  of  brick.* 

So,  also,  Porter  called  a  number  of  very  respect 
able  witnesses,  including  General  Morell,  to  dis 
credit  the  cavalry  officer  commanding  the  detach 
ment  which  -accompanied  the  troops  in  the  move- 


*The  volumes  and  pages  referred  to  in  the  foot-notes  are  those 
of  the  Congressional  publication  of  the  proceedings.  (Vol.  3,  p. 
1 1 16. 


1 6  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

ment  to  Dawkins  Branch,  and  who,  in  substance, 
deny  that  any  such  cavalry  detachment  was  pres 
ent.  Yet,  in  the  very  opening  statement  of  coun 
sel  was  read  a  dispatch  from  Porter  to  Morell  that 
day,  asking  to  have  some  of  "that  cavalry"  sent 
back  to  him  at  Bethlehem  Church.* 

Of  the  swift  witness  kind  is  the  staff  officer  who 
insisted  that  he  carried  reports  direct  from  Colonel 
Marshall  on  the  skirmisn  line  to  Porter  frequently 
during  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  and  that  Porter 
was  nearly  all  the  time  at  the  immediate  front, 
when  nothing  is  better  settled  than  that  soon  after 
McDowell  left,  Porter  went  back  to  Bethlehem 
Church  on  the  forks  of  the  Sudley  road  and  stayed 
there  till  evening,  f 

We  have  to  discriminate  as  to  the  value  of  testi 
mony  under  all  such  circumstances,  but  it  is  not 
necessary  to  assume  willful  lying  on  the  part  of  wit 
nesses.  After  so  long  a  time,  memory  and  imagina 
tion  get  easily  mixed,  and  this  is  no  small  objection 
to  opening  so  old  a  case. 

THE     QUESTION     OF    THE    TIME    OF    LONGSTREET'S    AP 
PEARANCE    ON    THE    29TH. 

In  view  of  the  difficulties  which  surround  the 
case,  it  is  very  desirable  to  fix  some  conclusive  a  'd 
satisfactory  starting  point  in  determining  the  ve.y 

*Vol.  3,  p.  33.  |Vol.  2,  p.  416. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  I/ 

important  questions  of  time  on  the  29th.  It  would 
seem  that  it  may  best  be  found  in  the  arrival  of 
Heintzelman's  corps  on  the  field  and  in  the  move 
ment  of  Poe's  brigade  around  Jackson's  left  flank. 
The  very  fact  that  this  was  the  opposite  extreme 
of  the  field  from  Porter,  and  that  the  hours  are 
fixed  without  reference  to  him,  makes  the  testi 
mony  disinterested  as  well  as  trustworthy. 

Heintzelman  came  on  the  field  about  ten  in  the 
morning,  and  tells  what  was  then  going  on,  includ 
ing  the  movement  of  Kearney's  division  in  which 
was  Poe's  brigade.  This  is  fixed  by  the  entry  made 
at  the  very  hour  in  Heintzelman's  diary,  and  is 
accepted  by  every  body.  Poe  is  thus  shown  to  be 
right  in  his  statement  of  the  time  of  his  effort  to 
outflank  Jackson's  left.  He  deployed  between  the 
Matthews  house  and  the  Sudley  road  after  ten 
o'clock  and  moved  forward,  crossing  Bull  Run,  and 
so  far  succeeded  in  his  purpose  as  to  create  con 
fusion  and  dismay  for  a  time  in  Jackson's  rear.  This 
can  not  have  been  earlier  than  half-past  ten,  con 
sidering  the  character  of  the  movement,  and  Porter's 
counsel  recognize  this  fact  by  dating  Poe's  position 
near  Sudley  Church  on  the  map  accompanying  their 
argument,  at  eleven  o'clock.  Here,  then,  we  have 
a  xed  point  about  which  there  is  no  dispute.  Let 
us' hold  fast  to  it.* 
*Vol.  2,  P.  580. 


1 8  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  in  the  memorandum  at 
tached  to  his  report,  says  he  was  there  when  this 
attack  was  made ;  that  he  gave  the  directions  for 
some  of  his  artillery  and  troops  to  resist  it ;  names 
the  officers  of  both  arms,  one  of  whom  was  mor 
tally  wounded  ;  states  the  time  as  about  ten,  and 
tells  us  that  after  the  flurry  was  over  he  started  to 
find  Longstreet.  *  Mark  that  this  was  contempo 
raneous  evidence,  both  Heintzelman's  diary  and 
Stuart's  report,  and  made  without  the  remotest 
reference  to  Porter.  It  is  corroborated  by  wit 
nesses  from  both  the  Confederate  and  the  Na 
tional  armies  in  the  most  abundant  way,  but  it  does 
not  need  corroboration.  If  we  know  any  thing 
about  that  field,  we  know  that  Stuart  started  from 
the  scene  of  Poe's  attack  to  find  Longstreet,  not 
earlier  than  half-past  ten  o'clock,  and  probably  as 
late  as  eleven.  He  took  with  him  a  considerable 
body  of  cavalry,  Robertson's  brigade  at  least,  and 
rode  by  way  of  Catharpin  Valley  around  Jackson's 
rear,  thence  across  the  country  to  Gainesville,  and 
out  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap,  meeting  the  head  of 
Longstreet's  column  between  Gainesville  and  Hay- 
market  Adopting,  therefore,  the  time  fixed  by 
Porter  and  his  counsel  as  that  of  Poe's  affair  on  our 
extreme  right  (eleven  o'clock),  taking  also  into  ac- 


Vol.    2,    p.    359. 


OF     BULL    RUN.  \g 

count  the  ordinary  rate  at  which  a  large  body  of 
horse  would  move  in  marching,  as  Stuart  marched, 
and  looking  to  the  distance  they  had  to  go,  it  is 
quite  within  bounds  to  say  it  took  Stuart  an  hour 
and  a  half  to  get  to  the  point  named ;  and  that, 
therefore,  the  head  of  Longstreet'S  column  was  half 
way  between  Haymarket  and  Gainesville  at  half- 
past  twelve,  certainly  not  earlier  than  noon.  They 
were  then  two  hours'  ordinary  march  from  Jack 
son's  right  at  the  Douglass  house,  and  it  would  take 
forced  marching  to  reach  there  in  an  hour  and  a 
half.  It  would  seem  proven,  therefore,  that  they 
could  not,  and  did  not,  make  connection  with  Jack 
son  before  half-past  one.  The  simple  chain  of  evi 
dence  which  leads  to  this  conclusion  seems  decisive, 
and  it  best  harmonizes  a  host  of  other  facts.  It  is 
also  most  in  accord  with  the  best  contemporaneous 
evidence  of  other  sorts  on  both  sides. 

Remember  that  Lee  had  no  cavalry  but  what 
was  with  Jackson,  that  Longstreet  had  Ricketts' 
division  in  front  of  him,  opposing  his  advance  dur 
ing  the  evening  before,  and  had  no  reason  to  sup 
pose  his  road  was  clear  in  the  morning ;  that  he 
must  have  skirmished — nay,  that  he  did  skirmish 
carefully  forward,  as  Hood's  report  shows ;  and  that 
Cadmus  Wilcox,  who  came  by  the  other  gap,  says, 
in  his  official  report,  that  he  reached  the  junction  of 
the  roads  west  of  Haymarket  at  half-past  nine,  and 


2O  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

found  Longstreet's  column  just  passing  there.* 
This  in  itself  makes  absurd  the  Buford  dispatch  on 
which  so  much  has  been  built  by  Porter,  and 
destroys  it,  except  as  evidence  that  Buford  wrote 
it  at  half-past  nine  upon  mistaken  information.! 
Whilst  Hood  says  that  he  himself  got  on  the  field 
earlier,  he  puts  the  time  when  the  whole  of  Long- 
street's  column  arrived  at  two  o'clock.  J  These 
and  many  other  collateral  things  go  to  establish  the 
fact  as  above  stated,  but  it  is  time  to  hasten  to  the 
next  step,  which  is  to  see  how  far  the  independent 
line  of  proof  taken  from  the  movements  of  Schenck 
and  Reynolds  forces  us  to  the  same  conclusion. 

SCHENCK'S  AND  REYNOLDS'  MOVEMENTS  ON  THE 
MORNING  OF  THE  29TH. 

What  has  been  said  above  sufficiently  indicates 
that  Longstreet  went  forward  cautiously,  and  there 
fore  slowly,  till  he  met  Stuart ;  then,  getting  the 
latest  news,  and  learning  of  Jackson's  necessity,  he 
hastened  the  marching,  while  Stuart,  with  a  de 
tachment  of  the  cavalry,  galloped,  as  Blackford 
says,  to  the  place  near  Hampton  Cole's,  on  the 
Monroe  Hill,  where  Rosser,  with  one  regiment  of 


*Vol.  2,  535;  vol.  i,  p.  472. 

tN.  B.  Buford,  who  was  on  the  Court-martial,  was  half-brother 
of  him  who  sent  the  dispatch.  It  can  not  be  said  that  it  was  not 
likely  to  have  all  due  weight  given  to  it. 

tVol.  i,  p.  552. 


OF     BULL     RUN.  21 

cavalry,  was  keeping  Porter  from  advancing  by  his 
demonstrations,  and  by  the  dust  which  his  troopers 
raised  by  dragging  the  brush  in  the  road.* 

Let  us  now  look  at  the  center  of  the  field.  It  is 
clear  that  though  Sigel's  forces  were  moving  earlier, 
the  slow  character  of  Schenck's  advance,  as  he 
describes  it,  made  it  about  noon  when  he  swung  for 
ward  from  the  woods  bordering  Lewis  Lane,  No.  I. 
Benjamin's  testimony  is  conclusive  on  this  point. 
He  commanded  a  battery  of  regulars,  and  belonged 
to  the  Ninth  Corps,  which  came  on  the  ground 
about  noon,  as  appears  from  Heintzelman's  diary, 
and  he  was  ordered  to  report  to  Schenck,  to  assist 
in  his  movement  then  in  progress.  He  identifies 
the  ridge  just  east  of  Groveton  where  his  battery 
went  into  position,  his  right  on  the  pike.  He  men 
tions  the  enemy's  skirmishers  in  front  of  and  to  the 
west  of  him,  which  were  driven  out.  He  says  he 
placed  his  battery  about  half-past  twelve,  that  after 
a  few  shots  all  was  quiet  for  an  hour,  then  a  severe 
artillery  fire  was  opened  from  the  direction  of  the 
Douglass  house,  and  the  cannonade  lasted  till  late 
in  the  afternoon,  when  he  had  to  withdraw  his  bat 
tery  to  repair  damages  and  reorganize,  f  This  covers 
the  whole  period  of  Schenck's  movement,  and  his 


*  Vol.  2,  pp.  673,  678  ;  vol.  3,  p.  1073. 
tVol.  2,  p.  608. 


THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

return  to  the   road  east  of  Lewis  Lane,    where  he 
covered  the  position  of  the  battery  and  remained, 
as  he  testifies,   till  four  o'clock  or  later.      Schenck 
is  not  only  corroborated  by  General  McLean,  Major 
Fox  and  others,  but  a  decisive  fact  is  found  in  their 
going  through  the  well  identified  wood  where  Gib 
bon's  field  hospital  \vas  after  the  fight  of  the  night 
before,   and   where   Schenck   had   those   still   living 
cared  for  and  sent  to  the  rear.      No  more  intelligent 
or   unimpeachable  witnesses   could   be   found   than 
those  who  thus  testify.    Schenck,  every  body  knows. 
McLean  is  a  son  of  the  late  Judge  McLean,  of  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court ;  Major  Fox  is  a  well 
known  business  man  of  high  standing  in  Cincinnati ; 
and  Colonel  Benjamin,  now  Assistant  Adjutant  Gen 
eral  at  Washington,   served   both   in  the  East  and 
in  the  West,   and  was   well  known  as    one  of  the 
coolest  and  bravest  officers  of  artillery  in  the  army. 
But  Reynolds'  division  was  on  Schenck's  left  and 
went  forward  also.    General  Meade  commanded  one 
of  his  brigades.      Reynolds  was  Porter's  friend,  had 
served  in  his  command  before  Richmond,  and  both 
he  and  Meade  were  men  who  could  not  be  charged 
with  making  careless  or  false  reports  of  tbeir  part  in 
the  engagement.      Reynolds  reports  that  he  crossed 
the  pike,  pushing  forward  to  turn  Jackson's  right, 
and  continued  the  movement  till  Longstreet  came 
on  the  field,  and  artillery  opened  upon  him  in  rear 


OF     BL'LL     RUN.  23 

of  his  left  flank.  *  Meade  told  McLean  in  person  that 
he  had  got  into  a  hornet's  nest  of  batteries.  Other 
testimony  shows  that  they  retired  only  because  they 
were  too  late  to  accomplish  their  purpose. 

If  we  let  Schenck  occupy  the  Gibbon  woods  and 
extend  Meade  on  that  flank,  with  the  rest  of  Rey 
nolds'  division  beyond  him,  even  if  somewhat  re 
fused,  it  is  plain  that  they  must  have  occupied  the 
high  ground  at  and  beyond  the  Cundliffe  house. 
Reynolds  himself  says  he  had  partial  possession  of 
the  highest  ground  south  of  the  pike  when  the  Con 
federate  battery  was  put  in,  viz.,  the  Monroe  or 
Stuart  Hill,  near  the  pike.f  He  subsequently  saw 
what  Schenck's  report  said  of  his  retiring,  and  in 
his  correspondence  with  Colonel  Cheesbrough,  of 
Schenck's  staff,  as  well  as  in  his  own  testimony,  he 
distinctly  says  that  Longstreet's  troops  were  not 
deployed  across  the  pike  till  one  o'clock  or  some 
time  in  the  afternoon.  He  corrects  Cheesbrough 
by  asserting  that  it  was  not  till  late  in  the  afternoon, 
towards  dusk,  that  Longstreet's  deployment  was  so 
complete  as  to  outflank  him  on  the  left,  after  this 
wing  had  been  drawn  back.J  He  says  his  artillery, 
supported  by  Meade,  engaged  Jackson  on  the  same 


-Vol.  2,  p.  506. 

tVol.   I,  p.  167. 

JVol.  I,  pp.  166,  167;   Vol.  2.  p.  507. 


24  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

ridge  they  were  on,  till  his  position  was  made  un 
tenable  by  the  approach  of  Longstreet  on  the  pike. 

As  to  the  time  of  Longstrcet's  arrival,  therefore, 
this  independent  mode  of  determining  it  corrobo 
rates  the  former.  The  testimony  of  Benjamin  es 
tablishes  the  fact  that  the  re-enforcements  in  artil 
lery,  which  went  into  position  on  Jackson's  right, 
and  which,  as  we  know  from  Longstreet,  were  his 
batteries,  came  into  action  between  one  and  two 
o'clock,  and  were  added  to  for  some  time  later. 
Reynolds  plainly  insists  that  he  did  not  begin  to 
withdraw  till  after  these  re-enforcements  arrived  ;  his 
subordinates,  together  with  Schenck,  McLean  and 
their  subordinates,  confirm  this  view. 

It  is  the  connection  of  these  things  with  definite 
and  fixed  starting  points  that  gives  them  their  force, 
and  when  we  find  that  Reynolds  and  Schenck,  with 
out  knowledge  of  where  Stuart  was  or  what  he  was 
doing,  give  us  the  same  conclusion  as  to  the  time 
of  Longstreet's  arrival,  that  we  deduce  from  Foe's 
affair  on  the  right  and  Stuart's  subsequent  ride  to 
ward  Haymarket,  and  when  an  independent  esti 
mate  reached  from  a  still  different  starting  point  in 
Benjamin's  case,  brings  us  to  the  same  result,  no 
amount  of  subsequent  guessing  at  the  time  can 
change  it.  Now  add  the  time  it  would  take  to  de 
ploy  and  put  in  position  the  whole  of  Longstreet's 
command  after  the  head  of  the  column  came  up, 


OF    BULL    RUN.  25 

and  it  could  not  have  been  earlier  than  three,  it  was 
quite  likely  to  be  as  late  as  four,  when  his  right 
reached  the  Manassas  and  Gainesville  road  on  which 
Porter  was. 

It  will  be  seen,  by  and  by,  that  Porter  gave  no 
new  cause  for  anxiety  to  Lee  later  in  the  afternoon, 
and  Longstreet,  being  informed  as  he  came  up,  of 
his  being  on  their  flank,  sent  Wilcox's  division 
across,  as  soon  as  his  connection  with  Jackson  was 
safely  made  and  he  was  assured  that  Reynolds  had 
really  given  up  his  aggressive  movement.  But  both 
Lee  and  Longstreet  put  this  late  in  the  day,  and 
Wilcox's  report  and  testimony  say  it  was  lialf-past 
four*  This  may  fairly  be  said  to  fix  the  time  when 
he  had  finished  his  deployment,  and  was  at  liberty 
to  attend  to  other  matters.  It  is  not  credible  that 
he  should  not  have  sent  Wilcox  earlier  if  he  had 
been  in  position  before  noon. 

The  fact  that  Rosser's  cavalry  dragged  limbs  of 
trees  in  the  road  to  create  the  impression  upon  Por 
ter  that  a  large  force  was  in  front  of  him,  neither 
has  been  nor  can  be  contradicted.  It  has  only  been 
waved  aside  as  of  little  consequence.  It  can  not  be 
properly  treated  so.  Rosser  says  that  he  did  it  for 
several  hours,  and  that  it  was  done  to  deceive  Por 
ter.  Stuart  says  in  his  official  report  that  Porter's 


Vol.  2,  p.  535. 


26  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

own  report  proved  the  success  of  the  ruse.  Chap 
lain  Landstreet  watched  it  with  interest  because 
he  knew  its  purpose.  The  fact  being  undisputed, 
it  is  impossible  to  get  away  from  its  logical  conse 
quences.  The  ruse  was  practiced  because  Long- 
street  was  not  yet  in  position,  i^nd  it  was  presuma 
bly  continued  until,  and  only  until,  the  need  of  it 
was  over,  and  the  Confederate  line  was  formed.  It 
is  one  of  those  speaking  facts  which  outweigh  a 
world  of  those  estimates  of  time  from  mere  mem 
ory,  for  which  General  Gibbon  sensibly  testified  that 
"  he  would  not  give  a  snap  of  his  finger. "  It  is  not 
necessary  to  treat  Rosser's  estimate  of  three  or  four 
hours  differently  from  other  estimates.  Take  it 
simply  that  he  continued  it  for  so  long  a  time  that 
the  best  impression  he  now  has  is  as  he  gives  it, 
and  it  still  seems  a  capital,  if  not  a  decisive  fact  in 
the  case.  If  the  time  were  only  half  what  he  thinks, 
it  still  shows  that  for  some  two  hours  after  Rosser 
became  aware  of  the  presence  of  Porter's  column, 
there  was  nothing  but  a  little  cavalry  to  prevent  the 
latter  from  pushing  over  the  hill  at  Hampton  Cole's 
and  Monroe's,  and  into  close  support  of  the  move 
ment  Reynolds  and  Schenck  were  making. 

Closely  connected  with  this,  and  almost  conclu 
sive  in  itself,  is  the  testimony  of  Major  White  of 
Stuart's  staff.  When  Stuart  reached  the  hill  in 
front  of  Porter  and  saw  what  was  going  on,  he  sent 


OF    BULL    RUN.  2/ 

White  to  Jackson  to  report  the  Union  troops  com- 
in"-  on  that  road.      If  Longstreet  had  been  between 

fc> 

Stuart  and  Jackson,  would  White  have  been  sent 
clear  across  Longstreet's  front  to  the  latter?  Long- 
street,  therefore,  had  not  yet  arrived  when  Porter 
came  to  Dawkins  branch,  no  matter  what  you  call 
the  hour,  and  Jackson  on  the  hills  north  of  the  pike 
was  the  nearest  Confederate  commander  to  whom 
to  send.  But  White,  on  his  return  from  Jackson, 
took  a  short  cut  through  the  wood  where  Gibbon's 
dead  and  wounded  lay.  This  shows  that  Schenck's 
advance  had  riot  yet  reached  there,  or  would  make 
it  so  late  as  to  show  that  Longstreet  was  some 
hours  later  in  arriving  than  even  General  Pope  has 
claimed.  The  circumstances  show  that  it  was  be 
fore  Schenck's  movement,  for  White  saw  the  artil 
lery  firing  from  Cole's  toward  Reynolds  on  that 
officer's  advance  over  the  same  ground  the  witness 
had  traveled  in  coming  back  from  Jackson.  But  I 
do  not  intend  to  repeat  here  what  has  been  pre 
sented  in  another  form  as  a  summary  of  evidence  at 
this  end  of  the  line,  but  only  to  point  out  how 
solidly  it  supports  that  which  is  drawn  in  turn  from 
our  right,  our  center,  and  from  the  best  reliable  and 
fixed  data  given  by  Confederate  witnesses. 


28  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

ERRORS    IS'    RECOLLECTION. 

At  as  early  a  day  as  1866,  General  Porter  began 
to  collect  from  Confederate  officers  such  letters  as 
would  favor  his  application  for  a  reversal  of  his  sen 
tence.  In  October,  1867,  ne  got  fr°m  General  R. 
E.  Lee,  a  letter  based  on  memory,  which  is  one  of 
the  most  convincing  proofs  of  the  unreliability  of 
such  recollection.*  In  it  Lee  puts  the  time  of  the 
arrival  of  Longstreet's  head  of  column  on  the  field 
as  early  as  Cadmus  Wilcox's  official  report  proves 
it  to  have  been  at  the  Junction  of  the  roads  between 
Thoroughfare  Gap  and  Haymarket,  and  an  hour  and 
a  half  earlier  than  Poe's  attack  on  Jackson's  left, 
which  occurred  before  Stuart  started  on  his  seven- 
mile  ride  to  meet  Lee  himself,  with  Longstreet,  be 
tween  Gainesville  and  Haymarket !  Lee's  estimate 
of  about  two  and  a  half  hours  as  the  time  it  took 
Longstreet  to  get  into  position  after  the  head  of  the 
column  came  up,  is  valuable  as  based  on  an  ex 
pert's  knowledge  of  the  time  such  maneuvers  would 
ordinarily  take,  and  is  totally  different  from  the 
attempt  to  recollect  a  particular  hour  of  the  day. 
With  such  letters  as  this  of  Lee's,  and  some  similar 
ones,  it  would  be  strange  indeed  if  Porter  and  his 
counsel  could  not  make  other  officers  and  men  on 


*   Vol.  I.  p.  551. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  29 

both  sides  modify  their  opinions.  An  example  of 
this  is  found  in  Longstreet's  admitted  modification 
of  former  statements  after  talking  with  Porter's 
friends  in  attendance  upon  this  investigation.  Men 
naturally  hesitate  to  put  their  recollection  against 
that  of  others  whom  they  respect,  when  the  state 
ments  of  these  are  pressed  upon  them.  But  fortu 
nately  for  history  there  are  facts  and  conjunctions 
of  facts  making  logical  chains  to  which  mere  mem 
ory  is  as  a  rope  of  sand.  We  may  assume  that  the 
time  of  the  occurrences  that  morning  of  the  2Qth 
has  been  shoved  forward  at  least  a  couple  of  hours 
in  the  minds  of  nearly  all  the  Confederate  officers 
by  the  knowledge  that  those  letters  had  been  writ 
ten,  except  where  their  own  official  reports  or  mem 
oranda  made  at  the  time  have  saved  them  from 
doubting  their  own  judgment.  White,  of  Stuart's 
staff,  seems  to  be  one  of  the  clearest  and  most  con 
sistent  witnesses  of  the  whole  class,  yet  he,  who 
was  with  Stuart  at  the  time,  under  the  influence  of 
this  epidemic  of  refreshed  recollection  as  to  hours, 
puts  the  affair  with  Foe  near  Sudley  at  eight  or 
nine  in  the  morning,  though  Stuart's  report  at  the 
time  said  about  ten,  and  Porter  and  his  counsel  now 
admit  it  was  eleven,  as  has  been  shown.  This  error 
in  starting  must  run,  of  course,  through  the  middle 
of  the  day,  at  least,  and  until  some  new  departure 
occurs  to  set  it  right.  Such  considerations  as  these 


3O  THE    SECOND    BATTLK 

give  great  strength  to  General  Gibbon's  estimate  of 
the  small  value  of  memory  as  to  the  mere  time  of 
day  in  the  midst  of  such  exciting  scenes,  unless  the 
recollection  is  helped  by  the  fixed  data  to  which 
reference  has  been  made.  It  is  therefore  not  merely 
because  the  concurrent  evidence  from  several  inde 
pendent  sources  proves  the  arrival  of  Longstreet  to 
have  been  much  later  than  the  time  when  Porter 
reached  Dawkins  branch,  but  also  because  that  fact, 
is  not  so  dependent  upon  what  is  thus  indicated  as 
the  most  untrustworthy  kind  of  evidence,  that  it 
should  be  regarded  as  overweighing  the  honest  but 
most  fallacious  efforts  to  fix  the  time  by  recollection 
alone  after  so  many  years. 

LONGSTREET'S  POSITION  ON  THE  FIELD. 

If  Longstreet  was  not  in  position  in  front  of  Por 
ter  for  four  or  five  hours,  or  one  or  two  hours  even, 
after  the  latter  reached  Dawkins  branch,  his  de 
fense  of  his  conduct  fails.  But  the  student  of  the 
field  will  desire  to  determine  for  himself  what  Long- 
street's  position  on  it  was.  There  are  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  a  satisfactory  conclusion,  but  the  weight 
of  evidence  is  largely  in  favor  of  putting  him  west 
of  Page-land  Lane. 

Let  us  go  back  and  study  the  topography  of  the 
field  a  little,  which  we  may  do,  as  to  the  greater 
part  of  it,  by  the  aid  of  General  Warren's  map 


OF    BULL    RUN 


with  contour  lines  of  elevations,  which  is  number 
six  of  the  quarto  volume  accompanying  the  Board's 
report. 


Porter's  command  was  in  the  only  considerable 
forest  that  was  in  the  whole  field  of  operations  that 
day.  Had  he  been  out  of  it  anywhere,  he  could 
hardly  have  failed  to  see  what  was  going  on.  The 


32  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

country  was  undulating,  the  ridges  being  fifty  or 
sixty  feet  only  above  the  hollows  in  which  the  in 
significant  water-courses  ran.  The  topographical 
lines  nowhere  show  any  deep  ravines,  nor  any  con 
formation  which  would  prevent  movements  of  an 
army  in  line  of  battle  except  in  the  wood  already 
spoken  of;  and  as  to  that,  General  Warren  testified 
to  what  every  military  man  could  tell  a  priori,  that 
there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  taking  troops  through 
it  if  the  outskirts  were  held.  It  constituted,  there 
fore,  simply  an  obstruction  in  the  way  of  maneu 
ver,  but  had  the  advantage  also  of  beinsr  a  cover 

o  o 

for  the  movement  of  Porter's  troops  as  soon  as  the 
terrain  was  understood  by  the  officer  in  command. 
In  Porter's  immediate  front,  from  the  ridge  on 
which  Morell's  troops  were  deployed  to  the  Hamp 
ton  Cole  house,  near  which  the  Confederate  cav 
alry  officer  put  in  a  section  of  a  light  battery,  is  a 
distance  of  something  more  than  a  mile  and  a-half 
by  the  scale,  with  a  hollow  of  only  sixty  feet  be 
tween.  The  ground  was  open  in  the  direct  line 
west  from  the  creek,  but  wooded  to  the  left  and 
along  the  dirt  road,  so  as  to  afford  excellent  cover 
for  skirmishers  advancing.  At  the  Cole  house, 
which  both  the  contour  lines  and  the  testimony 
show  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  points  on  the 
field,  there  is  a  convergence  of  roads.  That  by 
which  Porter  was  advancing,  the  Manassas  Gap 


OF    BULL    RUN.  33 

Railway,  the  old  Warrenton  and  Washington  road 
by  which  McDowell's  left  would  naturally  have 
gone  into  position,  a  lane  from  the  Gainesville  pike, 
and  a  road  from  Bristow  Station  (General  Banks' 
position),  all  meet  at  that  point. 

From  the  Monroe  house,  on  the  crest  a  little 
further  west,  the  view  reached  as  far  as  Gainesville, 
and  revealed  every  thing  between  there  and  Pope's 
head-quarters  at  Buck  Hill.  Here  was  Stuart's  po 
sition  beyond  all  doubt,  and  the  elevation  bears  his 
name  in  the  vicinity  to  this  day.  Chaplain  Land- 
street  was  there  with  him,  and  though  the  lack  of 
fuller  development  of  this  part  of  the  map  made 
him  refer  Stuart's  position  to  the  Cole  house,  his 
testimony  is  clear  and  telling  as  to  what  he  saw. 
The  character  of  this  position  must  be  kept  care 
fully  in  mind. 

Morell's  ridge  slopes  upward  toward  the  east,  to 
the  crowning  point  called  Mount  Pone,  a  bald  knob 
in  the  open,  which  is  the  only  considerable  ele 
vation  within  the  Union  lines.  On  the  slope  behind 
Morell  the  contour  line  marked  two  hundred  and 
ten  runs,  by  a  very  direct  course  north,  coming 
into  the  open  ground  where  it  crosses  the  old  War 
renton  and  Washington  road,  before  mentioned, 
and  thence  continues  in  an  almost  equally  direct  line 
to  the  Chinn  house,  where  the  slope  descends  to 
the  Gainesville  pike,  near  Pope's  head-quarters.  By 


34  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

a  direct  line,  therefore,  and  on  an  exact  level,  going 
neither  up  hill  nor  down  even  so  much  as  five  feet, 
the  position  of  Porter's  advance  division  was 
connected  with  the  position  occupied  by  Sigel's 
corps  that  morning,  the  screen  of  woods  alone  pre 
venting  this  from  being  plain  to  their  eyes  at  the 
time. 

But,  again,  the  old  Warrenton  and  Washington 
Road,  leaving  the  Hampton  Cole  house,  goes  east 
ward  along  a  ridge  on  almost  exactly  the  same 
contour  last  mentioned,  being  a  practically  level 
road  till  it  meets  the  prolongation  of  Morell's  line 
of  deployment  extended  northward.  Near  this 
point  the  road  marked  Compton's  Lane  goes  off  to 
Groveton,  descending  the  slope  and  passing  through 
the  position  in  which  Reynolds'  division  was  that 
morning  on  the  left  of  Schenck.  Around  the  foot 
of  the  gentle  slopes  to  the  north  runs  Young's 
Branch,  in  the  hollow  which  separated  the  posi 
tion  of  the  United  States  troops  from  those  of  Jack 
son,  who  lay  on  the  still  more  commanding  ground 
to  the  north,  on  a  ridge  forty  or  fifty  feet  higher 
than  that  which  connected  Schenck's  with  Porter's 
position. 

The  official  maps  made  by  General  Warren,  ex 
cellent  as  they  are  in  other  respects,  are  deficient 
in  not  extending  the  contours  which  mark  the  to 
pography,  so  as  to  include  the  Monroe  or  Stuart 


OF    BULL    RUN.  35 

Hill,  which  is  the  crest  of  the  high  ground,  of  which 
Hampton  Cole's  is  a  part.  The  Judge  Advocate 
presented  one  in  argument,  which  indicated  the 
topography  further  west  toward  Gainesville,  but  it 
was  not  before  the  witnesses  when  they  testified, 
and  was  so  ridiculed  by  Porter's  counsel  that  one 
might  well  hesitate  to  trust  to  it,  if  General  Porter 
himself,  in  a  paper  printed  since  the  investigation, 
had  not  treated  its  topography  as  correct. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  witnesses  were  not 
referred  to  a  map  which  showed  the  character  of 
the  ground  at  one  of  the  most  important  points  of 
the  field.  A  witness  who  has  before  him  what  is 
treated  as  an  official  chart  of  the  theater  of  opera 
tions  is  almost  certainly  led  to  place  every  thing 
within  those  limits,  and  this  influence  is  manifiest 
in  the  testimony  of  several.  In  the  official  map 
this  absence  of  contour  lines  west  of  Hampton 
Cole's  gives  to  that  point  the  appearance  of  being 
the  crest  from  which  Gainesville  was  visible.  Wit 
nesses  would  naturally  be  led  to  speak  of  that  as 
the  crest,  which,  in  fact,  was  a  little  farther  west, 
at  Monroe's.  This,  however,  makes  no  material 
difference  in  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the 
testimony,  as  may  easily  be  made  apparent. 

Let  us  extend  our  examination  of •  the  field  over 
the  portion  not  contoured  by  General  Warren.  The 
natural  starting  point  is  at  the  Douglass  house 


36  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

near  the  right  of  Jackson's  line,  and  which  is  a 
prominent  feature  in  all  descriptions  of  the  engage 
ment.  That  house  stands  on  the  slope  running 
from  the  contour  line  marked  220  feet  to  that 
marked  240  feet.  Going  south-westerly  along  the 
general  line  of  the  ridge  which  formed  Jackson's 
position,  we  find  ourselves  on  a  continuing  hill,  of 
which  the  crest  is  about  five  hundred  yards  wide 
between  the  contours  marked  220  on  the  two  sides 
of  it. 

This  ridge,  thus  directly  continuing  Jackson's  po 
sition,  crosses  the  pike  and  keeps  the  same  direc 
tion  south-west  for  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  till  it 
reaches  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  which  is  there 
on  the  top  of  the  watershed  dividing  the  streams 
flowing  southward  into  Broad  Run  and  towards 
Bristow,  from  those  flowing  northward  into  Cathar- 
pin  Run  (behind  Jackson),  and  into  Young's 
Branch.  Immediately  in  rear  of  the  place  last 
named,  and  toward  Gainesville,  the  ground  rises 
again  above  the  contour  marked  240,  and  even  260, 
and  forms  an  almost  semicircular  ridge  with  its 
two  flanks  on  the  pike,  and  its  face  southward  in 
the  direction  of  Bristow.  If  the  larger  ridge  last 
described  were  occupied  by  a  line  of  battle,  no 
military  man  will  fail  to  see  at  once  the  strength 
of  this  position  for  a  refused  flank  on  his  extreme 
right,  if  there  were  the  slightest  reason  to  appre- 


OF    BULL    RUN.  37 

hend  the  approach  of  an  enemy  from  any  point 
between  south  and  west — from  Bristow  to  the  di 
rection  of  Warrenton.  The  position  thus  described 
is  crossed  by  no  ravine  or  water-course.  It  has  in 
front  the  hollow  in  which  runs  the  upper  part  of 
Young's  Branch,  which  makes  an  elbow,  and  crosses 
the  pike  twice,  bearing  away  to  the  south-east, 
toward  the  Lewis-Leachman  house.  On  the  north 
side  of  the  pike  the  continuation  of  the  same  con 
tour  level  comes  forward  like  a  bastion  or  salient 
in  the  line  till  it  reaches  the  edge  of  the  "  Gib 
bon  Woods,"  to  which  reference  has  so  often  been 
made.  Nearly  the  whole  front  of  this  position, 
from  the  pike  southward,  is  covered  by  a  screen  of 
woods,  the  open  crest  behind  being  thus  admirably 
placed  for  easiest  and  most  concealed  maneuver, 
whilst  the  open  front  which  stretches  southward 
from  a  point  a  little  west  of  the  Douglass  house 
gives  the  needed  sweep  for  the  artillery  which  was 
placed  there.  The  smaller  map  used  by  Porter's 
counsel  in  argument  and  numbered  16,  shows  two 
things  more  clearly  than  the  larger  ones,  viz :  the 
relation  of  the  branch  of  Catharpin  Run  to  the 
parallel  part  of  Young's  Branch,  and  the  continua 
tion  of  the  unfinished  line  of  railway  till  it  unites 
with  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad.  The  latter  very 
significantly  indicates  to  any  one  having  an  eye  for 
topography,  that  the  natural  continuation  of  Jack- 


38  THE    SECOND    BATTLE. 

son's  position  was  along  the  same  line  of  rail 
road  survey  upon  the  ridge  which  has  just  been 
described. 

Such  considerations  make  it  almost  certain  that 
when  Lee  came  on  a  field  where  Jackson  was  al 
ready  warmly  pressed  by  a  force  which  the  com 
manding  General  believed  to  be  equal  or  superior 
to  his  own,  he  would  form  his  right  wing  on  this 
plain  prolongation  of  Jackson's  formation,  unless 
something  in  the  character  and  position  of  the 
Monroe  Hill  should  forbid.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
assume  that  Lee  would  mean  to  stay  permanently 
where  he  formed  his  line  of  battle.  His  tactics 
were  quite  as  likely  to  be  aggressive  in  those  days 
as  ours.  We  must  remember,  too,  that  Stuart 
already  held  the  highest  part  of  this  saddle-shaped 
Monroe  Hill,  and  that  it  is  called  by  his  name  in 
the  neighborhood  now,  from  the  fact  that  he  took 
his  station  on  the  southern  end  of  it  with  his  horse 
men,  after  he  came  back  from  his  meeting  with 
Lee  and  Longstreet,  on  the  Haymarket  road.  The 
middle  part  of  the  ridge  is  no  higher  than  the  cor 
responding  part  of  the  one  west  of  Page-land  Lane, 
which  has  been  described  above.  The  northern 
part,  which  runs  up  to  the  contour  line  240,  is 
narrow;  its  length  is  north  and  south,  and  both 
sides  of  it  are  completely  enfiladed  by  the  batteries, 
which,  it  is  admitted,  were  massed  in  the  interval 


OF    BULL     RUN.  39 

between  Jackson  and  Longstreet  and  near  the 
Douglass  house.  These  were  Meade's  ''hornets' 
nest.'7  That  salient  would  have  proved  as  useful  to 
the  Confederate  artillery  if  an  attack  by  the  left 
center  of  our  forces  had  been  made  on  Longstreet's 
right  after  he  was  fairly  in  position,  as  it  proved 
the  next  day  when  the  artillery  was  massed  upon 
Porter  in  his  attack  at  our  right  center.  Lee  could, 
therefore,  perfectly  well  afford  to  neglect  occupy 
ing  the  Monroe  Hill  till  he  was  fully  assured  that 
there  was  no  danger  impending  on  his  extreme 
right  and  rear.  It  is  toward  that  direction  \ve 
must  turn  our  thoughts  for  a  moment  to  appreciate 
his  conduct. 

Lee  had  left  Pope  in  his  old  front  on  the  Rap- 
pahannock  when  he  started  to  follow  Jackson  in 
the  bold  movement  on  the  rear  of  the  National 
army.  He  knew,  also,  that  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  was  on  its  way  to  join  Pope.  As  Jackson 
had  the  cavalry  with  him,  Lee  had  to  act  on  faith 
and  not  on  sight  till  he  reopened  communications 
with  his  subordinate  at  or  after  the  passing  of 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  All  that  either  he  or  Jackson 
knew  or  could  know  was  that  the  United  States 
army  was  concentrating ;  but  he  was  necessarily 
ignorant  of  the  extent  to  which  this  had  been  ef 
fected.  Is  it  not  certain,  therefore,  that  the  line 
of  railroad  from  Warrenton  to  Manassas  must  have 


4O  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

represented  to  him  the  general  line  of  the  army 
under  Pope,  whilst  the  doubtful  point  to  be  settled 
was  whether  it  had  concentrated  ?  Lee's  anxiety 
on  this  subject  is  shown  by  the  promptness  with 
which  he  pushed  some  cavalry  toward  Warrenton 
to  find  out  whether  Pope  still  had  forces  there,  and 
his  doubts  were  not  solved  till  the  night  of  the  29th, 
when  he  got  his  report.*  During  the  day  of  that 
date  he  was  therefore  necessarily  influenced  in  his 
movements  and  in  choosing  his  position,  by  the 
contingency  of  attack  from  the  west  as  well  as  south. 
This  view  of  the  case  so  palpably  occupied  his 
mind  and  his  subordinates'  that  by  a  sort  of  com 
mon  consent  they  speak  of  Porter's  column  as  com 
ing  from  the  direction  of  Bristow,  which  was  the 
direction  of  shortest  approach  from  the  general 
line  of  Pope's  army,  as  has  been  shown.  They 
even  allowed  this  natural  theory  of  the  situation  to 
outweigh  the  fact  that  those  of  Porter's  troops 
which  they  saw  were  on  the  Manassas  road.  Bas 
ing  our  judgment,  therefore,  on  the  most  solid  and 
fundamental  facts  in  the  general  problem,  we  must 
conclude  that  it  would  be  the  natural  and  the  wise 
thing  for  Lee  to  do  in  his  situation,  to  extend  Jack 
son's  line  on  the  continuous  ridge,  keeping  the 
still  higher  ground  commanding  the  Gainesville 


Vol.  2,  p.  545.      Report  of  Maj.  Hairston. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  4! 

pike  and  the  Bristow  road  as  the  strong  point  to 
be  occupied  in  force,  if  a  serious  push  at  him  were 
made  either  from  Warrenton  or  from  Bristow.  It 
is  clear,  also,  that  this  high  ground  was  that  which 
Early  had  occupied  in  the  morning,  before  the  ar 
rival  of  Longstreet,  to  cover  Jackson's  flank  from 
apprehended  dangers  of  precisely  the  same  sort. 

With  this  view  of  the  situation,  with  the  certainty 
that  Ricketts  had  withdrawn  toward  Bristow,  with 
the  presumption  that  King's  division  had  done  the 
same,  with  the  probability  that  Banks  and  the  rest 
of  Pope's  army  would  be  in  the  same  direction  (as 
was  the  fact),  with  the  knowledge  that  one  of  the 
corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  come  on  the 
field  from  Centerville  (Heintzelman's)  as  Jackson 
must  have  learned  from  his  prisoners,  Lee  must 
almost  necessarily  have  concluded  that  he  was  to 
have  Pope's  Army  of  Virginia  on  his  front  and  right, 
and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  his  left.  On  true 
military  theory,  therefore,  Lee's  line  would  be 
where  it  is  placed  above.  If  he  had  made  a  crochet 
at  Jackson's  right  and  put  Longstreet  on  the  line 
reaching  thence  to  Hampton  Cole's,  his  right  wing 
would  have  been  "in  the  air,"  sticking  out  like  a 
sore  thumb  in  a  position  to  be  most  easily  hurt. 
When  he  had  settled  the  fact  that  his  right  and 
right  front  were  not  threatened,  or  that  his  forces 
were  greatly  superior  in  number  or  in  morale  to 


42  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

Pope's,  he  could  afford  to  advance  that  wing  for 
decisive  attack,  as  he  did  next  day,  but  he  would 
be  quite  unlikely  to  do  it  at  once  upon  his  arrival 
on  the  field.  We  must  consider  the  testimony  in 
the  light  of  these  probabilities  when  we  strive  to 
reconcile  conflicts  in  the  memory  or  the  opinions 
of  the  witnesses  in  the  case. 

Hood  tells  us  in  his  report  that  he  formed  on  the 
extension  of  Jackson's  line,*  leaving  a  gap  for  the 
massing  of  the  artillery.  Wilcox  fixes  his  own  place 
in  support  of  the  artillery  and  behind  the  ridge.. 
Both  these  positions  are  properly  described  only  by 
taking  the  line  we  have  selected.  Stuart,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  occupied  the  south  end  of  the 
Monroe  Hill.  Neither  he  nor  any  one  who  was 
with  him,  says  that  Longstreet's  formation  was  in 
front  of  that  ridge.  On  the  contrary,  White  and 
Blackford,  his  staff  officers,  Chaplain  Landstreet  of 
his  command,  and  Colonel  Rosser,  all  locate  Long- 
street's  line  behind  Pageland  Lane.  Citizen  Mon 
roe,  who  lived  on  the  hill,  and  was  there  that  day, 
describes  the  "skirmishers"  who  were  around  his 
house  (meaning  probably  Stuart's  men),  and  says 
they  were  in  front  toward  Hampton  Cole's,  but  he 
places  the  line  of  battle  of  Longstreet  behind  Page- 
land  Lane  also,  and  says  that  none  of  these  troops 


*  Vol.    2,   p.    534. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  43 

went  forward  to  the  east  of  his  house  till  the  mid 
dle  of  the  afternoon,  when  Hunton's  brigade  did 
so.  *  Hunton  was  a  resident  of  that  vicinity,  and 
is  the  recent  member  of  Congress  from  that  dis 
trict.  The  naming  of  his  brigade  by  Monroe  is 
therefore  doubly  important,  because  it  was  one  in 
which  were  his  neighbors,  and  which  he  would  be 
likely  to  know  well.  Now  we  know  from  Lee's 
and  Longstreet's  reports  that  Hunton  was  ordered 
forward  to  support  Hood  in  the  contest  between 
him  and  McDowell's  men  on  the  pike  that  evening, 
and  this  makes  Monroe's  testimony  strongly  cor 
roborative  of  the  rest.  Citizen  Carraco,  whose 
house  was  nearest  of  all  to  Porter's  front  and  a  little 
east  of  Hampton  Cole's,  was  at  home  all  day  till 
about  four  p.  M.,  when,  on  warning  from  the  Con 
federate  officers,  he  went  to  the  rear  going  past 
Cole's  and  up  the  railroad  toward  Gainesville  about 
a  mile.f  He  crossed  no  line  of  the  enemy  and 
saw  none  but  a  few  cavalrymen  with  a  single  can 
non  a  little  in  the  rear  of  Cole's.  If  the  Confeder 
ate  line  had  been  where  Longstreet  and  some  others, 
guessing  at  it,  drew  it  on  the  map,  he  must  neces 
sarily  have  crossed  it,  as  he  must  also  have  done  if 
it  had  been  anywhere  on  a  possible  position  in 
front  of  that  which  has  been  indicated.  All  the 


*Yol.    2.   p.    925.  tVol.    2,    p.    921. 


44  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

evidence  given  us  by  the  reports  of  Reynolds  and 
Schenck  and  the  testimony  of  their  subordinates  is 
very  strong  in  the  same  direction ;  indeed,  it  is 
irreconcilable  with  any  other  conclusion.  The  tes 
timony  of  Colonel  Marshall,  who  commanded  Por 
ter's  skirmish  line,  is  decisive  to  the  same  effect,  if 
his  testimony  is  worth  any  thing.  He  was  brought 
forward  as  a  peculiarly  trustworthy  and  important 
witness  by  General  Porter  and  his  counsel  on  several 
occasions.  His  testimony  was  taken  in  the  original 
trial,  when  he  was  on  what  was  supposed  was  his 
death-bed  from  wounds  received  in  battle.  This 
fact  was  somewhat  dramatically  brought  out  to  add 
to  the  solemn  weight  of  his  testimony.  Stress  was 
laid  upon  the  fact  that  he  was  a  regular  officer, 
educated  at  West  Point,  and  his  opinions  were  put 
forward  as  if  those  of  an  expert.  Most  of  this  has 
an  unpleasant  air  of  clap-trap,  but  it  certainly  shows 
that  his  testimony  must  be  taken  as  final  by  those 
who  called  him,  when  he  speaks  of  military  posi 
tions  which  he  says  he  saw  with  his  own  eyes.  His 
opinion  that  it  was  unsafe  for  Porter  to  attack  under 
the  half-past  four  o'clock  order  was  said  to  be  itself 
enough  to  exonerate  his  commander.  If  his  testi- 

o 

mony  is  good  as  to  his  fears,  it  certainly  should  be 
good  as  to  his  facts.  He  says  that  at  three  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  or  later,  the  enemy  developed  an  in 
fantry  force,  the  first  infantry  he  Jiad  seen  in  his  front, 


OF    BULL    RUN.  45 

about  a  mile  north-west  of  the  point  near  the  Ran 
dall's  house,  (a  little  south  of  Hampton  Cole's) 
where  he  himself  crawled  to  make  his  observation.* 
A  simple  measurement  of  a  mile  north-\vest  from 
the  point  where  he  placed  himself,  puts  Longstreet's 
command  again  beyond  Page-land  Lane.  If  this 
force  appeared  there  at  three  o'clock  or  later,  and 
was  the  first  infantry  seen  in  Porter's  front  (and 
nobody  else  even  pretends  to  have  seen  any),  it 
demonstrate*  that  Porter  might  have  occupied 
that  hill  from  Cole's  to  Monroe's  for  three  or  four 
hours  at  least,  and  have  perfected  his  connection 
with  the  rest  of  the  line  long  before  Longstreet 
came  dangerously  near  to  him.  As  Marshall,  there 
fore,  from  his  command  on  the  skirmish  line,  was 
the  man  upon  whom  Porter  depended  for  the  facts 
regarding  the  situation,  and  whom,  as  he  claims, 
he  trusted  implicitly,  he  must  be  held  to  have 
known  that  Longstreet's  line  of  battle  was  nowhere 
near  the  Hampton  Cole  house. 

It  agrees  also  with  Longstreet's  official  report,  in 
which  he  says  that  'Mate  in  the  day"  he  heard  of 
the  Union  troops  on  his  left  flank  and  sent  three 
brigades  there.  All  the  Confederate  witnesses  agree 
that  no  man  of  their  infantry  on  Porter's  front  was 
engaged  that  day.  With  one  accord  they  say  it 


*  Vol.    2,   p.    132. 


46  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

was  only  the  cavalry  vedettes 'that  had  a  skirmish, 
and  that  so  slight  a  one  that  we  hear  of  no  casual 
ties  on  either  side  on  the  skirmish  line. 

Following  Longstreet's  line  back  again  toward 
Jackson,  we  find  the  Confederate  General  Wilcox 
testifying  that  his  division  was  placed  400  yards  in 
rear  of  the  artillery  which  was  on  the  crest  between 
Longstreet  and  Jackson;  and  when,  after  the  com 
bat  with  McDowell's  troops  that  evening,  he  was 
withdrawn,  he  not  only  says  it  was  to  a  position 
forming  connection  between  Lee's  two  wings,  but 
that  this  intervening  space  was  a  ridge  behind  which 
they  could  be  sheltered.*  We  can  find  on  the  map 
nothing  which  answers  to  this  description  except 
the  connecting  ridge  which  has  been  described,  and 
on  which  Longstreet's  line  has  been  located.  Law, 
of  Hood's  division,  who  seems  to  have  borne,  on 
the  Confederate  side,  the  brunt  of  the  fight  on  the 
pike  that  evening,  says  that  in  the  night  he  with 
drew  to  the  position  he  occupied  in  the  morning,  f 
This  corroborates  the  conclusion  drawn  from  Wil- 
cox's  testimony. 

In  opposition  to  all  this  is  the  opinion  of  several 
Confederate  officers  which  does  not  seem  to  be 
based  upon  any  such  decisive  identification  of  lo 
calities. 

*Vol.  2,  p.  266.  tVol.  2,  p.  542. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  47 

Their  opinion  can  not  be  accepted  without  re 
jecting  that  of  Reynolds  and  Schcnck  and  their 
subordinates,  upon  points  where  it  is  quite  incredi 
ble  that  they  should  be  mistaken.  We  should  have 
to  reject,  also,  the  testimony  of  a  greater  number 
of  Confederate  officers,  who  had  better  opportuni 
ties  of  knowing  the  exact  facts  in  relation  to  the 
position  of  their  right,  besides  the  citizens  whose 
testimony  has  been  referred  to. 

But  the  assumption  of  the  line  at  Hampton  Cole's 
has  difficulties  of  quite  another  sort.  Jofies,  whose 
division  is  supposed  to  be  on  the  brow  of  the  hill 
immediately  facing  Porter,  makes  no  reference  to 
Porter's  existence  in  his  official  report.  Neither 
does  Kemper.  The  testimony,  which  comes  from 
witnesses  who  were  in  their  commands,  all  indicates 
that  they  were  not  in  Porter's  presence  at  all.  Dray- 
ton's  brigade  was  put  out  at  right  angles  to  Jones' 
line,  in  support  of  Robertson's  cavalry,  late  in  the 
day ;  and  this  circumstance,  which  is  clearly  intelli 
gible  if  Jones  was  where  we  have  placed  him,  would 
be  utterly  unintelligible  on  the  other  hypothesis. 
With  Jones  at  Hampton  Cole's,  his  skirmishers  should 
have  been  in  contact  with  Porter,  and  he  would 
have  reported  it.  He  not  only  does  not  report  it. 
but  officers  from  his  command  testify  to  the  con 
trary.  Yet  Porter  is  supposed  to  have  paralyzed  the 


48  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

action  of  all    these  troops,  which  did  not  know  of 
his  existence. 

Longstreet  admits  frankly  that  he  don't  know 
where  to  place  Stuart  and  his  cavalry,  upon  his 
theory  of  the  field.  But  Stuart  is  placed  beyond 
dispute  where  he  would  be  behind  and  surrounded 
by  the  infantry  if  Longstreet  is  right,  namely,  on 
the  Monroe  or  Stuart  Hill.  That  is  not  where  he 
was  apt  to  be,  and  there  is  no  scintilla  of  evidence 
that  he  sought  such  shelter.  But  Longstreet's 
effort  to  construct  a  theory  favorable  to  Porter,  in 
volves  him  in  other  grave  inconsistencies.  In  his 
letter,  which  Porter  drew  from  him  in  1866,  he 
refused  to  state  hours,  and  we  have  seen  that  he 
modified  his  opinions  at  this  latest  investigation 
after  conference  with  Porter's  friends.  He  now  says 
he  arrived  with  his  head  of  column  on  the  field 
about  ten,  having  been  in  supporting  distance  since 
nine.*  That  is  to  say,  a  command  stretched  out 
three  or  four  miles,  as  he  says  his  was,  is  in  support 
ing  distance  when  the  head  of  the  column  is  some 
three  miles  away !  Such  support  as  that  gave  Na 
poleon  many  an  opportunity  to  whip  an  enemy  in 
detail.  He  says  he  was  deployed  within  an  hour 
(though  Lee  says  it  would  take  more  than  twice 
that  time),  and  within  twenty  minutes  thereafter,  or 


*Vol.    2,    p.     117. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  49 

by  twenty  minutes  past  eleven,  he  made  a  personal 
reconnoissance  to  the  Lewis-Leachman  (more  proba 
bly  Cundliffe)  house.  That  on  his  return,  and  while 
telling  Lee  what  he  saw,  Stuart's  report  of  Porter's 
advance  reached  him.*  This  would  be,  say  half- 
past  eleven  o'clock.  But  when  he  is  asked,  in  a 
subsequent  part  of  the  examination,  the  hour  at 
which  he  got  Stuart's  report,  he  says  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  f  His  official  report,  which  says 
"  late  in  the  day,"  and  Wilcox's  report,  which  says 
half-past  four,  only  enlarge  the  discrepancy  and 
show  the  confusion  of  memory  into  which  the  con 
ferences  with  Porter's  friends  had  led  him. 

Again  he  saysj  that  Porter  delayed  them,  and 
that  if  they  had  had  three  or  four  more  hours  of 
light,  they  would  have  attacked.  Waiving  the  fact 
that  they  actually  made  an  attack  at  dusk,  another 
indisputable  fact  is  that  they  did  not  attack  all  the 
next  day  till  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  though 
Porter  was  clean  gone  during  the  night.  Still  again 
he  says§  that  he  did  not  know  of  Porter's  with 
drawal  till  next  morning,  when  his  official  report, 
made  at  the  time  (and  Stuart  uses  almost  the  same 
words),  says  that  after  a  few  shots  Porter  withdrew', 
moving  around  to  Pope's  front,  and  apparently  join- 


*Vol.  2,  pp.  1 20  and  129.  tPage  124. 

+  Page  121.  \  Page  121. 


5O  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

ing  in  the  attack  on  Jackson,*  and  when  he  shows 
also  by  both  his  report  and  his  testimony  that  so 
far  from  Porter's  holding  his  troops  fast,  he  with 
drew  again  Wilcox's  division  from  his  right,  and 
used  him  in  supporting  Hood's  attack  in  the  center, 
which,  being  thus  made  with  Hood's  and  Wilcox's 
divisions,  and  part  of  Kemper's,  should  be  regarded 
as  a  general  attack  by  him,  for  most  of  his  com 
mand  was  thus  put  in,  and  the  rest  were  ready  to 
follow  it  up  if  he  was  successful.  He  admits  failure 
of  success,  because  he  says  he  withdrew  Hood  on 
account  of  finding  Pope's  troops  so  heavily  massed 
in  his  front,  f  To  such  a  tissue  of  inconsistencies 
and  contradictions  does  his  benevolent  disposition 
to  help  Porter  bring  him,  and  such  is  the  valuable 
newly-discovered  evidence  on  which  the  judgment 
of  the  Court-martial  of  1862  is  to  be  reversed. 
From  whatever  direction  we  approach  the  subject, 
therefore,  we  are  brought  to  the  same  conclusion  as 
to  the  time  and  place  of  Longstreet's  deployment. 
The  time  was  at  least  three  or  four  hours  after  Por 
ter  reached  Dawkins  Branch,  and  the  place  was 
west  of  Page-land  Lane. 

PORTER'S  CONDUCT  ON  THE  29™. 

A  written  dispatch  of  General  Sykes  to  General 
Morell,  dated  half-past  eight  on  the  morning  of  the 

*Vol.  2,  p.  526.  tlbid.,  p.  521. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  5  I 

29th,  at  Manassas  Junction,  says  that  the  column 
was  delayed  while  more  ammunition  was  distrib 
uted.  On  the  principle  already  stated,  this  date 
will  be  taken  as  a  fixed  point  in  that  morning's  his 
tory,  and  as  showing  that  Porter's  command  was 
then  at  the  Junction. 

As  to  the  delay  itself,  it  appears  in  the  testimony 
that  the  men  then  had  forty  rounds  of  ammunition 
with  them,*  and  if  speed  was  really  meant,  the  need 
of  waiting  there  to  distribute  more  is  at  least  ques 
tionable.  In  the  west,  the  common  way  would  have 
been  to  put  the  ammunition  wagons  into  the  column, 
and  take  other  opportunities  to  distribute  it,  as  the 
men's  cartridge  boxes  were  already  full.  We  have  no 
right  to  forget  that,  from  the  26th  onward,  Pope's 
dispatches  constantly  urged  haste.  The  one  under 
which  Porter  was  now  acting  repeated  it.  Every 
hour  was  of  incalculable  value  as  the  event  showed. 
But  passing  this  by,  we  will  assume  that  by  nine 
o'clock  Morell  was  leading  off  on  the  Gainesville 
road.  The  distances  by  scale  seem  to  be  a  mile 
and  a  half  to  the  forks  of  the  Sudley  road,  where 
Porter's  head-quarters  were  during  the  afternoon, 
and  from  there  two  miles  to  the  ridge  east  of  Daw- 
kins  Branch,  where  Morell  deployed.  From  all 
the  testimony  as  to  the  actual  rate  of  marching,  he 


*  Vol.  2,  pp.  333  and  431. 


52  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

ought  to  have  been  there  in  less  than  an  hour  and  a 
half,  and  that  would  not  be  rapid  work.  Some  of 
the  witnesses  put  the  time  of  arrival  at  the  branch  as 
early  as  ten,  but  Porter  claims  that  it  was  about 
eleven,  and  we  may  take  it  so,  simply  noting  the  fact 
that  this  certainly  shows  no  excess  of  zeal  in  getting 
forward.  They  had  taken  a  prisoner  or  two,  and  had 
seen  a  citizen,  and  learned  that  some  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  a  small  number,  were  between  them  and 
Gainesville.  Skirmishers  are  thrown  out  and  ex 
change  a  few  harmless  shots  with  Rosser's  videttes. 
What  ought  Porter  then  to  do? 

To  get  rid  of  some  fog,  we  must  look  at  Mc 
Dowell's  relation  to  the  command.  The  famous 
"joint  order"  had  directed  him  to  follow  Porter, 
and  whilst  they  acted  together,  McDowell  would, 
by  virtue  of  seniority,  have  the  right  to  command 
both  corps,  but  this  would  be  true  only  while  they 
acted  together  and  were  beyond  the  immediate 
orders  of  the  General-in-chief.  McDowell  did  not 
issue  any  orders  to  Porter  up  to  the  time  he  was 
with  him  in  person  at  Dawkins  Branch.  He  was 
looking  after  King's  division,  which  was  in  rather 
bad  plight  after  its  combat  of  the  evening  before, 
and  the  night  retreat.  The  "joint  order,"  and  Pope's 
special  order  to  Porter  were  so  far  in  accord  'that 
the  latter  was  simply  carrying  out  these  directions, 
and  was  certainly  bound  to  do  so,  in  their  full  pur- 


OF    BULL    RUN.  53 

pose  and  spirit,  unless  McDowell  exercised  his  right 
to  command  by  stopping  him  or  modifying  the 
order.  Thus  far  no  such  thing  had  been  done,  and 
in  speed  of  going  forward,  vigor  of  attacking  any 
thing  he  should  meet,  and  striving  to  do  all  that  the 
order  called  for,  he  was  as  fully  responsible  till  inter 
fered  with  as  if  McDowell  had  not  been  thsre  at  all. 
He  should,  no  doubt,  have  advised  McDowell  if  he 
found  any  great  force  before  him,  but  it  can  not  be 
questionable  that  his  business  was  to  get  into  posi 
tion  alongside  of  his  comrades,  whose  cannonade  he 
heard  in  the  direction  of  Groveton,  and  whose  shells 
he  and  his  troops  saw  bursting  in  the  air  when  they 
came  in  front  of  the  bit  of  open  ground  at  Dawkins 
Branch.  The  indisputable  fact  that  he  never  brushed 
away  the  cavalry  skirmishers  in  his  front,  never  de 
veloped  any  infantry  of  the  enemy,  and  has  to-day 
to  rely  upon  conjecture  and  purely  circumstantial 
evidence  to  prove  that  there  was  any  infantry  force 
immediately  before  him  till  late  in  the  day,  prove 
that  he  showed  no  vigor  or  energy  whatever. 

It  seems  to  have  been  a  full  hour  before  McDowell 
came  to  Dawkins  Branch  in  person,  and  there  is  no 
evidence  of  any  dispatch  or  message  from  Porter  to 
him.  He  seems  to  have  found  that  Porter's  column 
was  halted,  and  then  to  have  ridden  forward  to  dis 
cover  the  cause.  As  it  turned  out,  it  is  greatly  to 
be  regretted  that  McDowell  did  not  remain  and 


54  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

assume  practical  and  efficient  control  of  the  move 
ment  on  that  line,  but  it  is  easy  to  understand  how, 
in  view  of  the  difficulty  of  bringing  up  and  deploy 
ing  the  whole  force  in  the  woods,  he  should  have 
concluded  that  the  "  quickest  way  to  apply  his  force 
to  the  enemy,"  was  to  go  forward  by  the  Sudley 
road  whose  forks  were  close  to  the  head  of  his  own 
column,  and  bring  his  men  into  line  on  Reynolds' 
left,  where  from  his  theory  of  the  situation  ac 
cording  to  his  map,  he  would  probably  be  within 
easy  communicating  distance  of  Porter.  He  may 
have  erred  in  judgment,  but  he  did  not  retire  to  his 
tent.  He  acted,  "  he  marched  to  the  sound  of  the 
cannon,"  as  the  Comte  de  Paris  says,  and  went  as 
directly  as  possible  toward  his  object,  till  he  com 
municated  with,  and  got  new  orders  from  his  com 
manding  General. 

Had  Porter  ''kept  things  moving,"  supporting 
his  skirmishers  properly,  he  would  have  been  be 
yond  the  Hampton  Cole  house  before  McDowell 
came  to  the  front,  and  the  latter,  in  view  of  what 
he  must  have  seen  in  five  minutes'  gallop  on  the 
Warrenton  and  Alexandria  road  around  and  east 
of  Carraco's,  could  never  have  dreamed  of  any  cir 
cuitous  march  to  reach  the  field.  It  is  the  fatality 
of  war  that  one  blunder  or  fault  involves  many 
more.  Porter  was  mentally  and  morally  prepared 
to  find  the  enemy  before  him,  and  from  the  moment 


.OF    BULL    RUN.  55 

his  skirmishers  exchanged  shots  with  Rosser,  he 
stopped  stock-still,  and  never  dreamed  of  another 
step  in  advance.  By  the  time  McDowell  came  up 
Rosser  had  set  his  wits  to  work,  and  the  dust  was 
rising  from  the  brush  his  horsemen  were  dragging 
along  the  roads.  Hearing  Porter's  report  and  see 
ing  the  dust,  McDowell  reached  the  conclusion  that 
he  could  bring  his  men  into  action  most  speedily 
by  way  of  the  Sudley  road,  and  hurried  off  for  that 
purpose. 

The  testimony  is  not  conclusive  as  to  what  were 
McDowell's  parting  orders  to  Porter,  but  the  bur 
den  of  proof  is  upon  the  latter  to  prove  that  they 
were  explicit,  that  they  contained  directions  he  was 
bound  to  obey,  and  that  they  controlled  his  judg 
ment  in  fact.  McDowell  testifies  that  he  expected 
Porter  to  put  his  men  into  action  there,  but  no  sol 
dier  needs  to  be  told  that  not  even  an  explicit  order 
from  McDowell  could  continue  to  control  Porter 
after  the  union  of  their  forces,  on  which  alone  Por 
ter's  subordination  was  based,  had  been  broken. 
Left  to  himself,  his  first  duty  as  a  soldier  was  to  find 
out  what  was  in  front  of  him,  and  to  do  with  energy 
what  there  was  to  do.  A  vigorous  reconnoissance 
in  force  by  a  single  brigade  would  have  told  the 
whole  story  in  less  than  half  an  hour.  Instead  of 
this,  even  his  skirmish  line  did  not  press  the  enemy, 
two  or  three  cannon  shots  were  exchanged,  Porter 


56  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

went  two  miles  to  the  rear,  to  his  tent,  and  the  quiet 
was  only  disturbed  by  the  cannonade  off  to  their 
right,  where  Jackson  was  wishing  more  earnestly  for 
night  or  Longstreet  than  Wellington  did  for  "  night 
or  Blucher."  » 

Longstreet  tells  us  that  within  twenty  minutes 
from  the  time  his  line  was  formed  he  was  down  at 
the  very  verge  of  his  skirmish  line,  making  his  own 
reconnoissance  of  the  force  in  his  front ;  but  neither 
Porter,  nor  any  division  or  brigade  commander  of 
his  is  found  showing  any  curiosity  in  that  direction. 
Is  this  what  is  to  be  expected  of  an  energetic  and 
faithful  commander?  We  should  grievously  wrong 
the  members  of  the  Board  if  we  should  assume 
that  they  practiced  upon  the  example  which  they 
officially  declare  is  a  model  of  all  that  is  soldierly. 
It  is  a  pleasure  to  note  the  different  rules  of  duty 
they  applied  to  themselves  when  important  things 
were  dependent  on  their  action.  When  Schofield's 
little  army  was  retreating  from  Columbia,  Tennessee, 
the  night  before  the  bloody  battle  of  Franklin,  at 
the  close  of  November,  1864,  one  of  his  subordi 
nates,  coming  to  Spring  Hill  with  his  command  at 
midnight,  sought  the  General  to  get  further  orders. 
Stanley  told  him  that  Schofield  had  taken  the  ad 
vanced  guard  and  gone  off  to  Thompson's  Station 
to  settle  for  himself  the  truth  of  the  report  that 
Forrest  was  already  intercepting  us  at  the  forks  of 


OF    BULL    RUN.  57 

the  road.  This  was  not  in  the  middle  of  a  summer 
day,  but  in  the  middle  of  a  raw  autumnal  night. 
Ke,  at  least,  was  practicing  upon  the  maxim  laid 
down  by  the  Archduke  Charles,  in  his  principles 
of  strategy,  that  the  commander  who  wants  to  give 
energy  to  his  troops  must  live  with  the  advanced 
guard. 

But  as  to  Porter  on  that  day,  nothing  can  be 
made  plainer  than  that  from  the  moment  he  found 
one  of  Rosser's  videttes  in  front  of  him  he  gave  up 
every  thought  of  advancing  and  settled  down  into 
absolute  inaction.  The  officers  on  the  skirmish  line 
tell  us  they  found  comfort  in  the  understanding  that 
they  were  "not  to  bring  on  an  engagement."* 
General  Sturgis,  who  reported  with  a  brigade  just 
before  Porter  left  the  front,  was  sent  back  at  once 
to  Manassas  Junction,  f  Very  soon  Sykes'  division 
is  found  stretched  back  to  Bethlehem  Church,  and 
a  little  later  even  beyond  the  forks  of  the  Sudley 
road,  so  that  General  Tower,  himself  a  regular, 
recognized  the  regular  troops  on  the  right-hand  side 
of  the  road  as  he  marched  in  Ricketts'  division, 
past  them  to  the  field.  J  Morell's  men  began  soon 
to  follow  in  the  same  direction  as  General  Griffin 
and  others  tell  us,§  till  long  before  dark  the  whole 


*  Vol.  2,  pp.  660-661.          ,  t  Vol.  2,  p.   689. 

JVol.  2,  p.  452.  $  Vol.  I,  n.  158. 


58  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

command,  except  the  skirmishers  and  one  brigade, 
was  strung  along  the  road,  expecting  momentarily 
the  signal  to  march  to  Manassas,  and  Porter  had 
written  his  dispatch  to  McDowell,  saying,  in  sub 
stance,  that  as  he  was  satisfied  that  Pope  had  been 
beaten,  whilst  he  himself  was  thus  lying  idle  with 
in  earshot,  he  had  determined  to  withdraw. 

Porter's  counsel  wasted  a  deal  of  ingenuity  in 
trying  to  show  that  he  had  ordered  an  advance  of 
some  sort  before  he  got  the  half-past  four  order. 
To  what  end  ?  Is  there  the  slightest  indication  that 
any  new  conjuncture  had  arisen,  or  that  any  new 
facts  had  come  to  Porter's  knowledge  to  make  him 
push  at  five,  when  he  had  lain  stock-still  since 
eleven  ?  If  his  military  conscience  had  by  that  time 
become  uneasy,  it  only  proves  that  he  knew  he 
ought  to  have  acted  long  before. 

On  the  Union  side,  in  the  morning,  the  central 
line  was  the  old  Warrenton  Ridge  road,  and  the 
plainly  indicated  strategic  movement  for  our  army 
was  to  swing  forward  a  strong  left  flank,  interposing 
it  between  Jackson  and  Longstreet,  if  possible,  be 
fore  the  junction  of  their  forces,  the  movement  be 
ing  made  simultaneously  by  the  whole  line,  and 
with  as  much  ensemble  as  possible.  If  Longstreet 
had  not  arrived,  the  line  of  battle  would  have  been 
parallel  to  the  general  Confederate  line,  and  a  chance 
in  a  ranged  battle  could  have  been  accepted  or  de- 


BULL    RUN.  59 

to  circumstances.  Therefore,  if 
Porter  had  been  at  the  north  edge  of  the  woods  in 
stead  of  being  in  them  when  the  forward  move  of 
the  morning  was  made,  it  is  seen  at  once  that  he 
could  have  gone  forward  on  the  left  of  Reynolds. 
Now,  where  would  that  have  taken  him  ?  Let  us 
see.  The  testimony  proves  beyond  cavil  that 
Schenck  occupied  the  woods  south  of  the  pike, 
marked  on  Warren's  map  between  the  words  "War- 
renton  "  and  "Gainesville"  in  capitals.  Reynolds 
was  on  his  left,  and  these  two  divisions  were  swing 
ing-  the  left  forward  to  get  toward  the  right  flank 
of  Jackson.  Had  Porter  been  on  their  flank  there 
would  have  been  four  Union  divisions  nearly  on  a 
line  from  the  woods  just  spoken  of,  where  Schenck 
found  the  dead  and  wounded,  toward  the  Monroe 
or  Hampton  Cole  house.  That  such  a  line  would 
more  than  fill  the  space  is  proved  by  the  fact  that 
Longstreet  filled  what  Porter  claims  is  the  same 
line,  with  only  two  divisions,  viz :  Kemper's  and 
Jones'. 

If,  therefore,  Porter's  movement  had  been  coin 
cident  in  time  with  Schenck's  and  Reynolds',  he 
would  have  come  into  line  whenever  he  reached  the 
Hampton  Cole  house  in  his  front,  and  if,  by  promptly 
pressing  forward  when  he  came  to  Dawkins  Branch, 
this  would  have  resulted,  we  need  not  care  (as  I 
have  said  in  another  place)  whether  it  was  ' '  by 


6O  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

good  luck  or  good  management,"  he  could,  in  fact, 
have  been  in  his  proper  place  on  the  field. 

We  have  seen  that  in  Lee's  opinion,  as  an  ex 
pert,  it  took  Longstreet  about  two  and  a  half  hours 
to  get  into  position  after  the  head  of  his  column 
reached  the  field,  and  it  is,  no  doubt,  a  fair  estimate. 
But  Porter  needed  only  to  have  the  head  of  his 
column  on  the  Stuart  hill  to  have  had  the  whole 
field  under  his  eye.  From  the  Hampton  Cole  house 
he  could  have  seen  for  himself  where  Schenck  and 
Reynolds'were,  he  would  have  had  straight  com 
munication  by  the  Warrenton  and  Alexandria  road 
along  the  ridge  to  Pope's  head-quarters,  and  could 
have  solved  by  actual  vision  every  question  of  to 
pography  as  well  as  of  tactics.  To  have  held  that 
point  even  for  ten  minutes  would  have  shown  to  him 
how  to  retire,  if  he  must  retire,  by  a  concentric 
movement,  which  would  have  kept  him  in  position 
relatively  to  the  rest  of  the  army,  for  the  ridge  road 
would  have  been  his  own.  Even  if  Longstreet's 
wing  had  already  been  there,  a  temporary  posses 
sion  of  such  a  point  on  so  important  a  field  was 
worth  a  severe  struggle.  With  the  information  and 
the  orders  he  already  had,  and  the  knowledge  of  the 
situation  he  already  possessed,  with  the  noise  of 
his  comrades'  battle  in  his  ears,  and  with  the  con 
viction  which  he  was  too  intelligent  to  lack,  that 
from  the  bare  hill  before  him  he  would  see  what 


OF    BULL    RUN.  6 I 

the  forest  around  Morell  alone  was  hiding,  it  is  too 
plain  for  serious  argument  that  he  ought  to  have 
pushed  for  that  hill-top.  When  we  add  to  this 
what  we  have  seen  of  the  actual  movement  of  Rey 
nolds  and  Schenck,  whilst  he  was  lying  there,  and 
the  fact  that  neither  in  time  nor  in'  place  was  Long- 
street  near  him,  our  judgment  must  go  with  the 
Court-martial  of  1863,  that  what  he  did  was  a  mili 
tary  crime. 

When  we  are  told  of  the  newly-discovered  evi 
dence,  found  chiefly  in  the  charitable  disposition  of 
Confederate  officers  to  speak  kindly  of  the  "  bridge 
that  carried  them  safe  over,"  and  to  remember 
things  as  favorably  as  possible,  and  when  we  are 
asked  in  reliance  on  this  to  falsify  the  reports  of 
nearly  every  National  officer  on  the  field,  from 
Meade  on  the  left  to  Poe  on  the  extreme  right,  it 
is  well  to  recall  the  fact  that  among  this  newly-dis 
covered  evidence  is  this,  that  the  total  force  of  our 
army  on  that  field  was  superior  to  Lee's  combined 
army  by  just  about  the  amount  of  Porter's  corps. 
The  latest  historian  of  that  campaign,  himself 
friendly  to  Porter,  gives  the  number  of  Heintzel- 
man's,  Reno's  and  McDowell's  corps  at  5 3,000  men. 
Lee's  he  puts  at  54,000,  including  cavalry.* 

The  rest  were  engaged  in  deadly  contest  with  the 


'*  Ropes'  Army  under  Pope,  pp.  194-199. 


62  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

enemy.  The  orders  of  General  Pope  were  aimed 
at  thrusting  this  surplus  strength  with  a  telling  blow 
upon  the  flank  of  his  opponent,  or,  if  you  please, 
upon  the  extreme  right  of  his  line,  and  we  are  told 
it  was  not  safe  to  do  it.  In  behalf  of  the  soldiery 
of  the  American  army  we  may  insist  that  the  thing 
lacking  to  make  it  only  that  danger  out  of  which 
courage  "plucks  the  flower  safety"  was  the  proper 
leadership  for  this  flanking  force ;  this  it  was  which 
needed,  in  the  language  which  Porter  had  written  to 
Burnside,  something  "to  give  it  heart  if  not  head." 
The  truth  is  that  its  leader  lacked  heart. 

THE   HALF-PAST  FOUR   ORDER. 

At  half-past  four,  Pope,  impatient  at  hearing  noth 
ing  of  Porter,  sent  his  peremptory  order  to  attack 
at  once.  The  time  when  this  reached  Porter  has 
been  sharply  contested,  and  a  strong  and  direct 
attack  was  made  upon  the  veracity  of  Captain 
Douglas  Pope,  who  carried  it.  To  brand  this  officer 
as  a  perjurer  has  not  seemed  too  great  a  price  to 
pay  for  Porter's  reinstatement.  A  careful  attention 
to  the  evidence  shows  that  this  attack  is  entirely 
undeserved  and  is  cruelly  unjust. 

In  Warren's  written  dispatch  to  Sykes,  dated  at 
5:45  P.  M.,  we  have  one  of  those  reliable  dates,  like 
that  of  Sykes  to  Morell  in  the  morning,  which  must 
outweigh  all  mere  efforts  of  memory.  Mark  that 


OF    BULL    RUN.  63 

Griffin's  brigade  of  Morell's  division  was  then  a 
mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles  from  the  front,*  which 
would  bring  them  very  near  Porter's  head-quarters. 
Warren's  brigade  of  Sykes'  division  was  just  east 
of  them.  Randol,  of  the  regular  artillery,  was  so 
close  to  Porter's  head-quarters  that  he  saw  Captain 
Pope  arrive,  and  was  soon  told  that  he  had  ' '  got 
to  go  to  the  front  again,  "t  The  order  went  to 
Morell,  he  sent  back  to  Griffin,  Griffin  made  his 
column  about  face,  Warren  did  the  like,  and  after 
that,  he  wrote  his  dispatch  to  Sykes,  with  the  hour 
noted  above.  That  all  this  took  half  an  hour  needs 
no  telling,  and  the  testimony  proves,  beyond  rea 
sonable  cavil,  that  it  was  done  in  consequence  of 
the  order  Captain  Pope  had  brought.  That  order 
reached  Porter,  therefore,  a  very  few  minutes  in 
deed  after  five  o'clock.  Amid  all  the  wild  guessing 
as  to  hours,  which  makes  it  almost  ridiculous  to 
rely  on  what  anybody  in  that  command  remembers 
as  to  time  on  that  day,  this  dispatch  of  Warren  gives 
us  sure  and  solid  ground  of  the  sort  I  have  tried  to 
make  the  criterion  in  the  various  parts  of  that  day's 
history.  Captain  Pope  received  the  order  at  half- 
past  four,  tells  us  it  took  him  from  half  to  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour  to  carry  it  to  Porter.  This  im 
pregnable  array  of  facts  shows  that  it  was  delivered 


*Vol.    I,   p.    158.  t  Vol.  2,   p.    146. 


64  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

as  he  said  it  was.  There  can  be  no  satisfaction  to 
any  true  soldier  in  the  picture  of  Porter's  com 
mand  that  afternoon,  and  all  must  wish,  for  the 
sake  of  the  common  reputation  of  American  arms, 
that  there  had  been  a  gleam  of  energy  some 
where  in  those  weary  hours.  The  order  to  go  to  the 
front  again  was  hardly  issued  before  it  was  recalled ; 
it  was  too  late  for  Porter  to  do  any  thing,  but  Wil- 
cox,  who  had  been  sent  to  Longstreet's  flank  in  the 
expectation  that  Porter  might  do  something,  was 
on  his  way  back  to  join  in  the  fierce  assault  it  was 
not  too  late  for  the  Confederates  to  make  upon 
McDowell's  men  at  Groveton  on  the  pike. 

PORTER'S  DISPATCHES. 

If,  however,  lack  of  energy  were  all  the  fault  we 
had  to  find  with  Porter's  conduct,  it  would  be  com 
paratively  easy  to  pardon  it.  It  is  the  reading  of 
his  dispatches  to  McDowell  and  King  which  makes 
it  hardest  to  reconcile  his  actions  with  a  spirit  of 
honest  service  to  his  commander.  First  of  all,  we 
are  not  permitted  to  overlook  the  fact  that  it  was 
his  duty  to  communicate  directly  and  fully  with  the 
General-in-chief  on  the  field.  From  the  time  Mc 
Dowell  marched  up  the  Sudley  road,  Porter  was 
acting  under  Pope's  orders  alone,  under  no  obliga 
tion  to  communicate  at  all  with  McDowell  unless 
they  came  into  such  neighborhood  on  the  field  that 


OF    BULL    RUN.  65 

information  might  be  exchanged  for  the  good  of 
the  common  cause.  The  "joint  order"  had  no 
longer  any  effect,  whatever  might  have  been  its  orig 
inal  intent.  Almost  immediately  after  McDowell 
left,  Porter  went  back  nearly  to  the  forks  of  the 
Sudley  road,  between  there  and  Bethlehem 
Church,  and  his  tents  were  pitched  between  the 
roads.  We  are  not  permitted  to  forget  that  this 
was  the  direct  road  from  Pope's  own  position  or 
head-quarters  on  the  field  to  Manassas  Junction, 
and  that  as  McDowell  had  expected  to  leave  that 
road  and  move  into  position  somewhere  on  a  pro 
longation  of  Morell's  line,  it  would  be  more  direct 
to  communicate  with  Pope  than  with  McDowell, 
even  if  there  were  no  imperative  duty  to  do  so.  It 
will  not  do  to  say  he  did  not  know  where  Pope 
was.  He  had  staff-officers  and  orderlies  to  find 
him.  He  clicl  not  know  where  McDowell  was,  and 
his  staff-officers  and  orderlies  had  to  find  him,  and 
found  him,  in  fact,  with  General  Pope.  In  the  dis 
patch  sent  in  the  morning  early,  Pope  had  said  he 
was  following  the  enemy  down  the  Warrenton  turn 
pike.  In  the  joint  order  he  had  said  his  head-quar 
ters  would  be  with  Heintzelman  or  at  Centerville, 
Porter's  imperative  duty  was  to  communicate  with 
his  commander,  by  seeking  him  first  with  Heintzel- 
man's  corps,  which  was  fighting  near  this  Sudley 
road,  north  of  the  Warrenton  pike,  and  we  know 


66  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

that  in  sending  there,  his  messenger  would  have 
passed  Pope's  head-quarters  on  the  way.  He  did 
nothing  of  the  kind.  From  daylight  till  dark  no 
single  message  is  shown  to  have  been  sent  from  him 
to  his  commander  on  the  field. 

Men  who  have  served  in  the  war  do  not  need  to 
be  told  that  it  was  not  the  wont  of  General  of 
ficers  to  report  to  another  subordinate  when  they 
could  avoid  it.  Interchange  of  news  or  counsel, 
and  requests  for  assistance  and  cooperation  were 
common,  but  any  man  who  has  seen  service  will 
smile  at  the  idea  of  Porter's  thinking  he  was  under 
McDowell's  command  after  they  had  separated, 
when  Pope  had  never  ordered  him  to  report  to 
McDowell,  and  the  only  pretended  subordination  is 
based  upon  trie  provisions  of  the  army  regulations 
whilst  both  remained  together  and  both  were  de 
tached  from  the  main  army.  McDowell  went  to 
join  that  main  army,  and,  of  course,  Porter  knew 
he  was  then  answerable  to  the  General-in-chief. 
Porter's  dispatches  to  McDowell,  in  no  sense  differ 
from  those  exchanged  between  officers  who  are  in 
dependent  of  each  other,  but  who  wish  to  cooper 
ate.  He  tells  what  he  means  to  do,  without  asking 
whether  McDowell  approves  or  not :  does  not  inti 
mate  that  he  was  looking  to  McDowell  for  orders  ; 
does  not  imply  that  he  is  not  also  fully  in  commu 
nication  with  Pope,  as  it  was  his  primary  duty  to  be. 


OF    BULL    RUN.  6/ 

But  the  reading"  of  the  contents  of  those  dispatch 
es  is  our  most  painful  task  in  the  light  of  these  facts, 
and  of  his  actual  personal  situation  close  to  the 
Manassas  and  Sudley  road.  He  says  he  "  failed  in 
getting  Morell  over  to  him."  This  implies  an  ex 
pectation  on  McDowell's  part  that  this  could  be 
done,  and  a  feeling  on  his  own  part  of  the  necessity 
of  explanation.  The  truth,  as  the  evidence  shows 
it,  is  that  McDowell's  back  was  hardly  turned  be 
fore  he  stopped  Morell,  the  latter  having  encoun 
tered  no  obstacle  worth  naming.  Not  only  did  he 
not  try  to  get  Morell  over,  but  what  we  now  know 
of  the  field  shows  that  there  was  no  difficulty  in 
doing  so  if  he  had  chosen.  Men  who  have  marched 
through  the  Wilderness,  through  the  thickets  of 
Northern  Georgia  where  the  compass  was  their 
constant  guide,  or  through  the  Salkehatchie  swamps, 
making  their  dozen  or  fifteen  miles  of  corduroy 
road  a  day,  can  feel  nothing  but  contempt  for  the 
talk  of  obstacles  between  Porter  and  Groveton, 
where  his  men  could  have  marched  by  the  flank  and 
his  artillery  have  moved  easily  behind  them  on  the 
Five-forks  road  along  that  dry  and  level  ridge. 
From  the  Manassas  Gap  Railway  on  which  Mc 
Dowell  and  Porter  rode,  to  the  head  of  Compton 
lane,  in  the  open  ground  on  the  other  side  of  the 
woods,  is  barely  a  mile  by  the  scale.  But  besides 
all  this,  the  statement  was  baseless  in  fact.  Gen- 


68  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

eral  Morell  testified  that  no  effort  whatever,  great 
or  small,  was  made  after  McDowell  left. 

"After  wandering  about  in  the  woods  for  awhile 
I  withdrew  him,"  the  dispatch  goes  on  to  say. 
This  means  an  effort  on  a  large  scale — the  wander 
ing  of  a  division  over  a  region  where  there  was 
room  for  a  division  to  wander.  The  plain  truth  is 
that  the  division  could  not  have  been  all  deployed 
to  the  right  without  having  that  flank  where  it 
could  see  out  of  the  woods  on  the  other  side, 
and  the  simple  deployment  of  the  corps  could  not 
have  been  made  without  being  partly  in  the  fields 
over  which  Reynolds  moved.  Take  the  distance 
from  Morell's  position  on  the  Gainesville  road  to 
Porter's  own  head-quarters  near  the  Sudley  road, 
and  over  which  the  command  remained  stretched 
during  that  afternoon,  and  measure  with  it  from 
Morell  northward,  and  see  where  it  will  bring  you. 

"My  scouts  could  not  get  through,"  "my  mes 
sengers  have  run  into  the  enemy" — what  astound 
ing  assertions  are  these  !  The  road  from  his  own 
head-quarters  by  which  McDowell  had  marched  to 
join  Pope  is  known  to  have  been  absolutely  free 
from  any  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  had  been 
occupied  by  our  troops  most,  if  not  all  of  the  day. 
King's  division  had  passed  over  it  just  after  noon, 
and  Ricketts'  division  was  marching  over  it  whilst 
he  was  writing  these  words.  Parties  had  been  using 


OF    BULL    RUN.  69 

it  carrying  rations  and  ammunition  from  Manassas  to 
the  troops  at  the  front.  Porter's  dispatches  to 
Morell  bear  internal  evidence  of  containing  infor 
mation  which  he  got  from  some  of  these  parties  as 
they  passed.  What  then  can  be  meant  by  messen 
gers  running  into  the  enemy?  As  for  scouts,  there 
is  no  evidence  that  one  was  sent  out  in  any  direc 
tion.  Two  artillery  officers,  seeking  water  for  their 
horses,  rode  out  through  the  bushes  towards  Five- 
forks  and  were  fired  upon  by  some  one  whom  they 
did  not  see,  and  who  was  probably  a  straggler  from 
Reynolds'  command,  who  took  them  for  an  enemy. 
There  is  positively  nothing  else  in  the  testimony 
on  which  these  statements  can  be  based.  Stuart's 
officers,  Longstreet,  and  all  of  our  own  who  were 
north  of  the  ridge  road,  unite  in  testifying  that  not 
even  a  Confederate  skirmish  line  came  east  of  the 
Hampton  Cole  house  till  late  in  the  day,  and  it  is 
ridiculous,  with  the  map  before  us  and  anybody's 
marking  of  the  lines,  to  say  there  was  any  thing  to 
prevent  a  regiment  or  a  squad  from  going  to  the 
north  edge  of  that  woods  during  any  half-hour  from 
eleven  A.  M.  of  the  2gth  till  the  next  morning. 

But  these  dispatches  could  convey  to  those  who 
might  receive  them  but  one  impression,  and  by 
every  rule  of  interpretation  their  author  must  be 
held  to  have  meant  it.  They  implied  that  Porter 
was  at  Morell's  front,  earnestly  endeavoring  to  ad- 


/O  THE    SECOND    BATTLE 

vance,  and  trying  hard  to  communicate  across 
country  with  our  troops  on  the  north  of  the  woods  ; 
that  this  was  his  natural  and  only  means  of  commu 
nicating  with  the  rest  of  the  army ;  and  that  any 
communication  with  Pope,  except  in  this  way,  was 
impracticable.  In  doing  this  they  are  given  to 
understand  that  his  forces  have  been  over-matched 
by  the  enemy,  that  his  cavalry  and  his  messengers 
are  used  up  or  captured,  and  that  in  spite  of  the 
most  vigorous  exertions,  isolated  and  outnumbered, 
he  was  forced  to  decide  upon  a  retreat  to  Manassas 
as  a  matter  of  manifest  necessity.  But  in  this  im 
pression,  so  conveyed,  there  would  not  be  one 
word  of  truth.  He  was  not  at  the  front,  but  at  the 
rear,  where  a  highway,  traveled  by  our  troops  and 
wagons  all  clay  long,  led  directly  to  Pope's  head 
quarters.  He  had  shown  his  skirmish  line  a  mo 
ment  to  the  enemy  and  drawn  a  few  distant  can 
non  shots,  and  had  then  disappeared  so  utterly 
that  they  reported  him  gone  to  take  part  in  the 
attack  upon  Jackson.  There  is  no  evidence  that  a 
man  was  hurt  in  his  command,  and  if  his  messen 
gers  were  captured,  it  must  have  been  by  our  own 
troops  on  or  near  the  Sudley  road. 

In  like  manner  the  alarming  intelligence  he  sends, 
that  the  enemy  was  "moving  largely"  toward  his 
left,  purports  to  be  based  upon  the  appearance  of 
the  dust,  and  the  reports  of  scouts.  We  now  know 


OF     BULL    RUN.  /I 

from  the  Confederate  reports  that  there  was  no  move 
ment  toward  his  left,  and  that  every  thing  on  the 
Confederate  right  was  kept  in  a  strictly  defensive 
attitude.  We  know  also  that  there  were  no  "  scouts  " 
sent  out  by  him,  but  only  a  stationary  line  of  skir 
mishers  under  Marshall.  The  story  of  any  force  pass 
ing  beyond  his  left  was  purely  the  invention  of  some 
one's  fears,  but  it  was  none  the  less  well  calculated 
to  discourage  Pope,  if  it  should  reach  him  through 
McDowell.  If  it  was  an  illusion  which  anybody 
honestly  held,  the  vigorous  advance  of  a  few  regi 
ments  in  that  direction  would  have  dispelled  it. 

Unless  a  better  explanation  of  these  things  can 
be  given  than  anywhere  appears  in  the  record  of 
the  Board  investigation,  we  are  warranted  in  say 
ing  that  these  dispatches  alone,  in  connection  with 
the  newly-discovered  evidence  as  to  the  facts,  are 
sufficient  to  support  the  original  judgment  of  the 
Court-martial.  The  reputation  of  Porter  and  his 
troops  before  that  time  was  such  as  to  make  him 
responsible  for  doing  what  a  good  officer  could  do, 
not  what  might  be  expected  from  a  worthless  one. 
It  is  in  view  of  all  these  circumstances  that  the 
exhibition  of  motive  shown  in  his  letters  to  Burn- 
side  gains  double  significance,  and  forces  us  to  the 
conclusion  that  his  disaffection  to  Pope  had  led 
him  beyond  the  verge  of  criminal  insubordination, 
and  turned  what  might  reasonably  be  expected  to 


72      THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

be  a  triumph  of  our  arms  on  the  29th  of  August 
into  the  prelude  of  a  disaster  on  the  next  day. 

To  remit  the  remainder  of  a  continuing  punish 
ment  by  restoring  him  to  citizenship,  like  other  acts 
of  amnesty  and  oblivion,  would  be  magnanimous. 
But  to  vote  him  a  triumph,  to  record  his  conduct 
as  the  model  of  chivalry  and  excellent  soldiership, 
to  enrich  him  from  the  public  treasury,  to  restore 
him  to  his  rank,  to  retire  him  on  pay  ten  times  as 
great  as  the  pension  your  maimed  and  crippled  com 
rades  of  similar  grade  in  this  Society  are  receiving, 
is  to  do  dishonor  to  every  one  who  really  threw 
his  soul  into  the  struggle  for  his  country.  What 
ever  may  be  the  social  or  the  clique  influences 
which  favor  it  or  bring  it  about,  we  have  no  choice 
but  to  protest  against  it.  However  honored  may 
be  the  names  which  support  it,  it  is  our  solemn 
duty  to  say,  under  your  leadership  we  did  not  so 
learn  the  art  of  war.  Least  of  all  can  we  overlook 
the  fact  that  it  was  on  this  very  field  the  Confederate 
General  Jackson  extorted  the  admiration  of  all  sol 
diers,  whether  friends  or  foes,  by  an  audacity,  a 
courage,  and  an  intensity  of  will  and  purpose  which 
marked  him  as  a  great  soldier,  and  which  were  the 
completest  contrast,  in  every  particular,  -with  the 
conduct  on  which  we  have  commented. 


I.     PORTERS   LETTERS    TO    BURNSIDE EXTRACTS. 


FROM  WARREXTOX  JUNCTION,  August  27,  1862.— 4  p.  M. 
GENERAL  BURNSIDE,  Falmouth,  Va.: 

I  send  you  the  last  order  from  General  Pope,  which 
indicates  the  future  as  well  as  the  present.  Wagons  are 
rolling  along  rapidly  to  the  rear,  as  if  a  mighty  power  was 
propelling  them.  I  can  see  no  cause  of  alarm,  though  this 
may  cause  it.  McDowell  is  moving  to  Gainesville,  where 
Sigel  now  is.  The  latter  got  to  Buckland  bridge  in  time  to 
put  out  the  fire  and  kick  the  enemy,  who  is  pursuing  his 
route  unmolested  to  the  Shenandoah,  or  Loudoun  County.  .  . 

Every  thing  has  moved  up  north.  I  found  a  vast  differ- 
ance  between  these  troops  and  ours,  but  I  suppose  they  were 
new,  as  to-day  they  burned  their  clothes,  etc.,  when  there  was 
not  the  least  cause.  I  hear  that  they  are  much  demoralized, 
and  needed  some  good  troops  to  give  them  heart,  and,  I 
think,  head.  We  are  working  now  to  get  behind  Bull  Bun, 
and  I  presume  will  be  there  in  a  few  days,  if  strategy  don't 
use  us  up.  The  strategy  is  magnificent,  and  tactics  in  the 
inverse  proportion.  I  would  like  some  of  my  ambulances. 
I  would  like  also  to  be  ordered  to  return  to  Fredericksburg, 
to  push  toward  Hanover,  or  with  a  larger  force  to  push  to 
ward  Orange  Court-house.  I  wish  Sunnier  was  at  Wash- 

(73) 


74  APPENDIX. 

ington,  and  up  near  the  Monocaey,  with  good  batteries.  I 
do  not  doubt  the  enemy  have  a  large  amount  of  supplies  pro 
vided  for  them,  and  believe  they  have  a  contempt  for  the 
Army  of  Virginia.  I  wish  myself  away  from  it,  with  all 
our  old  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  so  do  our  companions.  . 

There  is  no  fear  of  an  enemy  crossing  the  Rappahannock. 

The  cavalry  are  all  in  the  advance  of  the  rebel  army. 

Most  of  this  is  private,  but  if  you  can  get  me  away,  please 
do  so.  Make  what  use  of  this  you  choose,  so  it  does  good. 
Don't  let  the  alarm  here  disturb  you.  If  you  had  a  good 
force  you  could  go  to  Richmond.  A  force  should  be  at  once 
pushed  on  to  Manassas  to  open  the  road.  Our  provisions  are 
very  short.  F.  J.  POUTER. 


WARRENTON,  27. — P.  M. 
To  GENERAL  BURNSIDE  : 

Morell  left  his  medicine,  ammunition  and  baggage  at 
Kelly's  ford.  Can  you  have  it  hauled  to  Fredericksburg  and 
stored?  His  wagons  were  all  sent  to  you  for  grain  and  am 
munition.  I  have  sent  back  to  you  every  man  of  the  First 
and  Sixth  New  York  Cavalry,  except  what  has  been  sent  to 
Gainesville.  I  will  get  them  to  you  after  awhile.  Every 
thing  here  is  at  sixes  and  sevens,  and  I  find  I  am  to  take 
care  of  myself  in  every  respect.  Our  line  of  communica 
tions  has  taken  care  of  itself  in  compliance  with  orders.  The 
army  has  not  three  days'  provisions.  The  enemy  captured 
all  Pope's  and  other  clothing;  and  from  McDowell  the  sainer 
including  liquors.  No  guard  accompanying  the  trains,  and 
small  ones  guard  bridges.  The  wagons  are  rolling  on,  and  I 
shall  be  here  to-morrow.  Good  night. 

F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General 


APPENDIX.  75 

FOUR  MILES  FROM  MANASSAS,  28th. — 2  p.  M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  BURNSIDE: 

All  that  talk  about  bagging  Jackson,  etc.,  was  bosh.  That 
enormous  gap,  Manassas,  was  left  open  and  the  enemy  jumped 
through  ;  and  the  story  of  McDowell  having  cut  off  Long- 
street  had  no  foundation.  The  enemy  has  destroyed  all  our 
bridges,  burned  trains,  etc.,  and  made  this  army  rush  back  to 
look  at  its  line  of  communication,  and  find  us  bare  of  sub 
sistence.  We  are  far  from  Alexandria,  considering  the  means 
of  transportation.  Your  supply  train  of  forty  wagons  is 
here,  but  I  can't  find  them.  There  is  a  report  that  Jackson 
is  at  Centerville,  which  you  can  believe  or  not.  The  enemy 
destroyed  an  immense  amount  of  property  at  Manassas,  cars 
and  supplies.  I  expect  the  next  thing  will  be  a  raid  on  our 
rear,  by  way  of  Warrenton  pike,  by  Longstreet,  who  was  cut 
off.  F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General. 


BRISTOW — 6  A.  M.  29th 
MAJOR-GENERAL  BURNSIDE  : 

I  shall  be  off  in  half  an  hour.  The  messenger  who 
brought  this  says  the  enemy  had  been  at  Centerville.  and 
pickets  were  found  there  last  night.  Sigel  had  a  severe  fight 
last  night;  took  many  prisoners.  Banks  is  at  Warrenton 
Junction ;  McDowell  near  Gainesville ;  Heintzelman  and 
Reno  at  Centerville,  where  they  marched  yesterday  ;  and  Pope 
went  to  Centerville.  with  the  last  two  as  a  body-guard,  at  the 
time  not  knowing  where  was  the  enemy,  and  when  Sigel  was 
fighting  within  eight  miles  of  him  and  in  sight.  Comment 
is  unnecessary. 

The  enormous  trains  are  still  rolling  on,  many  animals  not 
being  watered  for  fifty  hours.  I  shall  be  out  of  provisions 
to-morrow  night.  Your  train  of  forty  wagons  can  not  be 


76  APPENDIX. 

found.  I  hope  Mac's  at  work  and  we  shall  soon  be  ordered 
out  of  this.  It  would  seem,  from  proper  statements  of  the 
enemy,  that  he  was  wandering  around  loose,  but  I  expect 
they  know  what  they  are  doing,  which  is  more  than  any  one 
here  or  anywhere  knows.  F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General. 


2.     POPE  S    ORDERS    TO    PORTER. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA,     j 
BRISTOW  STATION,  August  27,  1862 — 6:30.  p.  M.  j 

GENERAL : 

The  Major-General  Commanding  directs  that  you  start 
at  one  o'clock  to-night,  and  come  forward  with  your  whole 
corps,  or  such  part  of  it  as  is  with  you,  so  as  to  be  here 
by  daylight  to-morrow  morning  Hooker  has  had  a  very 
severe  action  with  the  enemy,  with  a  loss  of  about  three  hun 
dred  killed  and  wounded.  The  enemy  has  been  driven  back, 
but  is  retiring  along  the  railroad.  We  must  drive  him  from 
Manassas  and  clear  the  country  between  that  place  and 
Gainesville,  where  McDowell  is.  If  Morell  has  not  joined 
you,  send  word  to  him  to  push  forward  immediately.  Also 
send  word  to  Banks  to  hurry  forward  with  all  speed  to  take 
your  place  at  Warrenton  Junction.  It  is  necessary  on  all 
accounts  that  you  should  be  here  by  daylight.  I  send  an 
officer  with  this  dispatch  who  will  conduct  you  to  this  place. 
Be  sure  to  send  word  to  Banks,  who  is  on  the  road  from 
Fayetteville,  probably  in  the  direction  of  Bealeton.  Say  to 
Banks,  also,  that  he  had  best  run  back  the  railroad  trains  to 
this  side  of  Cedar  Run.  If  he  is  not  with  you,  write  him  to 
that  effect. 

By  command  of  MAJOR-GENERAL  POPE. 

GEORGE  I).  RTTGGLER,  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  F.  J.  PORTER,  Warrenton  Junction. 


APPENDIX.  •  77 

P.  S. — If  Banks  is  not  at  Warrenton  Junction,  leave  a 
regiment  of  infantry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  as  a  guard 
till  he  comes  up,  with  instructions  to  follow  you  immediately. 
If  Banks  is  not  at  the  Junction,  instruct  Colonel  Clary  to 
run  the  trains  back  to  this  side  of  Cedar  Kun,  and  post  a 
regiment  and  section  of  artillery  with  it. 

By  command  of  MAJOR-GENERAL  POPE. 

GEORGE  D.  RUGGLES,  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 


HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA,  { 
NEAR  BULL  RUN,  August  29,  1862.— 3  A  M.      j 

GENERAL : 

McDowell  has  intercepted  the  retreat  of  Jackson ;  Sigel 
is  immediately  on  the  right  of  McDowell ;  Kearney  and 
Hooker  march  to  attack  the  enemy's  rear  at  early  dawn. 
Major-Gen.  Pope  directs  you  to  move  upon  Centerville  at 
the  first  dawn  of  day  with  your  whole  command,  leaving 
your  trains  to  follow.  It  is  very  important  that  you  should 
be  here  at  a  very  early  hour  in  the  morning.  A  severe  en 
gagement  is  likely  to  take  place  and  your  presence  is  neces 
sary^  I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

Your    obedient  Servant, 
GEORGE  D.  RUGGLES,  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  PORTER. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA, 
CENTER VILLE,  August  29,  1862. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  PORTER: 

Push  forward  with  your  corps  and  King's  division,  which  . 
you  will  take  with  you,  upon  Gainesville.     I  am  following 
the  enemy  down  the  Warrenton  turnpike.     Be  expeditious 
or  we  will  lose  much.         JOHN  POPE, 

Major-General  Commanding. 


78  APPENDIX. 

HEAD-QUARTKIW  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA, 
CENTERVILLE,  August  29,  1862. 

GENERALS  MCDOWELL  AND  PORTER  : 

You  will  please  move  forward  with  your  joint  com 
mands  toward  Gainesville.  I  sent  General  Porter  written 
orders  to  that  effect  an  hour  and  a  half  ago.  Heintzelman, 
Sigel  and  Reno  are  moving  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and 
must  now  be  not  far  from  Gainesville.  I  desire  that  as  soon 
as  communication  is  established  between  this  force  and  your 
own,  the  whole  commaiitisshall  halt.  It  may  be  necessary  to 
fall  back  behind  Bull  Run  at  Centerville  to-night.  I  presume 
it  will  be  so  on  account  of  our  supplies.  I  have  sent  no 
orders  of  any  description  to  Ricketts,  and  none  to  interfere 
in  any  way  with  the  movements  of  McDowell's  troops,  except 
what  I  sent  by  his  aide-de-camp  last  night,  which  were  to 
hold  his  position  on  the  Warrenton  pike  until  the  troops 
from  here  should  fall  upon  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  I  do 
not  even  know  Ricketts'  position,  as  I  have  not  been  able  to 
find  out  where  General  McDowell  was  until  a  late  hour  this 
morning.  General  McDowell  will  take  immediate  steps  to 
communicate  with  General  Ricketts,  and  instruct  him  to  re 
join  the  other  divisions  of  his  corps  as  soon  as  practicable. 
If  any  considerable  advantages  are  to  be  gained  by  depart 
ing  from  this  order,  it  will  not  be  strictly  carried  out.  One 
thing  must  be  held  in  view,  the  troops  must  occupy  a  posi 
tion  from  which  they  can  reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by 
morning.  The  indications  are  that  the  whole  force  of  the 
enemy  is  moving  in  this  direction  at  a  pace  that  will  bring 
them  here  by  to-morrow  night  or  next  day.  My  own  head 
quarters  will  be,  for  the  present,  with  Heintzelman's  corps, 
or  at  this  place. 

JOHN  POPE,  Major-General  Commanding. 


APPENDIX.  79 

HEAD-QUARTERS  IN  THE  FIELD, 

August  29,  1862.  4:30,  P.  M. 

Your  line  of  march  brings  you  in  on  the  enemy's  right 
flank.  I  desire  you  to  push  forward  into  action  at  once  on 
the  enemy's  flank,  and,  if  possible,  on  his  rear,  keeping  your 
right  in  communication  with  General  Reynolds.  The  enemy 
is  massed  in  the  woods  in  front  of  us,  but  he  can  be  shelled 
out  as  soon  as  you  engage  their  flank.  Keep  heavy  reserves 
and  use  your  batteries,  keeping  well  closed  to  your  right  all 
the  time.  In  case  you  are  obliged  to  fall  back,  do  so  to 
your  right  and  rear,  so  as  to  keep  you  in  close  communication 
with  the  right  wing. 

JOHN  POPE,  Major-General  Commanding. 
To  MAJOR-GENERAL  PORTER. 


HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA, 
IN  THE  FIELD  NEAR  BULL  RUN,  August  29, 1862.  8:50  P.M. 

GENERAL: 

Immediately  upon  receipt  of  this  order,  the  precise  hour 
of  receiving  which  you  will  acknowledge,  you  will  march 
your  command  to  the  field  of  battle  of  to-day,  and  report  to 
me  in  person  for  orders.  \'ou  are  to  understand  that  you 
are  expected  to  comply  strictly  with  this  order,  and  to  be 
present  on  the  field  within  three  hours  after  its  reception  or 
after  day-break  to-morrow  morning. 

JOHN  POPE,  Major-General  Commanding. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  F.  J.  PORTER. 


3.     PORTER'S  DISPATCHES  TO  MCDOWELL. 

GENERALS  MCDOWELL  or  KING  : 

I  have  been  wandering  over  the  woods,  and  failed  to  get 


8O  APPENDIX. 

a  communication  to  you.  Tell  how  matters  go  with,  you. 
The  enemy  is  in  strong  force  in  front  of  me,  and  I  wish  to 
know  your  designs  for  to-night.  If  left  to  me  I  shall  have 
to  retire  for  food  and  water,  which  I  can  not  get  here.  How 
goes  the  battle?  It  seems  to  go  to  our  rear.  The  enemy 
are  getting  to  our  left. 

F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General  Volunteers 

GENERALS  MCDOWELL  &  KING  : 

I  found  it  impossible  to  communicate  by  crossing  the 
woods  to  Groveton.  The  enemy  are  in  force  on  this  road, 
and  as  they  appear  to  have  driven  our  forces  back,  the  fire 
of  the  enemy  having  advanced,  and  ours  retired,  I  have  de 
termined  to  withdraw  to  Manassas.  I  have  attempted  to 
communicate  with  McDowell  and  Sigel,  but  my  messengers 
have  run  into  the  enemy.  They  have  gathered  artillery  and 
cavalry  and  infantry,  and  the  advancing  masses  of  dust 
show  the  enemy  coming  in  force.  I  am  now  going  to  the 
head  of  the  column  to  see  what  is  passing  and  how  affairs 
are  going,  and  I  will  communicate  with  you.  Had  you  not 
better  send  your  train  back. 

F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General. 


GENERAL  MCDOWELL  : 

Failed  in  getting  Morell  over  to  you.  After  wandering 
about  the  woods  for  a  time,  I  withdrew  him,  and,  while 
doing  so,  artillery  opened  upon  us.  My  scouts  could  not 
get  through.  Each  one  found  the  enemy  between  us,  and  I 
believe  so^me  have  been  captured.  Infantry  are  also  in  front. 
I  am  trying  to  get  a  battery,  but  have  not  succeeded  as  yet. 
From  the  masses  of  dust  on  our  left,  and  from  reports  of 
scouts,  think  the  enemy  are  moving  largely  in  that  way. 


APPENDIX.  8 1 

Please  communicate  thi.s  way  this  messenger  came.  I  have 
no  cavalry  or  messengers  now.  Please  let  me  know  your 
designs,  whether  you  retire  or  not.  I  can  not  get  water,  and 
am  out  of  provisions.  Have  lost  a  few  men  from  infantry 
firing.  F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General  Volunteers. 

Aug.  29,  6  P.  M. 

4.    DISPATCHES    OF    OTHER    OFFICERS. 

August  29, 1862.  8:30  o'clock. 
GENERAL  MORELL: 

General  Porter  desires  you  to  keep  closed  up  and  see 
that  the  ammunition  train,  which  is,  I  learn,  at  Manassas,  is 
put  in  with  our  train.  Yours  respectfully, 

GEORGE  SYKES. 


Endorsed.  MANASSAS  JUNCTION. 

GENERAL : 

There  is  an  ammunition  train   here  belonging  to  King's 
division ;  nothing  for  us. 

GEORGE  W.  MORELL,  Major-General. 
To  MAJOR-GENERAL  PORTER. 


HEAD-QUARTERS  CAVALRY  BRIGADE.  9:30  A.  M. 
Seventeen  regiments,  one  battery  and  five   hundred  cav 
alry  passed  through  Gainesville  three  quarters  of  an  hour 
ago,  on  the  Centerville  road.     I  think  this   division  should 
join  our  forces  now  engaged  at  once.     Please  forward  this. 
JOHN  BUFORD,  Brigadier-General. 
To  GENERAL  RICKETTS. 

5A.  45/71.  P.  M.,  Aug.  29,  '62. 
GENERAL  SYKES: 

I    received  an   order  from   Mr.  Cutting  to    advance  and 
support    Morell.     I  faced   about  and  did  so.     I    soon   met 


82  APPENDIX. 

Griffin's  brigade  withdrawing  by  order  of  General  Morell, 
who  was  not  pushed  out,  but  returning.  I  faced  about  and 
marched  back  two  hundred  yards  or  so.  I  then  met  an 
orderly  from  General  Porter  to  General  Morell,  saying  he 
must  push  on  and  press  the  enemy ;  that  all  was  going  well 
for  us,  arid  he  was  returning.  Griffin  then  faced  about,  and 
I  am  following  him  to  support  General  Morell,  as  ordered. 
None  of  the  batteries  are  closed  up  to  me. 
Respectfully, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 


DISPATCHES  BETWEEN  PORTER  AND  MORELL.* 
(VOL.  2,  PP.  26-27.) 

I.-' 

GENERAL:  Colonel  Marshall  reports  that  two  batteries 
have  come  down  in  the  woods  on  our  right,  toward  the  rail 
road,  and  two  regiments  of  infantry  on  the  road.  If  this  be 
so,  it  will  be  hot  here  in  the  morning. 

GEO.  W.  MORELL,  Major-General. 
To  GENERAL  PORTER. 

(This  was  returned  to  Morell  endorsed  as  follows:) 
II. 

Move  the  infantry  and  everything  behind  the  crest  and 
conceal  the  guns.  We  must  hold  that  place  and  make  it 
too  hot  for  them.  Come  the  same  game  over  them  they  do 
over  us,  and  get  your  men  out  of  sight. 

F.  J.  PORTER. 


*  Col.  Marshall's  testimony  on  page  115  fixes  the  time  of  his 
information  to  Morell,  which  must  have  preceded  all  these,  as  be 
tween  three  and  four  !•.  M. 


APPENDIX.  83 

III. 

GENERAL  PORTER:  I  can  move  everything  out  of  sight  hut 
Hazlitt's  battery.  Griffin  is  supporting  it,  and  is  on  its 
right,  principally  in  the  pine  bushes.  The  other  batteries 
and  brigades  are  retired  out  of  sight.  Is  this  what  you 

mean  by  every  thing? 

GEO.  W.  MORELL,  Major-General. 

(Indorsed  as  follows:) 

IV. 

GENERAL  MORELL:  I  think  you  can  move  Hazlitt's  bat 
tery,  or  the  most  of  it,  and  post  him  in  the  bushes  with  the 
others,  so  as  to  deceive.  I  would  get  every  thing,  if 
possible,  in  ambuscade.  All  goes  well  with  the  other  troops. 

F.  J.  P. 
V. 

GENERAL  MORELL  :  Tell  me  what  is  passing,  quickly.  If 
the  enemy  is  coming,  hold  to  him,  and  I  will  come  up.  Post 
your  men  to  repulse  him. 

F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General. 

VI. 

GENERAL  MORELL:  Push  over  to  the  aid  of  Sigel,  and 
strike  in  his  rear.  If  you  reach  a  road  up  which  King  is 
moving,  and  he  has  got  ahead  of  you,  let  him  pass;  but 
see  if  you  can  not  give  help  to  Sigel.  If  you  find  him  retir 
ing  move  back  toward  Manassas,  and  should  necessity  re 
quire  it,  and  you  do  not  hear  from  me,  push  to  Centerville. 
If  you  find  the  direct  road  filled,  take  the  one  via  Union 
Mills,  which  is  to  the  right  as  you  return. 

F.  J.  PORTEU.  Major-General. 

Look  to  the  points  of  the  compass  for  Manassas. 


84  APPENDIX. 


VII. 

GENERAL  MOBELL:  Hold  on,  if  you  can,  to  your  present 
place.  What  is  passing?  F.  J.  PORTER. 

VIII. 

GENERAL  PORTER:  Colonel  Marshall  reports  a  movement 
in  front  of  his  left.  I  think  we  had  better  retire.  No  in 
fantry  in  sight,  and  I  am  continuing  the  movement. 

Stay  where  you  are,  to  aid  me  if  necessary.         MOBELL. 

IX. 

GENERAL  MOBELL:  I  have  all  within  reach  of  you.  I 
wish  you  to  give  the  enemy  a  good  shelling  without  wasting 
ammunition,  and  push  at  the  same  time  a  party  over  to  see 
what  is  going  on.  We  can  not  retire  while  McDowell  holds 
his  own.  F.  J.  P. 

X. 

GENERAL  MORELL:  I  wish  you  to  push  up  two  regiments 
supported  by  others,  preceded  by  skirmishers,  the  regiments 
at  intervals  of  200  yards,  and  attack  the  section  of  artillery 
opposed  to  you.  The  battle  works  well  on  our  right,  and  the 
enemy  are  said  to  be  retiring  up  the  pike.  Give  the  enemy 
a  good  shelling  as  our  troops  advance. 

F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General  Commanding. 

XI. 

GENERAL  MORELL:  Put  your  men  in  position  to  remain 
during  the  night,  and  have  out  your  pickets.  Put  them  so 
that  they  will  be  in  position  to  resist  any  thing.  I  am  about 
a  mile  from  you.  McDowell  says  all  goes  well,  and  we  are 


APPENDIX.  85 

getting  the  best  of  the  fight.     I  wish  you  would  send  me  a 
dozen  men  from  that  cavalry. 

F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General. 

Keep  me  informed.     Troops  are  passing  up  to  Gainesville, 
pushing  the  enemy.     Ricketts'  has  gone,  also  King.* 


5.       KEPORTS    OF    U.    S.    OFFICERS EXTRACTS. 

MAJOR-GEXREAL  HEINTZELMAN  : 

"At  10  A.  M.  I  reached  the  field  of  battle,  a  mile  from 
Stone  Bridge  on  the  Warrenton  Turnpike.  General  Kearney's 
division  had  proceeded  to  the  right  and  front.  I  learned 
that  General  Sigel  was  in  command  of  the  troops  then 
engaged.  At  11  A.  M.  the  head  of  Hooker's  division  arrived. 
General  Reno  an  hour  later.  ...... 

The  firing  continued  some  time  after  dark,  and  when  it 
c-easi'd,  we  remained  in  possession  of  the  battle-field." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  SCHENCK.  (He  being  disabled  by  a 
wound,  his  report  waif  made  by  Colonel  Cheesebrouyh,  his 
Adjutant-General.) 

"  It  was  at  this  time,  one  or  two  o'clock,  that  a  line  of  skir 
mishers  were  observed  approaching  us  from  the  rear,  they 
proved  to  be  of  General  Reynolds.  We  communicated  with 
General  Reynolds  at  once,  who  took  his  position  on  our  left, 
and  at  General  Schenck's  suggestion  he  sent  a  battery  to  our 
right  in  the  woods  for  the  purpose  of  flanking  the  enemy. 
They  secured  a  position,  and  were  engaged  with  him  about 
an  hour,  but  with  what  result  we  were  not  informed.  Gen- 


*The  order  of  these  dispatches  is  that  in  which  they  were  arranged 
by  General  Morell  in  his  testimony.  None  of  them  have  the  hour 
noted  upon  them. 


86  APPENDIX. 

end  Reynolds  now  sent  us  word  that  he  had  discovered  the 
enemy  bearing  down  upon  his  left  in  heavy  columns, 
and  that  he  intended  to  fall  back  to  the  first  woods  behind 
the  cleared  space,  and  had  already  put  his  troops  in  motion. 
We  therefore  accommodated  ourselves  to  his  movement." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  REYNOLDS.     (Sitpptenientftl  report  re 
ferring  to  Colonel  Cheesebrough.} 

"  I  sent  no  word  to  General  Schenck  of  the  kind  indicated 
in  this  paper  of  the  movement  of  the  enemy  at  the  time  this 
change  of  position  was  made,  nor  at  any  time.  There  was  a 
report  came  later  in  the  evening  that  the  enemy  were  moving 
over  the  pike,  but  I  am  not  aware  that  I  communicated  it  to 
General  Schenck,  as  at  that  time  I  had  no  connection  with 
him." 

COLONEL    CHEESEBROUGH.     (Explanatory  of  foregoing.) 

"  General  Reynolds  did  not  communicate  directly  with 
General  Schenck,  as  it  would  appear  from  my  report,  but  the 
information  was  received  through  Colonel  McLean  who  told 
General  Schenck  that  General  Reynolds  had  informed  him 
that  'the  enemy  was  bearing  down,  etc.,  and  that  he  (Rey 
nolds)  intended  to  fall  back,  and  has  actually  commenced  the 
movement.'  Colonel  McLean  wished  to  know  if  he  should 
act  accordingly.  General  Schenck  directed  him  to  accom 
modate  himself  to  General  Reynolds'  movements." 


6.        REPORTS   OF   CONFEDERATE   OFFICERS EXTRACTS. 

GENERAL  R.  E.  LEE.     Official  Report. 

"  Longstreet  entered  the  turnpike  near  Gainesville,  and 
moving  down  toward  Groveton,  the  head  of  his  column  came 
upon  the  field  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  left,  which  had  already 


APPENDIX.  S/ 

opened  with  artillery  upon  Jackson's  right,  as  previously 
described.  He  immediately  placed  some  of  his  batteries  in 
position,  but  before  he  could  complete  dispositions  to  attack, 
the  enemy  withdrew;  not,  however,  without  loss  from  our 
artillery.  Longstreet  took  position  on  the  right  of  Jackson, 
Hood's  two  brigades,  supported  by  Evans,  being  deployed 
across  the  turnpike,  and  at  right  angles  to  it.  These  troops 
were  supported  on  the  left  by  three  brigades  under  General 
Wilcox,  and  by  a  like  force  on  the  right  under  General 
Kemper.  '  D.  R.  Jones'  division  formed  the  extreme  right  of 
the  line,  resting  on  the  Manasses  Gap  Railroad.  The  cavalry 
guarded  our  right  and  left  flanks,  that  on  the  right  being 
under  General  Stuart  in  person.  After  the  arrival  of  Long- 
street,  the  enemy  changed  his  position,  and  began  to  con 
centrate  opposite  Jackson's  left,  opening  a  brisk  artillery  fire, 
which  was  responded  to  with  effect  by  some  of  General 
A.  P.  Hill's  batteries.  Colonel  Walton  placed  a  part  of  his 
artillery  upon  a  commanding  position  between  Generals 
Jackson  and  Longstreet,  by  order  of  the  latter,  and  engaged 
the  enemy  vigorously  for  several  hours. 

"Soon  afterwards  General  Stuart  reported  the  approach  of  a 
large  force  from  the  direction  of  Bristow  Station,  threatening 
Longstreet's  right.  The  brigades  under  General  Wilcox 
were  sent  to  re-enforce  General  Jones,  but  no  serious  attack- 
was  made,  and  after  firing  a  few  shots  the  enemy  withdrew. 
While  this  demonstration  was  being  made  on  our  right,  a 
large  force  advanced  to  assail  the  left  of  Jackson's  position, 
occupied  by  the  division  of  General  A.  P.  Hill.  The  attack 
was  received  by  his  troops  with  their  accustomed  steadiness, 
and  the  battle  raged  with  great  fury.  ..... 

"  While  the  battle  was  raging  on  Jackson's  left,  General 
Longstreet  ordered  Hood  and  Evans  to  advance,  but  before 
the  order  could  be  obeved.  Hood  was  himself  attacked,  and 


RSITY 


APPENDIX. 

his  command  at  once  became  warmly  engaged.  General 
Wilcox  was  recalled  from  the  right  and  ordered  to  advance 
on  Hood's  left,  and  one  of  Kemper's  brigades,  under  Colonel 
Hunton,  moved  forward  on  his  right." 

GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET.     Official  Report. 

"  On  approaching  the  field  some  of  Brig.-Gen.  Hood's 
batteries  were  ordered  into  position,  and  his  division  was  de 
ployed  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  turnpike,  at  right  angles 
with  it,  and  supported  by  Brig.-Gen.  Evans'  brigade.  Before 
these  batteries  could  open,  the  enemy  discovered  our  move 
ments,  and  withdrew  his  left.  Another  battery,  Captain 
Stribling's,  was  placed  upon  a  commanding  position  to  my 
right,  which  played  upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  left,  and 
drove  him  entirely  from  that  part  of  the  field.  He"  changed 
his  front  rapidly  so  as  to  meet  the  advance  of  Hood  and 
Evans.  Their  brigades,  under  General  Wilcox,  wrere  thrown 
forward  to  the  support  of  the  left,  and  three  others,  under 
General  Kemper,  to  the  support  of  the  right  of  those  com 
mands.  Gen.  D.  R.  Jones'  division  was  placed  upon  the 
Manassas  Gap  Eailroad  to  the  right  and  in  echelon  with  re 
gard  to  the  three  last  brigades.  Colonel  Walton  placed  his 
batteries  in  a  commanding  position  between  my  line  and 
that  of  General  Jackson,  and  engaged  the  enemy  for  several 
hours  in  a  severe  and  successful  artillery  duel.  At  a  late 
hour  in  the  day,  Major-General  Stuart  reported  the  approach 
of  the  enemy  in  heavy  columns  against  my  extreme  right. 
I  withdrew  General  Wilcox  with  his  three  brigades,  from 
the  left,  and  placed  his  command  in  a  position  to  support 
Jones  in  case  of  an  attack  against  my  right.  After  some 
few  shots  the  enemy  withdrew  his  forces,  moving  them 
around  toward  his  front,  and  about  four  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  beiran  to  press  forward  against  General  Jackson's  posi 
tion.  Wilcox's  brigades  were  moved  back  to  their  former 


APPENDIX.  89 

position,  and  Hood'.s  two  brigades,  supported  by  Evans,  were 
quickly  pressed  forward  to  the  attack.  At  the  same  time 
Wilcox's  three  brigades  made  a  like  advance,  as  also  Hun- 
ton's  brigade  of  Kemper's  command." 

GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL.     Official  Report. 

"Friday  morning,  in  accordance  with  orders  from  General 
Jackson,  I  occupied  the  line  of  the  unfinished  railroad,  my 
extreme  left  resting  near  Sudley's  Ford ;  my  right  near  the 
point  where  the  road  strikes  the  open  field 

"  The  evident  intention  of  the  enemy  this  day  was  to  turn 
our  left  and  overwhelm  Jackson's  corps  before  Longstreet 
came  up ;  and  to  accomplish  this,  the  most  persistent  and 
furious  onsets  were  made  by  column  after  column  of  infantry, 
accompanied  by  numerous  batteries  of  artillery.  Soon  my 
reserves  were  all  in,  and  up  to  six  o'clock  my  division,  as 
sisted  by  the  Louisiana  brigade  of  General  Hays,  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Forno,  with  an  heroic  courage  and  ob 
stinacy  almost  beyond  parallel,  had  met  and  repulsed  six 
distinct  and  separate  assaults,  a  portion  of  the  time  the  ma 
jority  of  the  men  being  without  a  cartridge." 

GENERAL  J.  E.  B.  STUART.     Official  Report. 

"The  next  morning  (29th)  in  pursuance  of  General  Jack- 
son's  wishes,  I  set  out  again  to  endeavor  to  establish  com 
munications  with  Longstreet,  from  whom  he  had  received  a 
favorable  report  the  night  before.  Just  after  leaving  the 
Sudley  road,  my  party  was  fired  on  from  the  wrood  bordering 
the  road,  which  was  in  rear  of  Jackson's  lines,  and  which 
the  enemy  had  penetrated  with  a  small  force,  it  was  after 
ward  ascertained,  and  captured  some  stragglers.  They  were 
between  General  Jackson  and  his  baggage,  at  Sudley. 

I  met  with  the  head  of  General  Longstreets  column  be 
tween  Haymarket  and  Gainesville,  and  then  communicated 


9O  APPENDIX. 

to  the  Commanding  General,  General  Jackson's  position  and 
the  enemy's.  I  then  passed  the  cavalry  through  the  column 
so  as  to  place  it  on  Longstreet's  right  flank,  and  advanced 
directly  toward  Manassas,  while  the  column  kept  directly 
down  the  pike  to  join  General  Jackson's  right.  I  selected  a 
fine  position  for  a  battery  on  the  right,  and  one  having  been 
sent  to  me,  I  fired  a  few  shots  at  the  enemy's  supposed  posi 
tion  which  induced  him  to  shift  his  position. 

General  Robertson,  who,  with  his  command,  was  sent  to 
reconnoiter  further  down  the  road  toward  Manassas,  reported 
the  enemy  in  his  front.  Upon  repairing  to  that  front,  I 
found  that  Rossers  regiment  was  engaged  with  the  enemy 
to  the  left  of  the  road,  and  Robertson's  videttes  had  found 
the  enemy  approaching  from  the  direction  of  Bristow  station 
toward  Sudley.  The  prolongation  of  his  line  of  march 
would  have  passed  through  my  position,  which  was  a  very 
fine  one  for  artillery  as  well  as  observation,  and  struck  Long- 
street  in  flank.  I  waited  his  approach  long  enough  to  ascer 
tain  that  there  was  at  least  an  army  corps,  at  the  same  time 
keeping  detachments  of  cavalry  dragging  brush  down  the 
road  from  the  direction  of  Gainesville,  so  as  to  deceive  the 
enemy  (a  ruse  which  Porter's  report  shows  was  successful), 
and  notified  the  Commanding  General,  then  opposite  me  on 
the  turnpike,  that  Longstreet's  flank  and  rear  were  seriously 
threatened,  and  of  the  importance  to  us  of  the  ridge  I  then 
held.  Immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  that  intelligence, 
Jenkins',  Kemper's  and  D.  R.  Jones'  brigades  and  several 
pieces  of  artillery  were  ordered  to  nie  by  General  Long- 
street,  and,  being  placed  in  position  fronting  Bristow,  awaited 
the  enemy's  advance.  Ai'ter  exchanging  a  few  shots  with 
rifled  pieces,  this  corps  withdrew  toward  Manassas,  leaving 
artillery  and  supports  to  hold  the  position  till  night." 


APPENDIX.  QI 

GENERAL  J.  E.  B.  STTAKT.     Menwmndu  made  part  of  his 
report. 

"Friday,  August  29th.  As  General  Stuart  rode  forward, 
toward  Groveton,  about  ten  o'clock  A.  M.,  he  found  the 
enemy's  sharpshooters  had  penetrated  the  woods,  going  to 
ward  the  ambulances  arid  train,  threatening  to  cut  them  off. 
He  at  once  directed  Captain  Pelham,  of  the  Stuart  Horse 
Artillery,  who  was  near  by,  to  shell  the  woods,  and  gather 
up  all  the  stniirirlers  around  the  train  and  drive  back  the 
enemy,  notifying  General  Jackson  in  the  meantime  of  what 
was  transpiring.  ...  .  .  . 

"  General  Stuart  also  sent  Colonel  Baylor,  who  was  near  the 
railroad  embankment,  in  command  of  the  Stonewall  brigade, 

etc Having  ordered  Captain  Pelham  to 

report  to  General  Jackson,  General  Stuart  went  toward  Hay- 
market  to  establish  communication  with  Generals  Lee  and 
Longstreet,  accompanied  by  Brigadier-General  Robertson, 
with  a  portion  of  his,  and  a  portion  of  General  F.  Lee's 
cavalry." 

GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY  (of  Jackson's  command),  Official 
Report. 

"  Early  next  morning  (August  29th),  the  division  was 
formed  on  a  ridge  perpendicular  to  the  railroad  track,  with 
the  right  resting  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike  and  facing  to 
ward  Groveton.  In  a  short  time  thereafter,  I  received  an 
order  from  General  Jackson  to  move,  with  my  own  and  Hays' 
brigade,  to  a  ridge  west  of  the  turnpike  and  the  railroad 
track,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  flanking  our  forces 
on  the  right,  a  movement  from  the  direction  of  Manassas 
indicating  that  purpose  having  been  observed. 
When  this  corps  (Longstreets)  had  advanced  sufficiently  far 
to  render  it  unnecessary  for  me  to  remain  longer  in  my  posi 
tion,  or  for  the  Thirteenth  and  Thirty-first  regiments  to  re- 


92  APPENDIX. 

main  where  they  were,  I  recalled  them  and  moved  to  the 
left  for  the  purpose  of  rejoining  the  rest  of  the  division. 

"  I  found  General  Lawton,  with  his  brigade,  in  the  woods, 
not  far  from  the  position  at  which  I  had  been  the  evening 
before,  but  formed  in  line  so  as  to  be  parallel  to  the  railroad, 
Trimble's  brigade  being  posted  on  the  railroad  cut,  on  the 
right  of  our  line  as  thus  contracted.  I  was  ordered  by  Gen 
eral  Lawton  to  form  my  brigade  in  line  in  rear  of  his  brigade, 
and  Colonel  Forno  was  directed  to  form  on  my  right. 

"  Shortly  after  this  the  enemy  began  his  attempts  to  drive 
our  troops  from  the  line  of  the  railroad,  and  about  half-past 
three,  P.  M.,  Colonel  Forno  was  ordered  to  advance  to  the 
front  by  General  Jackson,  to  the  support  of  one  of  General 
A.  P.  Hill's  brigades." 

GENERAL  C.  M.  WILCOX.     Official  Report. 

11  Hopewell  Gap  is  about  three  miles  from  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  being  connected  with  the  latter  ou  the  east  by  two 
roads,  one  of  which  is  impracticable  for  wagons.  The  enemy 
had  been  at  this  pass  during  the  day,  but  retired  before 
night,  thus  giving  us  a  free  passage.  Early  the  following 
morning  our  march  was  resumed,  and  the  command  rejoined 
at  half-past  nine  A.  M.,  the  remainder  of  the  division  at  the 
intersection  of  the  two  roads  leading  from  the  gaps  above 
mentioned. 

Pursuing  our  line  of  march  together  with  the  division,  we 
passed  by  Gainesville  and,  advancing  some  three  miles  beyond, 
my  three  brigades  were  formed  in  line  of  battle  on  the  left 
and  at  right  angles  to  the  turnpike.  Having  advanced  near 
three-quarters  of  a  mile,  we  were  then  halted.  The  enemy 
was  in  our  front  and  not  far  distant.  Several  of  our  bat 
teries  were  placed  in  position  on  a  commanding  eminence  to 
the  left  of  the  turnpike  A  cannonading  ensued,  and  con- 


APPENDIX.  93 

tinned  for  an  hour  or  two,   to  which  the  enemy's  artillery 
replied 

"  At  half-past  four  or  five  P.  M.,  the  three  brigades  were 
moved  across  to  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  a  mile  or  more,  to 
the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad.  While  here  musketry  was  heard 
to  our  left,  on  the  turnpike.  This  firing  continued  with  more 
or  less  vivacity  till  sundown.  Now  the  command  was  or 
dered  back  to  the  turnpike,  and  forward  on  this  to  the  sup 
port  of  General  Hood,  who  had  become  engaged  with  the 
enemy  and  had  driven  him  back  some  distance,  inflicting 
severe  loss  upon  him,  being  checked  in  his  successes  by  the 
darkness  of  the  night." 
MAJOR  S.  H.  HAIRSTON,  (Stuart's  cavalry).  Official  Report. 

GAINESVILLE,  August  29,  1862,  8  P.  M. 
"  To  COLONEL  CHILTOX,  Assistant  Adjutant-General: 

"  In  obedience  to  General  Lee's  order  I  started  this  morning 
at  eight  o'clock  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  cavalry  to  go  to 
Warrenton,  '  to  find  out  if  any  of  the  enemy's  forces  were 
still  in  the  vicinity  of  that  place.'  I  went  from  Thorough 
fare  to  the  right  on  a  by-road,  which  took  me  into  the  Win 
chester  road  two  miles  below  Warrenton,  and  came  up  to 
the  rear  of  the  town.  I  inquired  of  the  citizens  and  persons 
I  met  on  the  way,  but  could  not  hear  that  any  of  their  forces 
were  in  the  vicinity  of  that  place.  They  informed  me  that 
the  last  left  yesterday  in  the  direction  of  Gainesville  and  War 
renton  Junction." 


/.     ORAL    TESTIMONY. 
PASSAGES  REFERRED  TO  IN  THE  TEXT.       EXTRACTS. 

W.  L.  B.  WHEELER    (Citizen).     Record,  Vol.  3,  pp.  1109-11. 

Q.  Did  Bethlehem  church  have  a  spire  on  it  on  the  29th 

of  August,  1862?     A.  It  never  has  had  since  I  have  known 


94  APPENDIX. 

it,     Q.  How  long  have  you  known  it?     A.  I  suppose  I  have 
known  it  since  I  was  eight  years  old.     I  went  to  school  there 

in  1834 

Q.  Relative  to  Bethlehem  church,  when  did  the  walls  fall 
in  of  that  structure?  A.  I  could  not  say  when,  because  I 
did  not  see  it  until  the  spring  of  1862.  I  did  not  even  know 
that  of  my  own  knowledge,  but  1  understood  that  the  South 
ern  soldiers  had  taken  the  inside  woodwork  in  building  their 
winter-quarters.  Q.  When  did  it  fall  in?  A.  During  the 
winter.  Q.  During  the  winter  of  1862?  A.  Yes.  lean  not 
say  the  exact  month  or  week  that  they  commenced  taking 
timbers  from  the  house.  It  was  a  very  old  frame  building. 

JOHN  T.  LEACHMAN  (Citizen).     Record,   Vol.   3,  pp.  1115-6. 

Q.  I  did  not  recollect  whether  you  testified  about  Bethle 
hem  church  on  your  former  examination?  A.  I  did  not;  I 
do  not  think.  Q.  Did  Bethlehem  church  ever  have  a  spire 
to  it?  A.  No,  sir.  Q.  Or  a  belfry  ?  A.  No,  sir.  .  . 
Q.  Of  what  material  was  it?  A.  The  house  was  built  of 
brick 

Q.  What  is  that  hill  at  Monroe's  called?  A.  I  never 
heard  it  called  any  thing  but  Monroe's  hill,  until  since  the  war 
I  have  heard  it  called  frequently  Stuart's  Hill.  Q.  How 
long  after  the  war  did  you  hear  it  called  that?  A.  Really, 
T  could  not  say ;  very  frequently.  T  reckon  that  very  soon 
after  the  war  it  was  called  Stuart's  Hill.  Q.  Never  heard  a 
reason  ascribed  for  it?  A.  Yes,  I  did.  I  heard  that  Stuart 
was  on  that  hill  during  the  29th,  and  T  think  the  family  of 
Monroe,  from  that  circumstance,  called  it  Stuart's  Hill.  It 
is  a  short  distance  from  Monroe's  house." 

GENERAL  ORLANDO  M.  POE  (U.  S.  Engineers).     Vol.  2,  )>p, 

579-80. 
"  We  formed  between  the  Matthews  house  and  the  road — 


APPENDIX.  95 

our  left  resting  on  the  road — formed  in  line  of  battle  and 
moved  directly  forward,  our  left  touching  the  road,  toward 
Bull  Run,  nearly  due  north.  We  continued  that  movement 
until  we  crossed  Bull  Run,  or  at  least  a  portion  of  the  bri 
gade ;  two  regiments  did  not  cross;  advanced  some  distance 
to  the  north  of  Bull  Run,  two  or  three  hundred  yards,  per 
haps  ;  and  after  perhaps  an  hour  there,  we  were  recalled.  Or 
at  least  from  the  time  that  we  got  across  until  we  got  back, 
was  perhaps  an  hour.  .  .  Q.  What  was  your 

position  at  that  time  in  reference  to  the  rest  of  General  Pope's 
army?  A.  The  extreme  right  flank,  so  far  as  I  know;  the 

right  flank  of  the  infantry,  certainly Q.  What 

time  do  you  fix  it  to  have  been  in  the  morning  that  that  ar 
tillery  opened  on  you  when  in  that  advanced  position  ? 
A.  About  eleven  o'clock,  I  should  think.  I  assume  it  at 
that ;  I  did  not  look  at  my  watch.  Q.  Nearer  ten  or  nearer 
twelve?  A.  I  should  say  about  eleven.  That  is  an  estimate 
I  made  some  years  ago  and  put  in  writing  at  that  time.  I 
see  no  reason  to  change  it. 

GENERAL   SAMUEL  P.  HEIXTZELMAX,   Commanding   Third 

Army  Corps.      Vol.  2,  p.  604. 

Q.  Did  you  keep  a  diary  of  events  that  transpired? 
A.  Yes,  I  carried  a  memorandum  book  in  my  pocket,  and  I 
made  a  note  of  every  thing  that  was  brought  to  me  that  I 
-upposed  would  be  of  use  to  me  in  making  my  reports. 
Q.  When  did  you  make  these  notes?  A.  On  the  spot,  during 
the  day. 

(Extracts  from  diary  read)  ...  At  ten  A.  M. 
reached  the  field,  a  mile  from  the  Stone  Bridge.  Firing  going 
on,  and  I  called  upon  General  Sigel.  General  Kearney  was 
at  the  right.  Part  of  General  Hooker's  division  I  sent  to 
support  some  of  Sigel' s  troops.  General  Hooker  got  up  about 


96  APPENDIX. 

11  A.  M.  General  Reno  nearly  an  hour  later.  Soon  after 
General  Pope  arrived — about  quarter  to  two.  I  rode  to  the 
old  Bull  Run  battle-field  where  my  troops  were.  The  enemy 
we  drove  back  in  the  direction  of  Sudley  Church,  and  they 
are  now  making  another  stand.  We  are  hoping  for  McDowell 
and  Porter." 

COLONEL  SAMUEL  N.  BENJAMIN,  Assistant  Adjutant-General, 
United  States  Army.      Vol.  2,  pp.  606-608. 

Q.  What  rank  did  you  hold  and  command  on  the  29th  of 
August,  1862  ?  A.  I  was  first  lieutenant  in  the  Second 
United  States  Artillery,  in  command  of  battery  E. 
I  got  into  action,  as  near  as  I  can  recollect,  a  little  after 
twelve  o'clock ;  but  I  can  not  be  very  certain  of  the  hour. 
Q.  With  what  command  were  you  on  duty  at  that  time? 
A.  I  went  up  there  with  Stevens'  division,*  and  before  I  got 
into  action  I  was  ordered  to  report  to  Sigel ;  I  reported  to  Gen 
eral  Schenck.  I  am  not  sure  that  I  saw  General  Sigel  at  all. 
I  went  to  my  battery,  and  got  it  on  the  road, 
and  brought  it  back  and  put  it  in  position  on  the  ridge,  just 
this  side  of  Groveton,  about  200  yards  from  the  house.  .  . 
Soon  after  that  the  enemy  opened  fire  upon  me ;  they  lay  on 
a  ridge.  I  did  not  see  any  of  their  men  to  the  left  of  the  pike, 
but  on  the  right,  according  to  my  recollection,  there  were 
eighteen  guns,  ranging  from  1,000  to  1,100  yards,  about 
1,500  yards  from  me.  .  Q.  About  what  time  did 

you  take  that  position?  A.  As  near  as  I  can  recollect,  half- 
past  twelve.  Q.  At  that  time  every  thing  was  very  still? 
A.  Very  still  at  the  time  I  got  up  there.  I  had  heard  firing 
before.  Q.  How  long  did  it  remain  still?  A.  About  an 
hour  or  more,  then  I  got  engaged  myself.  Q.  How  long  did 


-Stevens'  division  was  in  Reno's  ninth  corps. 


APPENDIX.  97 

you  remain  at  that  point?  A.  I  must  have  remained  at  that 
point  over  three  hours ;  then  I  went  on  the  road  to  near  the 
Stone  house.  I  had  suffered  very  heavily  in  men  and  mate- 
rial,  and  I  re-organized  my  battery. 

GENERAL  ROBERT  C.  SCHENCK,  Commanding  Division  SigeVs 
Corps.      Vol.  3,  pp.  1008,  1012. 

Q.  Where  was  that  (your)  division  early  on  the  morning 
of  that  day,  August  29th.  A.  We  were  upon  the  hills  below 
Bull  Run,  up  in  the  neighborhood  of  Young's  Creek. 
Q.  What  formation  was  your  division  in?  A.  I  had  Stahel's 
brigade  upon  the  right,  and  McLean's  brigade  to  the  left, 
moving  along  south  of  and  parallel  to  the  turnpike. 
Q.  At  what  time  of  day  did  you  reach  your  farthest  point  in 
advance?  A.  I  think  it  must  have  been  somewhere  about 
the  middle  of  the  day,  perhaps  a  little  earlier  than  the  middle 
of  the  day.  Q.  Did  you  see  General  Reynolds'  division  dur 
ing  that  day  ?  A.  No,  but  I  understood  he  was  off  on  my 
left.  Q.  Did  you  see  General  Reynolds  himself  during  the 
morning  or  afternoon?  A.  No,  I  think  not;  I  don't  recollect. 
Q.  How  far  did  you  get  beyond  the  Gibbon  woods,  in  which 
the  wounded  of  the  night  before  were?  A.  I  don't  know 
that  we  got  beyond  the  Gibbon  woods.  My  remembrance  is 
that  the  farthest  point  we  reached  was  somewhere  about  the 
west  edge  of  the  Gibbon  wood — that  is,  the  wood  in  which 
Gibbon's  troops  were  engaged  the  night  before.  We  found 
there  his  wounded,  and  the  evidence  of  the  battle  that  had 
taken  place.  :  Q.  At  what  time  did  you 

quit,  with  your  division,  this  Gibbon  wood?  A.  I  should 
think,  to  the  best  of  my  recollection,  somewhere  between 
one  and  three  o'clock.  I  don't  think  I  can  be  more  positive 
than  that.  My  recollection  is  that  it  was  sometime  after 
noon.  Q.  To  what  point  did  you  then  go  with  your  division? 
7 


98  APPENDIX. 

A.  In  consequence  of  reports  made  to  me  in  reference  to  the 
movements  of  General  Reynolds,  I  thought  it  best  for  me  to 
fall  back,  and  I  came  into  a  strip  of  woods  which  I  suppose 
to  be  these.  (South  of  the  '  ville '  in  '  Gainesville '  on  War 
ren's  map.)  I  formed  in  line  of  battle  near  the  west  edge  of 
that  woods.  There  we  lay  most  of  the  afternoon. 
Q.  With  reference  to  your  advanced  point,  where  were  you 
at  the  time  Benjamin  was  placed  where  his  batteries  were? 
A.  That  I  can  not  tell.  Q.  Have  you  any  recollection  as  to 
whether  you  were  then  in  Gibbon's  wood?  A.  I  do  not 
recollect.  My  impression,  rather,  is  that  I  was  not  at  that 
time  in  Gibbon's  wood.  Q.  How  long  after  Benjamin  being 
placed  in  that  position  do  you  think  that  you  reached  Gib 
bon's  wood?  A.  I  can  not  tell  you.  Q.  How  long  after  that 
opening  fire  began  with  such  severity  upon  Benjamin  ? 
A.  After  he  was  placed  there.  Q.  Yes?  A.  I  think  he  had 
occupied  the  position  for  some  little  time.  Perhaps  half  an 
hour  or  more.  He  was  firing  an  occasional  shot  before  the 
enemy  seemed  to  discover  his  range  and  position,  and  con 
centrated  their  fire  upon  him. 

GENERAL    N.    C.    McLEAN,    Colonel    Commanding    Brigade 
Schenctts  Division.      Vol.  2,  pp.  883,  884. 

Q.  Where  were  you  on  that  morning  (29th)?  A.  On  the 
battle-field  of  Bull  Run.  Q.  What  time  did  you  go  into 
action?  A.  We  were  ordered  quite  early  in  the  day,  as  I 
supposed  at  the  time  on  the  extreme  left  of  our  troops;  we 
advanced  toward  the  position  of  the  enemy  in  line  of  battle, 
with  a  very  heavy  line  of  skirmishers,  the  skirmishers  en 
gaged  more  or  less  as  we  advanced,  sometimes  severely,  some 
times  very  lightly,  but  the  opposition  to  us  was  not  so  heavy 
as  to  prevent  our  advance.  We  advanced  slowly  and  regu 
larly;  that  was  the  condition  of  affairs.  We  halted  at  times 


APPENDIX.  99 

to  examine  the  position,  and  then  went  on  again  until  the 
afternoon.  Quite  late  in  the  afternoon  we  were  ordered  back 
into  camp.  During  the  day,  exactly  at  what  portion  of  the 
day  I  can  not  now  state,  General  Meade  came  to  me,  and 
said  he  was  ordered  to  take  position  on  our  left;  he  was  in 
General  Reynolds'  division.  General  Meade  was  commanding 
the  brigade.  Q.  George  D.  Meade?  A.  Yes;  afterward 
Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  I  halted  and  he 
came  up  with  his  troops;  we  then  went  on,  and  he  took  posi 
tion  on  our  left.  Some  time  afterward — the  intervals  of  time 
I  can  not  give  you  at  all,  regulated  more  by  events  than  time 
then — General  Meade  came  back  with  his  brigade,  saying  to 
me  that  he  had  placed  a  battery,  and  he  had  been  shelled  out 
of  his  position  by  the  rebel  batteries,  and  had  got  into  a 
hornet's  nest  of  batteries;  he  was  then  coining  back  and  ad 
vised  me  to  do  the  same.  I  reported  to  General  Schenck. 
my  division  commander,  the  facts,  and  in  a  short  time  we 
were  ordered  back  a  little  distance,  and  remained  there  until 
night-fall.  .  .  Q.  How  far  do  you  suppose  you  ad 
vanced  forward?  A.  I  can  not  give  you  an  estimate;  we 
were  in  line  of  battle  the  whole  time,  from  the  time  we 
moved  early  in  the  morning.  We  moved  along  for  some 
time  before  we  found  any  reply  to  our  skirmishers;  then  it 
was  continuous  dropping  fire;  sometimes  it  was  very  severe, 
and  sometimes  not  severe.  We  kept  advancing  very  slowly  ; 
occasionally  we  would  halt  and  skirmish  along  to  find  out 
where  we  were,  and  what  the  enemy  were  doing,  and  then 
advance  again.  That  was  kept  up  all  the  day  until  in  the 
afternoon,  when  General  Meade  came  back ;  we  did  not  ad 
vance  anv  more  after  that. 


IOO  APPENDIX. 

GENERAL  JOHN  F.  REYNOLDS  (Commanding  division  Mc 
Dowell's  corps),    Vol.  l,p.  166. 

Q.  Do  you,  or  not,  know  where  the  enemy's  right  flank 
was  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  say  towards  sunset.  A. 
I  was  on  the  extreme  left  of  our  troops  facing  the  enemy,  and 
their  right  towards  sunset  had  been  extended  across  the  pike, 
with  fresh  troops  coming  down  the  Warrenton  turnpike.  But 
up  to  twelve  or  one  o'clock  it  was  not  across  the  pike,  and  I 
had  myself  made  an  attack  on  their  right  with  my  division, 
but  was  obliged  to  change  front  to  meet  the  enemy  coming 
down  the  Warrenton  pike.  I  was  forming  my  troops  paral 
lel  to  the  pike,  to  attack  the  enemy's  right,  which  was 
on  the  other  side  of  the  pike,  but  was  obliged  to  change  from 
front  to  rear  on  the  right,  to  face  the  troops  coming  down 
the  turnpike.  That  was,  I  suppose,  as  late  as  one  o'clock, 
and  they  continued  to  come  in  there  until  they  formed  and 
extended  across  the  turnpike.  .  .  .  Q.  Did  you 
see  any  of  the  enemy's  forces  on  the  29th,  on  the  south  of 
the  pike  leading  from  Gainesville  to  Groveton,  and  do  you 
not  know  that  the  right  of  the  enemy's  line  rested  on  the  north 
of  that  road?  A.  Their  line  changed  during  the  day.  I 
was  on  their  right  up  to  twelve  o'clock,  or  about  that  time. 
In  the  afternoon  it  was  extended  across  the  pike.  I  can  not 
state  how  far ;  the  country  was  very  wooded  there,  and  I 
could  not  see  how  far  across  it  was.  I  thought  at  the  time, 
they  were  extending  it  that  afternoon  until  dark. 
Q.  On  the  29th  of  August,  did  or  did  not  the  enemy's  right 
outflank  your  left  at  any  time  ?  A.  I  think  it  did  towards 
evening.  It  was  late,  not  dark,  towards  the  dusk  of  the  evening. 
Q.  Did  the  enemy  outflank  you  at  sunset  of  the  29th? 
A.  My  division,  with  a  brigade  of  Sigel's  corps,  lost  connec 
tion  for  a  time  with  the  remainder  of  Sigel's  corps,  but  at 
sunset  we  had  closed  in  to  the  right,  so  that  the  enemy,  I 


APPENDIX.  IOI 

think,  did  outflank  us  at  sunset.  That  is,  I  think  his  flank 
extended  beyond  ours,  although  distant  from  us ;  not  near 
enough  to  be  engaged. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  ROSSER  (Confederate  in  Stuart's  cav 
alry),  Vol.  3,  p.  1073. 

Q.  Did  you  join  General  Stuart  that  morning  (29th);  if 
so,  state  at  what  time  and  narrate  what  happened.  A.  At 
daylight  I  moved  out,  crossing  the  Alexandria  and  Warren- 
ton  turnpike,  and  occupied  a  road  leading  off  to  Manassas 
Junction,  a  mile  or  two  beyond  the  turnpike.  At  this  point, 
about  ten  o'clock,  I  was  joined  by  General  Stuart  and  his 
staff.  Longstreet's  command  was  coming  in  in  a  very  forced 
and  disordered  march  from  the  direction  of  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  moving  rapidly  and  straggling  badly.  My  position  was 
taken  up  with  reference  to  their  protection  from  a  gun  of 
the  enemy,  who  were  in  my  front.  When  Stuart  joined  me 
he  notified  me  that  the  enemy  was  moving  on  our  right 
flank,  and  orderd  me  to  move  my  command  up  and  down 
the  dusty  road,  and  to  drag  brush,  and  thus  create  a  heavy 
dust  as  though  troops  were  in  motion.  I  kept  this  up  at 
least  four  or  five  hours. 

MAJOR    B.    S.    WHITE    (Confederate  on   General    Stuart's 

staff),   Vol.  3,  pp.  983-991. 

Q.  Where  were  you  on  the  morning  of  Friday,  August 
29th,  1862?  A.  Near  Sudley  church.  Q.  Do  you  know  any 
thing  that  transpired  in  your  immediate  vicinity  on  that 
morning?  If  so,  what  was  it?  A.  On  that  morning  we  were 
looking  south ;  there  were  some  troops  appeared  on  our  left, 
Federal  troops,  and  there  was  some  little  confusion  in  our 
ambulance  train  just  north  of  Sudley  Springs.  Q.  What 
then  transpired?  A.  There  were  some  artillery  and  troops 
put  in  position  to  open  on  the  enemy  in  that  direction  (wit- 


IO2  APPENDIX. 

ness  indicated  that  the  artillery  was  west  of  Dudley  church) 
tiring  east  across  Bull  Run.  Q.  Do  you  know  whose  battery 
that  was  that  was  put  in  position?  A.  Pelham's  battery; 
he  commanded  the  Stuart  horse  artillery.  Q.  What  then 
transpired  ?  A.  Major  Patrick  was  ordered  to  charge,  and 
did  charge  the  enemy  in  that  direction  and  lost  his  life  there.  . 
Q.  Then  what  was  the  next  event  that  transpired?  A.  We 
moved  off  across  the  country  to  find  out  what  had  become 
of  Longstreet's  corps;  we  moved  off  in  this  way,  toward 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  Q.  Did  you  find  General  Longstreet's 
columns  or  corps  advancing?  A.  We  did,  between  Hay- 
market  and  Gainesville.  Q.  What  did  General  Stuart  then 
do  ?  A.  General  Stuart  then  threw  his  command  on  Long- 
street's  right,  and  moved  down  with  his  right  flank  in  the 
direction  of  Bristow  and  Manassas  Junction.  .  .  .  We 
took  the  road  leading  directly  down  the  Manassas  Gap  rail 
road  ;  there  is  a  road  running  parallel  with  it.  .  .  .  Gen 
eral  Stuart  threw  his  command  on  the  right  of  Longstreet, 
and  passed  down  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad  to  about  that 
point  (west  of  Hampton  Cole's,  point  marked  W). 
We  discovered  a  column  in  our  front,  discovered  a  force  in 
our  front  coming  from  the  direction  of  Manassas  Junction  to 
Bristow.  ...  It  was  a  good  point  for  observation  ; 
a  high  position,  elevated  ground.  We  could  see  Thorough 
fare  Gap  and  Gainesville,  and  all  the  surrounding  country. 
.  .  Q.  What  did  General  Stuart  then  do  ?  A.  He 
put  a  battery  in  position  on  that  hill.  .  .  My  instruc 
tions  were  to  put  a  battery  in  position  there,  and  open  on 
the  column  advancing  in  this  direction.  His  instructions 
to  me  were  to  go  to  General  Jackson  and  report  the  fact  of 
this  column  moving  in  that  direction.  .  .  I  went  across 
here  (parallel  to  Pageland  Lane).  General  Jackson's  corps 
was  here ;  that  is,  his  command  was  along  the  Independent 


APPENDIX.  1O3 

Manassas  Gap  Railroad*,  and  the  batteries  were  posted  right 
on  a  range  of  hills  in  the  rear  of  that.  I  found  General 
Jackson  on  a  range  of  hills  just  in  rear  of  his  battery.  .  . 
I  then  started  to  return  to  General  Stuart.  .  .  I  tried 
to  take  a  little  short  cut  going  back  to  him.  I  made  a  little 
detour.  I  passed  where  there  had  been  a  skirmish  the 
evening  before 

Q.  Did  you  find  any  dead  and  wounded  there  ?  A.  I  did. 
Q.  North  of  the  pike  or  south  of  the  pike?  A.  On  the 
north  side.  Q  Did  you  find  General  Stuart  at  once  ?  A.  It 
was  some  time  before  I  found  him;  a  half  or  three-quarters 
of  an  hour.  Did  you  halt  on  the  way  going  back?  A.  I 
passed  a  little  time  with  General  Jackson  after  I  reported  to 
him,  because  the  batteries  were  engaged ;  his  batteries  were 
on  Stony  Ridge.  His  line  of  battle  was  along  the  Indepen 
dent  line  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad  ;  there  was  a  battery 
that  came  out  about  the  point  of  that  woods  (just  north 
west  of  the  Matthew's  house  and  west  of  the  Sudley  pike) ; 
just  about  that  point  there  was  a  battery  from  the  Union 
side  that  came  out  there  and  took  position,  and  I  stayed  there 
some  time  watching  the  artillery  duel  between  the  guns  sta 
tioned  here  and  that  battery.  Then  going  back  to  General 
Stuart  I  took  a  little  short  cut  and  passed  over  some  ground 
where  there  had  been  a  fight  the  evening  before,  and  there 
were  some  dead  on  the  field.  In  going  back  I  met  a  cousin 
of  mine  \vho  commanded  a  battalion  connected  with  Ewell's 
corps,  which  was  engaged  in  this  fight ;  he  was  reconnoiter- 
ing ;  I  went  along  with  him  and  saw  what  was  in  my  front. 
I  suppose  it  was  half  or  three-quarters  of  an  hour  before  I 
got  back  to  General  Stuart.  ...  Q.  When  you  got 


*.  This  is  the  unfinished  railroad,  not  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad, 
into  which  its  line  ran. 


IO4  APPENDIX: 

back  to  General  Stuart,  where  was  he?  A.  Where  I  left 
him,  on  that  hill.  Q.  At  that  time  where  was  General  Long- 
street's  command  ?  A.  They  had  come  down  and  were  form, 
ing  here.  (Witness  indicates  a  point  back,  west  of  Pageland 
Lane).  ...  Q.  What  became  of  this  column  of 

troops  that  you  saw  advancing?  A.  I  don't  know  what  be 
came  of  them.  They  disappeared  from  our  front.  Q.  Do 
you  know  of  any  other  position  being  taken  up  by  General 
Longstreet's  command,  during  the  day,  in  advance  of  the 
position  that  you  have  indicated;  if  so,  when  and  where? 
You  indicated  a  position  back  of  Pageland  Lane.  A.  I  do 
not.  Q.  How  long  were  you  down  in  the  neighborhood  of 
this  hill  which  you  have  marked  with  a  cross,  during  that 
day?  up  to  what  time?  A.  We  were  down  there  the  greater 
part  of  the  day ;  we  were  on  the  extreme  right  all  the  time 
afterwards.  The  cavalry  remained  on  the  extreme  right  until 
the  morning  of  the  30th.  Q.  Do  you  know  of  any  other 
measures  taken  to  retard  the  advance  of  this  column  of 
troops  from  the  direction  of  Manassas  Junction  or  Bristow, 
that  day  by  General  Stuart,  other  than  the  planting  of  that 
battery  in  that  position?  A.  I  do  not.  Before  that  battery 
was  put  in  position,  Robertson's  brigade  of  cavalry  and 
Rosser  were  engaging  the  enemy  in  our  front.  When  that 
battery  was  put  in  position  and  opened  on  the  enemy,  it 
checked  them  ;ind  they  retired.  Then  General  Stuart  told 
me  to  go  to  General  Jackson  and  report  the  fact  that  this 
column  was  advancing  in  this  direction.  Q.  During  that 
day  what  sort  of  an  action  was  going  on  on  the  29th,  to  your 
knowledge?  A.  There  was  very  heavy  fighting  going  on  up 
here  in  Jackson's  front.  ...  Q.  What  time  do  you 

think  you  met  General  Longstreet  between  Haymarket  and 
Gainesville?  A.  It  was  about  eleven  o'clock.  Q.  Was  Gen 
eral  Longstreetat  the  head  of  his  column?  A.  He  was  near 


APPENDIX.  105 

the  head  of  the  column Q.  How  long  a  con 
versation  did  General  Stuart  have  with  General  Lee  or  Gen 
eral  Longstreet  ?  A.  Ten  or  fifteen  minutes.  .... 
Q.  How  long  was  it  before  you  arrived  at  the  front  marked 
W,  by  you  on  this  map.  A.  It  could  not  have  been  over 
three-quarters  of  an  hour  or  an  hour.  ...  Q.  Were 

those  troops  (Porter's)  near  any  house  that  you  could  see? 
A.  They  were  near  the  Carraco  house.  Q.  Very  near?  A. 
Perhaps  a  little  beyond.  Q  Did  not  you  see  any  troops  in 
the  direction  of  the  place  marked  "  Lewis-Leachman  house," 
on  that  day?  A.  Yes,  there  were  troops  there,  too.*  Q. 
How  were  they  disposed  ?  Are  you  certain  that  no  shots 
were  fired  from  that  direction  at  the  men  about  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Lewis-Leach  man  house  ?  A.  No,  I  am 
not  certain,  though  I  believe  that  there  were.  Q.  Are  you 
not  certain  that  most  of  the  shots  were  fired  in  that  direc 
tion  ?  A.  I  am  unable  to  answer  that  for  this  reason  :  at  the 
time  that  battery  was  put  in  there,  firing  in  this  direction 
upon  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  General  Stuart  requested 
that  I  should  go  here,  and  report  the  fact  to  General  Jackson, 
which  I  did ;  I  went  off  then  and  was  gone  at  least  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour  or  an  hour.  Q.  What 
time  do  you  put  it  that  you  came  back  from  General  Jack 
son  after  being  sent  over  by  General  Stuart?  A.  Half-past 
two  or  three  o'clock. 
REV.  JOHX  LAXDSTREET,  (Chaplain  Confederate  Army,) 

Vol.  3,  jtp.  95)6-1003. 

Q.  Where  were  you  on  the  morning  of  August  29th, 
1862?  A.  I  was  between  Sudley  Springs  and  Aldie,  about 
midway  in  the  mountain.  Q.  Did  you  join  General  Stuart 
that  day.  A.  I  joined  him  for  the  first  time  for  eight 


:;:  This  was  the  position  from  which  Reynolds  advanced. 


IO6  APPENDIX. 

months,  alter  our  Catlett  Station  raid.  I  think  I  reached 
Sudley  between  eight  and  nine  in  the  morning.  Q.  Was 
General  Stuart  there?  A.  Yes,  sir.  Q.  Do  you  recollect 
any  circumstance  transpiring  after  you  arrived  there?  A. 
No,  sir.  Just  before  we  arrived  there  was  a  little  confusion 
or  kind  of  stampede  among  the  baggage  train.  I  don't  know 
that  I  noticed  any  of  our  cavalry  there  unless  it  was  those 
connected  with  the  commissary's  and  quarter-master's  de 
partment.  But  there  was  a  little  skirmish  there  about  that 
time  which  attracted  my  attention.  ...  Q.  Do  you 
know  at  what  time  you  left  Sudley?  A.  No,  sir:  I  recollect 
that  the  next  place  where  I  was,  was  called  Cole's.  It  was 
an  elevated  position,  rather  in  the  angle  between  Gainesville 
and  Bristow.  .  .  •  .  \  Q.  At  what  time  in  the  day 
were  you  at  Hampton  Cole's?  A.  I  did  not  have  a  watch, 
but  I  think  it  was  somewhere  toward  ten  o'clock  in  the  day. 
Q.  What  did  you  see  there  which  has  impressed  itself  upon 
your  attention?  A.  There  was  considerable  dust  in  this 
direction,  indicating  a  body  of  troops.  .  .  .  General 

Stuart  ordered  some  of  the  Fifth  Cavalry  to  go  and  cut  brush 
and  drag  it  along  the  road.  .  .  Q.  Who  was  the 
Colonel  of  that  regiment?  A.  T.  L.  Rosser — we  frequently 
after  that  conversed  about  it.  .  .  There  was  some 
firing  from  this  position  in  the  direction  of  this  approaching 
force.  .  .  Q.  What  became  of  this  column  of 

troops  upon  those  shots  being  fired  ?  A.  I  did  not  see  them. 
Q.  They  disappeared  from  your  sight?  A.  Yes,  sir.  Q. 
Where  did  General  Longstreet  form  his  command?  (In  an 
swer  the  witness  marked  upon  the  official  map  a  position 
west  of  Pageland  Lane).  Q.  What  time  of  day  was  that  that 
they  were  all  in  position?  A.  When  I  say  that,  I  say  so 
simply  from  my  recollection  and  guessing  at  the  time.  Mr. 
Maltby  (counsel  for  Porter) — Then  T  object  if  ho  guesses. 


APPENDIX.  lO/ 

The  Witness. — What  I  guess  is  this:  Every  man  has  a  way 
of  forming  an  idea  of  an  hour  of  the  day  based  upon  his  ex 
perience.  It  is  my  recollection  that  it  was  somewhere  be 
tween  two  and  three  o'clock.  .  .  Q.  How  late  in 
the  day  do  you  recollect  seeing  General  Hood's  division  ? 
.1.  Between  three  and  four  o'clock.  Q.  Where  was  it  then  ? 
A.  Where  I  have  indicated  on  the  map. 
LEWIS  JB.  CARRACO,  citizen,  Vol.  2,  pp.  921-923. 

"  Q.  Where  did  you  reside  on  the  29th  August,  1862?  A. 
Where  I  now  reside,  very  near  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad. 
Q.  Were  you  there  that  day?  A.  I  was.  Q.  Up  to  what 
hour  in  the  day  did  you  remain  there  ?  A.  I  was  there  until 
very  late  Friday  evening.  Q.  During  the  day  did  you  see 
any  Confederate  forces?  If  so,  when?  A.  I  saw  some  cav 
alry  scouts  during  the  day,  and  in  the  evening  there  was  a  bat 
tery  firing  some  seventy-five  or  eighty  yards  back  of  my  house, 
just  west  of  my  house,  and  an  officer  came  there  and  told 
me  I  was  in  danger,  and  to  take  my  family  and  go  back  of 
the  line.  Q.  Where  did  you  go?  A.  I  went  up  the  road 
about  a  mile,  to  a  farm  owned  now  by  Major  Nutt. 

Q.  Toward  Gainesville?  Q.  Between  there  and  Gaines 
ville.  Q.  Did  you  meet  any  Confederate  force  on  that  trip? 
If  so,  about  where?  A.  I  saw7  them  a  little  beyond  Hamp 
ton  Cole's;  a  very  small  number.  They  were  sitting  down 
on  the  side  of  the  railroad,  and  their  battery  that  was  plant 
ed  at  the  back  of  my  house,  that  opened  on  the  Federal 
troops  directly  after  I  passed  it ;  and  when  I  got  up  there 
against  them,  they  got  up  and  took  shelter  on  the  embank 
ment  of  the  railroad.  Q.  Did  you  at  that  time  see  any 
troops  to  the  south  of  the  railroad  9  A.  None  at  all  except 
a  little  picket  force  that  was  a  little  to  the  south  of  the  rail 
road  just  above  there;  a  small  picket  force.  Q.  Did  any 
Confederate  force  pass  to  the  east  of  your  house  during  the 


IO8  APPENDIX. 

day?  If  so,  in  what  direction  did  they  go  ?  A.  I  saw  none 
pass  to  the  eastward.  I  saw  some  shelling  from  the  back  of 
what  is  called  the  Britt  farm,*  and  a  disabled  Federal 
wagon  at  the  mouth  of  a  lane,  called  Compton's  Lane.  Q. 
About  what  time  in  the  day  was  that?  A.  I  could  hardly 
say.  Twelve  or  one  o'clock.  Q.  You  say  in  the  evening 
you  saw  a  battery  west  of  your  house?  A.  I  think  it  was 
only  one  cannon,  seventy-five  or  eighty  yards  from  the 
house.  Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  the  expression  "evening"? 
A.  I  mean  something  like  three  or  four  o'clock  ;  somewhere 
thereabouts.  .  .  Q.  What  time  was  the  cannon 
posted  there  ?  A.  Possibly,  four  o'clock.  Q.  You  are  pos 
itive  about  that?  A.  I  am  not  positive;  but  according  to 
the  best  of  my  judgment  it  was  probably  as  late  as  four. 
Q.  Was  it  earlier  or  later  than  four  ?  A.  It  was  not  earlier, 
I  do  not  think  ;  not  earlier  than  three,  I  am  very  sure.  .  . 
.  .  Q.  Were  there  any  soldiers  of  any  description  about 
your  house,  except  the  battery  ?  A.  On  Friday  there  was  a 
Federal  force  in  Mr.  Lewis's  field,  to  the  east  of  my  house. 
Q.  Where  was  Lewis's  field.  A.  Within  800  or  400  yards  to 
the  east  of  my  house. 

WILLIAM  THOMAS  MOXROE  (Citizen),    Vol.  2,  p.  924. 

Q.  Where  were  you  residing  on  the  29th  of  August 
1862?  A.  At  home  (place  on  the  Monroe  Hill  designated  on 
the  map).  Q.  Is  there  any  considerable  elevation  near  your 
residence?  If  so,  where  is  it?  A.  There  is,  just  here.  (Wit 
ness  indicates.)  Q.  What  do  you  call  that  hill  ?  A.  We 
never  had  any  name  for  it  at  all,  until  since  the  war,  when 
it  has  got  the  name  of  Stuart's  Hill ;  I  don't  know  how,  unless 
it  was  that  there  was  a  battery  of  Stuart's  on  that  hill  dur 
ing  Friday  of  the  right.  Q.  In  August?  A.  Yes,  the  29tb 


This  iurm  is  between  Cole's  a-nd  the  turnpike. 


APPENDIX. 

of  August,  1862.  Q.  From  that  hill  what  points  can  be 
seen?  A.  Mauassas  and  Centerville.  Q.  How  as  to  the 
Bull  Run  range  of  mountains?  A.  You  can  see  the  mount 
ains  very  plainly.  Q.  Do  you  recollect  any  tiling  of  the  oc 
currences  on  the  29th  of  August,  1862  ?  A.  I  recollect  ahout 
eleven  o'clock  General  Longstreet's  troops  first  came  in 
then,  or  about  twelve ;  I  reckon  that  battery  was  posted  on 
that  hill ;  it  may  have  been  a  little  earlier,  but  not  later 
than  twelve  o'clock.  Q.  Do  you  know  in  what  direction 
that  battery  was  fired?  A.  It  fired  in  the  direction  of 
Groveton.  Q.  Did  it  continue  to  fire  in  that  direction  ? 
A.  It  fired  in  that  direction  some  hours,  or  may  be  more. 
Q.  Do  you  know  where  it  went  to  from  that  point  ?  A.  It 
went  down  by,  just  into  the  depot  that  is  now  upon  the 
railroad,  and  from  there  to  the  hill  at  the  Britt  house.  .  . 
Q.  Do  you  know  where  the  Confederate  lines  were,  or 
forces,  on  that  day,  aside  from  that  particular  battery  that 
finally  got  down  to  the  Britt  house  ?  A.  There  was  infantry 
just  in  here,  running  from  the  Warrantor!  and  Gainesville  pike 
(back  of  Pageland  Lane.)  There  was  an  army  road  running 
through  there,  and  there  they  were  posted  on  this  road, 
(witness  marks  the  map).  Q.  Do  you  know  how  far  down 
they  were  posted?  A.  I  don't  know.  (Witness  closes  his 
marking  at  the  road  just  west  of  Charles  Randall's.)  The 
skirmish  line  was  drawn  down  as  far  as  Vessel's.  Q.  When 
did  you  first  see  theConfederate  lines  advance  beyond  Pageland 
Lane  during  the  day — the  infantry?  A.  I  don't  know  when 
thisip&rt  of  the  line  advanced  at  all  (down  near  the  railroad). 
It  moved  down  under  the  hill  out  of  sight  of  the  house.  I 
did  not  see  them.  Q.  Off  in  what  direction  ?  A.  Off  in 
this  way,  I  suppose.  (In  the  direction  of  Hampton  Cole's.) 
Q.  Down  along  the  railroad,  do  you  say?  A.  They  moved 
in  that  direction,  down  along  the  railroad.  Q.  About  what 


I1O  APPENDIX. 

time  of  day  was  it?  A.  I  think  it  was  about  the  middle 
of  the  afternoon,  say  three  or  four  o'clock.  Q.  You  were 
describing  some  portion  of  the  line  that  you  did  see  ?  A. 
This  portion  of  the  line  marched  through  by  the  house — 
that  was  about  three  o'clock.  (The  line  just  north  of  the 
house.)  Q.  That  portion  of  the  line  between  your  house 
and  the  turnpike,  you  mean  ?  A.  Yes,  sir.  Q.  Marched  to 
the  front  about  four  o'clock?  A.  I  think  it  was  General 
Hunton's  brigade.  General  Hun  ton  was  along  with  the 
brigade,  and  I  thought  he  was  commanding.  Q.  Do  you 
know  of  the  advance  of  any  of  the  other  Confederate  forces 
that  day,  during  the  day  ?  A.  I  do  not.  Q.  Did  you  remain 
there  during  the  day,  in  that  vicinity  ?  A.  I  was  about  the 
house  and  about  on  the  farm  during  that  day.  I  do  not  rec 
ollect  leaving  the  farm  at  any  time.  .  .  Q.  Did  you  see  any 
separate  body  of  men  after  the  advance  of  the  first  line  march 
ed  across  by  your  house?  A.  I  did  not  see  any  marching  to 
the  place  at  all  on  Friday,  except  this  brigade  that  I  took  to 
be  Gen.  Hunton's.  Q.  Could  you  see  from  your  house  to 
Hampton  Cole's?  A.  Very  plainly.  Q.  Could  you  see  any 
lines  of  troops  that  would  be  formed  along  what  is  called 
Meadowville  Lane?*  A.  I  did  not  see  any  troops  at  all 
formed  along  Meadowville  Lane,  but  about  some  time  be 
tween  three  and  four  o'clock  there  were  some  Confederate 
troops  formed  right  along  here  in  the  woods  (south  of 
Hampton  Cole's),  I  think  one  regiment. 

COLONEL  WILLIAM  W.  BLACKFORD,  (Confederate,  Stuart's 
staff),.  Vol.  2,  p.  672. 

Q.    Which    direction   did    you   take    in    going    to    meet 


*  This  lane  runs  from  Hampton  Cole's  northward  to  the  turnpike, 
and  is  the  position  on  which  Porter  claims  that  Longstreet's  line 
was  formed 


APPENDIX.  I  I  I 

Longstreet  that  morning?  A.  I  do  not  recollect  whether 
we  followed  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  or  whether  we  cut 
across  fields;  I  am  inclined  to  think  we  cut  across; 
I  think  we  did  not  follow  the  turnpike.  The  enemy 
were  in  strong  force,  and  I  think  we  avoided  the  turnpike, 
so  as  to  strike  across  the  country.  We  had  a  detachment  of 
cavalry  with  us,  and  when  we  got  in  sight  of  Longstreet's 
dust,  we  galloped  ahead  to  meet  the  column.  Q.  AVhere 
was  that,  relative  to  the  position  of  Gainesville  and  Hay- 
market?  A.  It  was  beyond  Gainesville;  I  do  not  recollect 
how  far.  .  .  Q.  How  long  should  you  say,  from 
your  recollection,  General  Stuart  and  General  Lee  halted 
for  their  conversation?  A.  They  just  waited  there  till  the  cav 
alry  could  have  gotten  across ;  I  should  suppose  within  a  quar 
ter  of  an  hour.  .  .  Q.  Where  did  General  Stuart  go  ? 
A.  Then  we  galloped  across  to  our  right.  ...  Q. 
Where  were  you  during  the  day  after  you  left  this  place 
near  Monroe's  ?  A.  I  was  all  around  here  (Young's  Branch) 
reconnoitering.  Q.  From  the  direction  of  Lewis-Leachman's? 
A.  Yes;  all  around  that  quarter — Britt's  and  Hampton 
Cole's.  Q.  Do  you  know  of  any  movement,  during  the  day, 
of  the  corps  that  was  on  this  Manassas  and  Gainesville  road, 
beyond  Dawkins  Branch  ?  A.  No,  sir.  Q.  Was  your  posi 
tion  such  that  it  would  have  fallen  under  your  observation 
if  there  had  been  such  a  movement?  A.  I  think  we  would 
have  been  sent  over  there  if  there  had  been. 
Q.  In  going  towards  General  Lee  in  the  morning,  why  did 
you  not  take  the  pike  as  your  line  of  march  ?  A.  I  do  not  know 
exactly  why.  This  road  from  Gainesville  goes  off  at  a  con 
siderable  angle  towards  Thoroughfare  Gap.  I  suppose  Gen 
eral  Stuart  struck  across  here.  I  do  not  recollect  that  he 
told  me  his  object ;  but  I  recollect  that  we  were  not  on  that 
pike.  We  had  met  videttes,  and  we  expected  to  run  into 


112  APPENDIX. 

scouting  parties  all  the  time.  I  know  there  were  a  good 
many  turns  in  the  road,  and  we  were  a  little  nervous  at  the 
small  force  that  was  with  us,  and  a  little  uneasy  that  we 
would  not  be  able  to  make  the  connection.  Q.  Were  you 
afraid  that  scouts  might  be  around  in  that  country  ?  A.  Yes ; 
we  thought  very  likely  the  enemy  would  get  in  in  force,  and 
have  cavalry  bodies  out  there.  Q.  Did  you  see  at  any  time 
during  the  day  a  body  of  men  in  the  ravine  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Cunliffe's,  marked  Meadow ville  on  the  map — 
Union  troops  ?  A.  I  do  not  understand  the  question.  Q. 
Did  you  see  a  large  force,  a  brigade  or  two  brigades,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  CunlinVs,  in  a  ravine,  at  any  time  during 
the  day,  or  in  the  ravine  near  the  word  "  Meadowville"  about 
rive  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  or  four  o'clock,  or 
three  o'clock  ?  A.  I  do  not  recollect  seeing  them.  Q.  Do 
you  recollect  whether  the  Confederate  lines  included  that  or 
not  at  that  time  ?  A.  Longstreet's  first  line  was  back  of 
that;  I  think  his  first  line  was  in  these  woods  (west  of  Page- 
land  Lane).  Q.  Do  you  say  that  from  positive  knowledge? 
A,  No,  sir;  I  do  not  know  exactly;  that  was  his  first  line 
after  he  first  deployed.  Q.  How  soon  did  he  advance  ?  A. 
I  do  not  know. 

COLONEL  E.  G.  MARSHALL,  Thirteenth  New  York  Volunteers, 
and  Captain  of  Regulars.      Vol.  2,  pp.  130-132. 

Q.  Where  were  you  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th  August 
last?  A.  I  was  on  the  road  leading  to  Gainesville — the  road 
from  Manassas  Junction.  Q.  On  what  duty  ?  A.  On  duty 
with  General  Morell's  division  in  General  Porter's  corps,  and 
commanding  my  regiment.  Q.  Specify  the  character  of 
duty  you  were  performing  that  afternoon?  A.  About  one 
o'clock  I  was  detailed  by  General  Porter  to  go  with  my  regi 
ment  across  an  open  country  and  ravine  to  some  timber  that 


APPENDIX.  113 

was  facing  our  line  of  battle,  and  deploy  skirmishers  to  find 
out  the  position  of  the  enemy,  and  any  thing  else  that  I 
could  find  out  concerning  them.  Q.  State  the  position  and 
force  of  the  enemy  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  General 
Porter's  command,  as  tar  as  you  know  it.  A.  Immediately 
after  going  there,  my  skirmishers  were  fired  on  by  a  body  of 
dragoons,  and  shortly  afterward  there  was  a  section  of  artil 
lery  which  opened  fire  upon  General  Porter's  command. 
Soon  after  that,  perhaps  about  two  o'clock,  the  head  of  a 
large  column  came  to  my  front.  They  deployed  their  skir 
mishers  and  met  mine,  and  about  three  o'clock  drove  my 
skirmishers  into  the  edge  of  the  timber.  We  were  all  on  the 
left  of  the  Manassas  road  going  towards  Gainesville.  Their 
force  continued  to  come  down  all  day ;  in  fact,  until  one 
o'clock  at  night.  It  was  a  very  large  force,  and  they  were 
drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  as  they  came  down.  I  reported  at 
different  intervals  to  General  Morell,  my  immediate  com 
mander,  the  position  of  the  enemy.  But  at  one  time  I 
deemed  it  so  important  that  I  did  not  dare  to  trust  orderlies 
or  others  with  messages,  and  I  went  myself  up  to  him  to 
confer  concerning  the  enemy.  This  was  about  dusk.  Gen 
eral  Morell  told  me  that  he  had  just  received  orders  from 
General  Porter  to  attack  the  enemy,  to  commence  the  attack 
with  four  regiments.  .  .  About  the  same  time,  be 
fore  I  went  in  to  General  Morell,  I  could  hear  and  judge  of 
the  result  of  the  fighting  between  the  force  of  the  enemy  and 
General  Pope's  army.  I  could  see  General  Pope's  left  and 
the  enemy's  right  during  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  about 
two  miles  off,  perhaps  more,  diagonally  to  our  front  and  to 
the  right.  The  enemy  set  up  their  cheering,  and  appeared 
to  be  charging  and  driving  us,  so  that  not  a  man  of  my  com 
mand  but  what  was  certain  that  General  Pope's  army  was 
being  driven  from  the  field.  .  .  Afterward,  at  dark, 


I  14  APPENDIX. 

I  was  sent  for  by  General  Porter,  and  questioned  very  strin 
gently  with  reference  to  the  enemy,  and  my  remarks  to  him 
were  the  same  as  I  am  now  making,  and  as  I  made  to  Gen 
eral  Morell (The  witness  read  as  follows,  being 

No.  34  of  the  printed  statement  of  the  petitioner.) 

"GENERAL  MORELL:  The  enemy  must  be  in  much  larger 
force  than  I  can  see.  From  the  commands  of  the  officers,  I 
should  judge  a  brigade.  They  are  endeavoring  to  come  in  on 
our  left,  and  are  advancing.  Have  also  heard  the  noise  on  left 
as  the  movement  of  artillery.  Their  advance  is  quite  close. 
"  E.  G.  MARSHALL,  Colonel  Thirteenth  New  York." 

Q.  Was  that  written  before  or  after  you  crawled  out? 
A.  That  was  written  before,  upon  the  reports  received  from 

different  parts  of  my  skirmish  line After  this 

dispatch  was  gotten  off,  I  then  went  with  Major  Hyiand 
of  the  Thirteenth  New  York,  and  was  conducted  by  him  to 
a  certain  open  space  on  the  front  of  my  picket  line ;  from 
this  map  I  suppose  it  was  somewhere  in  this  vicinity  (north 
west  of  Randall's) ;  *  crawling  out  some  distance,  so  that  I 
could  look  beyond  this  point  of  timber  (if  it  is  correct  on  this 
map)  north-west,  in  this  direction,  perhaps  a  mile,  I  discov 
ered  a  force,  the  right  of  which  was  resting  on  a  timber  that 
jutted  on  our  front.  Major  Hyiand  had  been  there  preceding 
me,  and  stated  that  the  line  went  only  a  little  distance  be 
yond,  and  it  was  unsafe  to  go  further I  accepted 

his  statement,  and  concluded  it  was  best  to  return  to  head 
quarters,  and  report  the  state  of  affairs;  that  the  enemy  was 
drawn  up  in  line  of  battle,  in  full  view,  and  were  infantry, 
and  the  line  was  a  parallel  to  my  position  that  I  was  occupy- 


*  Randall's  house,  on  the  official  map,  was  a  short  distance  south  of 
Cole's.  A  mile  north-west  from  those  points  the  infantry  were  first 
seen  by  him,  west  of  Pageland  Lane. 


APPENDIX.  I  15 

ing  that  day.*  I  returned  to  my  head-quarters,  and  made 
another  more  positive  report.  .  .  This  force  I  speak  of 
on  the  left  was  developed  perhaps  about  three  o'clock.  It 
might  have  been  about  three  and  one  half  or  four  that  I 
went  out  there.  Between  three  and  four  o'clock  I  sent  the 
first  dispatch.  It  must  have  been  four  o'clock,  if  not  later, 
when  I  sent  my  second  dispatch. 

GENERAL  GEORGE   W.   MORELL,    Commanding  Division  in 

Porter'*  Corps.      Vol.  1  p.  141. 

When  the  head  of  my  division  had  crossed  the  railroad  at 
Manassas  I  was  halted,  and  in  a  short  time  received  orders 
to  go  to  Gainesville.  As  we  countermarched  to  go  there, 
my  division  was  thrown  in  front,  General  Sykes  having 
already  passed  on  towards  Centerville.  We  had  gone  up  the 
road  towards  Gainesville,  perhaps  about  three  miles,  when  I 
met  a  mounted  man  coming  toward  us.  I  stopped  him  and 
asked  him  the  road  to  Gainesville,  and  also  the  news  from 
the  front.  He  said  that  he  had  just  come  from  Gainesville, 
and  that  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were  then  there  to  the 
number  of  about  four  hundred,  and  the  main  body  was  not 
far  behind  them.  I  then  moved  on  up  the  road,  and  in  a 
short  time  our  own  skirmishers  reported  that  they  had  dis 
covered  the  enemy's  skirmishers  in  their  front.  The  column 
was  then  halted  by  General  Porter,  who  was  with  me.  After 
a  little  consultation  he  directed  the  batteries  to  be  posted  on 
the  crest  of  a  ridge  that  we  had  just  passed,  and  the  men  to 
be  placed  in  position.  Immediately  went  about  that  work. 
After  a  while  I  saw  General  McDowell  and  General  Porter 
riding  together.  They  passed  off  to  our  right  into  the  woods 
towards  the  railroad.  After  a  time  General  Porter  returned; 
and,  I  think,  alone,  and  gave  me  orders  to  move  my  com- 


*  Marshall's  line  was  south  of  Randall's  house. 


1  l6  APPENDIX. 

mand  to  the  right  over  the  railroad.  I  started  them,  and  got 
one  brigade,  and  I  think  one  battery  over  the  railroad,  pass 
ing  through  a  clearing  (a  corn  field),  and  had  got  to  the 
edge  of  the  woods  on  the  other  side  of  it,  when  I  received 
orders  to  return  to  my  former  position.  I  led  the  men  back, 
and  as  the  head  of  the  column  was  in  front  of  Hazlitt's  bat 
tery,  which  had  been  put  in  position,  we  received  a  shot 
from  the  enemy's  artillery  directly  in  front  of  us.  I  got  the 
infantry  back  of  the  batteries,  under  cover  of  the  bushes  and 
the  crest  of  the  ridge,  and  posted  Waterman's  battery  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Gainesville  road,  and  we  remained  in 
that  position  the  most  of  the  day A  little  be 
fore  sunset,  just  about  sunset,  I  received  an  order  in  pencil 
from  General  Porter  to  make  dispositions  to  attack  the 
enemy.  That  order  spoke  of  the  enemy  as  retiring.  I  knew 
that  could  not  be  the  case  from  the  reports  I  had  received, 
and  also  from  the  sounds  of  the  firing.  I  immediately  sent  back 
word  to  General  Porter  that  the  order  must  have  been  given 
under  a  misapprehension,  but  at  the  same  time  I  began  to 
make  dispositions  to  make  the  attack  in  case  it  was  to  be  made. 
Colonel  Locke  soon  after  came  to  me  with  an  order  from 
General  Porter  to  make  the  attack.  I  told  him  (and  I  think 
in  my  message  to  General  Porter  I  spoke  of  the  lateness  of 
the  day)  that  we  could  not  do  it  before  dark.  Before  I  got 
the  men  in  position  to  make  the  attack,  the  order  was  coun 
termanded,  and  I  was  directed  to  remain  where  I  was  dur 
ing  the  night.  General  Porter  himself  came  up  in  a  very 
few  minutes  afterwards,  and  remained  with  me  for  some  time. 
It  was  then  just  in  the  gray  of  evening  between  dusk  and 
dark.  .  .  .  Q.  About  what  hour  of  the  day  did  you 
first  hear  musketry  firing  in  force  and  volume?  A.  There 
were  a  few  shots  exchanged  between  our  pickets  and  those 
of  the  enemy  when  we  first  came  upon  that  ground,  and  a 


APPENDIX.  II/ 

few  scattering  shots  during  the  day.  With  that  exception  I 
did  not  hear  any  until  the  volleys  I  have  just  spoken  of.* 
.  .  .  I  am  satisfied,  upon  reflection,  that  the  order  of  the 
29th  to  attack  was  not  countermanded  prior  to  the  receipt 
of  the  order  to  pass  the  night  where  I  was.  I  construed  the 
order  to  pass  the  night  there  as  being  virtually  a  counter 
mand  of  the  order  to  attack.  I  was  making  dispositions  to 
pass  the  night  when  General  Porter  joined  me. 

Vol.  2,  p.  442 :  I  suppose,  from  the  nature  of  the  woods 
which  we  examined  that  morning,  that  we  could  not  get  in 
from  that  quarter.  Q.  Do  you  know  of  any  effort  to  go 
through  that  woods?  A.  Nothing  further  than  the  inspec 
tion  made  by  these  two  officers  that  morning.  |  Q.  Do  you 
know  any  thing  about  those  woods?  A.  I  don't  know  any 
thing  about  these  woods;  I  have  not  been  there  since.  The 
wood  was  thick,  but  I  did  not  know  any  thing  about  the 
country.  .  .  Q.  After  those  few  shots  in  the  morn 
ing  were  there  any  shots  fired  by  Hazlitt's  battery  during 
the  day?  A.  No,  sir;  nothing  to  fire  at  that  we  could  see. 
Q.  So  in  point  of  fact  there  was  nothing  going  on  where  you 
were  during  the  day  except  those  few  shots  in  the  morning? 
A.  That  was  all.  We  were  then  on  the  defensive,  as  I  sup 
posed  ;  not  ready  to  attack,  certainly.  Q.  On  page  350, 
dispatch  No.  28,  please  state  when  you  received  that  dis 
patch  on  the  29th  of  August?  A.  "  Push  over  to  the  aid  of 
Sigel?"  I  can  not  designate  the  hour.  Q.  What  efforts  did 
you  make  to  do  that?  A.  I  did  not  make  any  efforts.  I 
must  have  received  almost  immediately  afterward  the  order 
that  I  readjust  now,  to  hold  on. 


*  These  were  described  as  in  the  direction  of  tin  rest  of  Pope's 
command,  "  a  considerable  distance  on  our  right,"  and  "  just  at  the 
close  of  day." 

t  McDowell  and  Pqrter  when  they  rode  off  together  t<>  the  right. 


Il8  APPENDIX. 

GENERAL  S.  D.  STURGIS,  Commanding  Division,  Vol.  2,  pp. 

688-689. 

Q.  What  rank  and  command  did  you  hold  on  the  29th 
August,  1862?  A.  I  was  Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers.  I 
had  on  that  day  only  one  brigade  of  a  division,  the  principal 
part  of  which  was  back  at  Alexandria.  .  .  .  General 
Piatt's  brigade.  .  Q.  To  whom  were  you  ordered  to 

report?  A.  General  Porter — ordered  by  General  Porter  himself 
to  join  him ;  that  order  I  received  at  Warrenton  Junction. 
Q.  Where  did  you  find  General  Porter's  column  ?  A.  I 
found  it  on  the  road  leading  from  Manassas  Junction  in  the 
direction  of  Gainesville  ;  I  should  think  a  mile  and  a  half, 
about,  beyond  Bethlehem  church.  .  .  Q.  What  did 
you  do?  A.  I  reported  to  General  Porter.  1  rode  in  ad 
vance  of  my  brigade.  I  found  troops  occupying  the  road, 
and  I  got  up  as  near  as  I  could  get,  and  then  halted  my  com 
mand,  and  then  rode  forward  to  tell  General  Porter  that 
they  were  there.  He  said,  For  the  present  let  them  lie  there. 
Q.  What  did  you  then  do  individually  ?  A.  Well,  I  simply 
looked  about  to  see  what  I  could  see.  I  was  a  stranger  to 
the  lay  of  the  land  and  the  troops,  and  all  that ;  so,  without 
getting  off  my  horse,  I  rode  about  from  place  to  place  watch 
ing  the  skirmishers,  and  among  other  things  I  took  a  glass 
and  looked  in  the  direction  of  the  woods,  about  a  mile  be 
yond,  which  seemed  to  be  the  object  of  attention— beyond 
the  skirmishers.  There  I  saw  a  glint  of  light  on  a  gun,  and  I 
remarked  to  General  Porter  that  I  thought  they  were  prob 
ably  putting  a  battery  in  position  at  that  place,  for  I  thought 
I  had  seen  a  gun.  He  thought  I  was  mistaken 

about  it,  but  I  was  not  mistaken,  because  it  opened  in  a  mo 
ment  ;  at  least,  a  few  shots  were  fired  from  that  place ;  four, 
as  I  recollect.  Q.  What  force  of  the  enemy  did  you  see  in 
that  direction  at  that  time  ?  A.  I  did  n't  see  anv  of  the 


APPENDIX.  I  IQ 

enemy  at  all.  Q-  Then  what  did  you  do  ?  A.  Then,  when 
they  had  fired,  as  near  as  I  can  recollect,  about  four  shots 
from  this  piece,  General  Porter  beckoned  to  me ;  I  rode  up 
to  him  and  he  directed  me  to  take  my  command  to  Manassas 
Junction,  and  take  up  a  defensive  position,  inasmuch  as  the 
fire  seemed  to  be  receding  on  our  right.  Q.  What  firing  do 
you  mean?  A.  I  mean  the  cannonading  that  had  been  go 
ing  on  for  some  time  on  our  right,  probably  in  the  direction 
of  Groveton.  .  .  Q.  What  time  was  it  when  you 

received  that  order?  A.  I  have  no  way  of  fixing  the  time 
of  day.  I  have  carried  in  my  mind  the  impression  that  it 
was  more  about  the  middle  of  the  day — about  one  o'clock. 


8.  GENERAL  GARFIELO's  OPINION  IN  l88o. 
In  view  of  all  the  peculiar  circumstances,  and  of  his  rela 
tions  to  the  original  judgment  of  the  Court-martial,  it  can 
not  be  improper  to  have  on  permanent  record  the  evidence 
that  General  Garfield  saw  nothing  in  the  new  matter  before 
the  Advisory  Board  to  change  the  conclusions  he  had  delib 
erately  reached  in  1863. 

"  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,     ) 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  February  18,  1880.  f 

MY  DEAR  Cox — In  our  twenty-five  years  of  acquaintance 
and  friendship,  you  have  never  done  a  greater  service  to  the 
truth,  or  given  me  so  valuable  a  help,  as  in  your  letter  of  the 
14th  inst.,  which  I  have  just  received.  I  have  been  so  stung 
by  the  decision  of  the  Schofield  Board  that  it  is  very  hard  to 
trust  my  own  mind  to  speak  of  it  as  it  appeared  to  me.  I 
have  made  a  strong  effort  to  separate  myself  from  the  case, 
and  to  look  at  it  intellectually  as  though  it  related  only  to 
the  pieces  on  a  chess-board,  and  not  to  living  men,  or  men 
who  had  ever  lived;  and  all  my  best  efforts  have  brought  me 
out  precisely  to  the  conclusions  of  your  letter. 


I2O  APPENDIX. 

Still,  1  had  not  yet  made,  in  the  light  of  the  new  testi 
mony,  a  careful  strategic  study  of  the  field  and  map  as  you 
have  done.  'But  how  curious  it  is  that  what  you  say  now, 
with  the  new  maps  before  you,  is  the  exact  picture  of  the 
field,  and  Porter's  conduct  upon  it,  which  glowed  in  strong 
colors  in  my  mind,  and  the  mind  of  the  Court-martial,  sev 
enteen  years  ago. 

With  kindest  regards,  I  am,  as  ever,  yours, 

J.  A.  GAKFIELD." 


I  IN"  ID  IE  IX  . 


Archduke  Charles  of  Austria,  57. 
Army,  Lee's,  its  strength,  61. 
Array,  Pope's,  its  strength,  01. 
Banks,  Gen.  N.  P.,  33,  41,  76,  77. 
Butteries,  National : 

Benjamin's,  21,  96. 

Ilazlitt's,  83,  116,  117. 

Randol's,  63. 

Waterman's,  116. 
batteries,  Confederate: 

Pelham's,  91,  102. 
.   Stribling's,  88. 

( )f  Jackson's  corps,  103. 

Of  Longstreet's  corps,  87. 

Walton's  battalion,  87. 
Baylor,  Colonel,  91. 
Benjamin,  Capt.  Samuel  N.,  21,  22, 

24,  98;  testimony,  96. 
Bethlehem  Church,  15,  16,  57,  65, 

93,  94. 

Blackford,    Col.    W.   W.,    42;    testi 
mony,  110. 

Hoard,  Advisory,  its  members,  4. 
Broad  Run,  36. 
Bristow,  8,  9,  33,  36,  40,  41,  75,  87,  90, 

102,  104. 

Britt  farm,  108,  109,  111. 
Buck  Hill,  33. 
Buford,  Gen.  John,  20,  81. 
Buford,  Gen.  N.  B.,  3,  20. 
Bull  Run,  13,  17,  78,  79,  95. 
Burnsid o,  Gen.  Ambrose,  10,  13,  62, 
71,  7:i. 


jCarraco,    L.  B.,  43,  54,    105;    testi 
mony,  107. 
I  Casey,  Gen.  Silas,  3. 

Catharpin  Valley,  18,  36,  37. 

Centerville,  13,  41,  65,  75,  77,  78,  109. 

Cheesebrough,  Col.Wm.  H..  23, 85,86. 

Chilton,  Colonel  R.  II.,  93. 

Chinn  House,  33. 

Clary,  Col.  Robert  E.,  77. 

Cole  House,  Hampton,  20,  26,  27,  32, 
34,  45,  41,  42,  43,  45,  47,  54,  59,  60, 
69,  102,  106,  107,  109,  110,  111. 

Compte  de  Paris,  54. 

Compton  Lane,  34,  67,  108. 

Court  Martial  of  1862,  its  members, 
3,  50. 

Cundliffe  House,  2:"!,   19. 

Dawkins  Branch,  16,  27,  30,  50,  51, 
52,  53,  59. 

Douglass  House,  19,  21,  35,  36,  37,  39. 

Drayton,  Gen.  Thos.   P.,  47. 

Early,  Gen,  Jubal  A.,  official  re 
port,  91. 

Evans,  Gen.  N.  G.,  87,  88,  89. 

Ewell,  Gen.  R.  S.,  103. 

Five  Forks,  67,  69. 
j  Forno,  CoL  H.,  89,  92. 
I  Forrest,  Gen.  N.  B.,  56. 

Fox,  Capt.  George  B.,  22. 

Franklin,  battle  of,  56. 

Gainesville,  18,  19,  28,  33,  35,  40,  43, 
51,  52,  59,  7:>,  77,  85,  86,  92,  100, 
102,  101,  107,  111.  115,  US. 

(121) 


122 


INDEX. 


Garfield,  Gen.  James  A.,  his  rela 
tions  to  the  case,  1,  2;  member 
of  court  martial,  3,  5;  opinion, 

in  1880,  119. 
Getty,  Gen.  George  W.,  member  of 

advisory  board,  4. 
Gibbon,  Gen.  John,  22,  23,  20,  30. 
Gibbon  woods,  22,  23,  27,  37,  97. 
Grant,  Gen.  U.  S.,  4. 
Griffin,  Gen.  Charles,  57.  82,  83. 
Groveton,  4,  21,  34,  53,  04,  07,  90,  100,  I 

109. 
llairston,  Maj.  Samuel  H.,  40;  re-  j 

port,  93. 

Hayes,  Gen.  Rutherford  B.,  4. 
Hay  market,  18,  19,  24,  28,  38,  91,  102, 

104,  111. 

Hays,  Gen.  II.  S,,  89,  91. 
Heintzelman,  Gen.  Samuel  P.,  17, 

18,  21,  41,  61,  05,  75,  78;    report, 

85;  testimony,  95. 
Hill,  Gen.  A.  P.]  87;  official  report, 

89,  92. 

Hitchcock,  Gen.  E.  A.,  3. 
Hood,  Gen.  J.  B.,  19,   20,  42,  43,  46, 

50,  87,  88,  93,  107. 
Hooker,   Gen.  Joseph,  8,  9,  12,  70, 

85,  95. 

Hopewell  Gap.,  92. 
Hunter,  Gen.  David,  3. 
Hunton,  Col.  Eppa,  43,  88,  89,  110. 
Hyland,  Major  G.,  jr.,  114. 
Jackson,  Gen.  Thomas  J.,  12,  17,  19, 

22,  23,  24,  25,  20,    27,   36,    40,    58, 

59,  70.  72,  77,  87,  89,  102,  103 ;  his 

position,  37,  38,  41,  42. 
Jenkins,  Gen.  M.,  90. 
Jones,  Gen.  D.  R.,  47,  59,  87,  88,  90. 
Kearney,    Gen.    Philip,    17,   77,   85, 

95. 
Kemper,  Gen.  J.  L.,   47,  50,   59,   87, 

88,  90. 
King,  Gen.  Rufus,  3,  41,  52,  04,   68, 

80. 
Landstreet,  Chaplain  J.,  20,  33,  42; 

testimony,  105. 
Law,  Col.  K.  M.,  46. 


Law  ton,  Gen.  A.  R.,  92. 

Lee,  Gen.  Fitzhugh,  91. 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  3,  12,  19,  25, 
39,  39,  40,  48,  49,  60,  86,  105,  111 ; 
his  letter,  28;  his  position,  46; 
official  report,  80. 

Lewis-Leachman  House,  37,  49,  105, 
111. 

Locke,  Col.  F.  T.,  110. 

Longstreet,  Gen.  James,  met  by 
Stuart,  18,  19,  20;  time  of  his 
arrival,  20,  22-29,  48,  104,  100, 
107 ;  position  on  the  field,  30-39, 
43,  45,  104,  100,  112 ;  on  the  skir 
mish  line,  50;  statements  com 
pared,  48,  50;  official  report,  88; 
other  mention,  58,  59,  60,  69,  75, 
87,  89,  90,  91,  101. 

Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  30,  37,  67, 
87,  88,  93,  105,  107. 

Manassas  Junction,  39,  40,  51,  57, 
65,  67,  79,  70,  75,  80,  90,  102,  104, 
112,  118. 

Marshall,  Col.  E.  G.,  16,  44,  45,  67, 
71,  82,  84;  testimony,  112. 

Matthews  House,  17,  94,  103. 
!  McDowell,  Gen.  Irvin,  16,  33,  43,  46, 
58,    64,   65,    66,  67,  68,  09,  71,  73, 
75,    77,    78,    84,    115;    the   joint 
order,  52,  53,  78. 

McLean,  Col.  Nathaniel  CM  22,  24, 
86;  testimony,  98. 

Meade,  Gen.  George  G.,  22,  23,  39. 
61,  99. 

Meadowville  Lane.  110,  112. 

Monroe,  W.  T.,  42,  43;  testimony, 
108. 

Monroe  Hill,  20,  23,  26,  33,  34,  38,  39, 
45,  48,  59,  94,  108. 

Morell,  Gen.  George  W.,  15,  16,  32, 
33,  34,  51,  57,  63,  05,  07,  68,  69, 
81-85,  113;  testimony,  115 

Paga-land  Lane,  30,  38,  42,  45,  50, 
102,  104,  100,  10'.),  112. 

Patrick,  Major.  102. 

Poe,  (Sen.  Orlando  M.,  17,  18,  28,  61; 
testimony,  94. 


INDEX. 


123 


Pone,  Mount,  33. 
Pope,  Capt.  Douglass,  15,  62,  63. 
Pope,  Gen.  John,  commanding  at 
second  battle  Bull  Run,  4; 
animus  of  Porter  toward  Pope, 
7;  order  to  Porter,  August  27, 
8,  76;  headquarters  on  28th,  13; 
position  when  Jackson's  move 
ments  began.  39;  position  on 
August  29,  40;  his  forces,  61; 
order  of  4:30  P.  M..  62,  79;  order 
of  8:50  P.  M.,  79;  other  orders  to 
Porter,  76-79;  headquarters  on 
the  field,  65;  connection  with 
Porter's  headquarters,  70;  the 
fighting  with  Jackson,  89,  92, 
113;  other  mention,  39,  40,  62, 
65,  66. 

Porter,  Gen.  Fitz  John,  judgment 
of  court  martial.  1,  3;  corres 
pondence  with  Author,  2;  ac 
tion  of  advisory  board,  4,  7; 
march  from  Warrenton  Junc 
tion,  8-13,  76;  correspondence 
with  Burnside,  10,  11,  13,  73; 
correspondence  with  Confeder 
ates,  28;  his  position  at  Daw- 
kins  Branch,  31 ;  time  of  arriv 
ing  there,  52;  his  conduct  on 
August  29,  50;  joint  order  to 
Porter  and  McDowell,  52,  65,  78 ; 
Pope's  order  of  4:30  P.  M.,  62; 
dispatches  to  Morell,  82-85;  dis 
patches  to  McDowell,  64,  80; 
Pope's  orders  to,  76-79 ;  effect  of 
Rosser's  ruse,  90;  MoreLTs  testi 
mony  as  to  orders,  115;  direc 
tions  to  Gen.  Sturgis,  118. 

Prentiss,  Gen.  B.  M..  3. 

Randall,  Charles,  house,  45,  109, 114, 
115. 

Randol,  Lieut.  Alanson  M.,  63. 

Reno,  Gen.  Jesse  L.,  61,  75,  -.\  95. 

Reynolds.  Gen.  John  F.,  20,  24,  25, 
26,  27,  47,  54,  59,  <JO,  61,  68,  6'.), 
7':,  85,  96,  97.  98,  99 ;  official  re 
port,  86;  testimony,  i;,u. 


Ricketts,  Gen.  James  B.,  3,  19,  41, 
57,  78,  81,  85. 

Robertson,  Gen.  Beverley  H.,  18,  47, 
90,  91,  104. 

Rosser,  Col.  Thomas  L.,  20,  25,  26, 
42,  52,  55,  57,  90, 106 ;  testimony, 
101. 

Ruggles,  Col.  George  D.,  76-79. 

Salkehatchie  Swamps,  67. 

Schenck,  Gen.  Robert  C.,  20,  21,  24, 
26,  27,  34,  44,  47,  59,  60,  61,  97,  99; 
official  report,  85 ;  testimony,  97. 

Schofield,  Gen.  John  M.,  member 
of  advisory  board,  4,  10,  56. 

Shenandoah,  73. 

Sherman,  Gen.  William  T.,  10. 

Sigel,  Gen.  Franz.  21,  75,  77,  78,  80, 
85,  95,  96,  100,  117. 

Slough,  Gen.  J.  P.,  3. 

Smith,  Gen.  T.  C.  H.,  11. 

Stanley,  Gen.  David  S.,  56. 

Stevens,  Gen.  Isaac  I.,  96. 

Stony  Ridge,  103. 

Stuart,  Gen.  J.  E.  B. ;  near  Sudley 
at  Poe's  attack,  18,  29,  89,  91, 
101,  106;  going  to  meet  Long- 
street,  19,  28,  89,  102,  111;  gal 
lops  to  Monroe  Hill,  20,  90,  102, 
111;  same  hill  called  Stuart's, 
108;  orders  dust  to  be  raised, 
25,  90,  101,  106;  sends  word  to 
Jackson,  27,  102;  sends  word  to 
Lee  and  Longstreet,  87,  88;  his 
position  in  front  of  Porter,  33, 
42,  48,  69,  90,  102,  106;  time  he 
arrived  on  the  field,  49,  91,  102, 
103,  104 ;  his  official  report,  89, 
91. 

Stuart  Hill,  23,  34,  48,    3,  94,  108. 

Sturgis,  Gen.  Samuel  D.,  57;  testi 
mony,  118. 

Sudley  Church,  17,  29,  89,  90,  96, 
101,  105,  106. 

Sudley  Road,  16,  17,  51,  55,  57,  64, 
65,  70,  1U3. 

Sykes,  Gen.  George,  50,  57,  62.  63, 
81,  115. 


I24 


INDEX. 


Terry,  Gen.  Alfred   H.,  member  of 

advisory  board,  I. 
Thoroughfare   Gap,    18,    28,    39,   93, 

102,  111. 

Tower,  Gen.  Zealous  B.,  57. 
Tilmble,  Gen.  I.  R.,  92. 
Walton,  Col.  J.  B.,  87. 
Warren,  Gen.   G.  K.,   his  map,  30, 

35,  59 ;  testimony,  32,  34,  62,  G3 ; 

dispatch,  82. 

Warrenton,  37,  39,  40,  41,  93. 
Warrenton   Junction,   8,   73,  75,  76, 

93. 


Warrenton  Turnpike,  65,  78,  £>.  91, 
100,  101,  111. 

Warrenton  and  Washington  road, 
33,  34,  54,  59,  60. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  66. 

Wheeler,  W.  L.  B.,  testimony,  93. 

White,  Major  B.  S.,  26,  27,  29,  42; 
testimony,  101. 

Wilcox,  Gen.  Cadmus  M.,  19,  25,  28, 
42,  46,  49,  50,  87,  88 ;  official  re 
port,  92. 

Wilderness,  67. 

Young's  Branch,  34,  36,  37. 


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